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## Off-Case

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#### Anti-trust reform is based in free market logics of upholding competition which strengthens free enterprise and saves capitalism.

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Antitrust laws have historically been associated with countries that possess a free-market capitalist economy, which is understood as an economic system in which competition and the market forces of demand and supply determine economic outcomes. This historical association between capitalism and antitrust laws is evident from the fact that the countries that first adopted national antitrust laws, such as Canada, the United States, and the countries of Western Europe, are countries that have long embraced a market economy. On the contrary, the statist economies of the erstwhile Soviet bloc and many developing countries, for the most part, did not institute antitrust laws of the type associated with free market economies. Notwithstanding these country examples, which indicate a positive association between a capitalist economic system and antitrust laws, there exist arguments that both support and oppose antitrust laws for a capitalist economy. Arguments in support of antitrust laws for a capitalist economy begin with the fundamental understanding that the most important ingredient of a capitalist system is market competition. The presence of a competitive market is vital to achieving the efficiency levels that a capitalist economy seeks. Therefore, competitive forces need to be protected to discipline the market players, especially the dominant ones. By preventing and punishing anticompetitive practices by market players, an antitrust law protects and promotes market competition. 1 In the United States, which is commonly understood to be the leading bastion of free-market capitalism and one of the first countries to enact an antitrust law, the role of antitrust legislation in preserving the capitalist character of its economic system is underscored by the near-constitutional status accorded to its antitrust statues by the U.S. Supreme Court. 2 The Court described these statutes as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” and “as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”3 Such a sentiment is appropriate, given that the American antitrust law, the Sherman Act, was passed in 1890 to protect economic competition from rapidly-growing “trusts.”4 While the social and political zeitgeist has changed considerably since the passing of the Sherman Act, the fact remains that antitrust is perceived as key to “protecting consumers against anticompetitive conduct that raises prices, reduces output, and hinders innovation and economic growth.”5 Moreover, it is understood that “competition is a public good, and society cannot expect the victims of anticompetitive conduct to protect themselves.”6 The implication therefore is that government power, through the enforcement of antitrust statutes, is critical to reining in corporate power in order to protect economic competition and capitalism.

#### The new “cold war” battle for tech supremacy with China is a race manufactured to cover up US digital colonialism — only movements against capitalism can reign in US imperialism and prevent the aff’s impact

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A Chinese or US digital empire?

In the West, there is a lot of chatter about “a new Cold War,” with the US and China battling it out for global technological supremacy. Yet, a close look at the tech ecosystem shows that US corporations are overwhelmingly dominant in the global economy. China, after decades of high growth, generates around 17 percent of global GDP and is predicted to overtake the US by 2028, feeding into claims that American empire is on the decline (a narrative that was previously popular with the rise of Japan). When measuring the Chinese economy by purchasing power parity, it is already larger than the US. However, as economist Sean Starrs points out, this wrongly treats states as self-contained units, “interacting as billiard balls on a table.” In reality, Starrs contends, American economic dominance “hasn’t declined, it globalized.” This is particularly true when looking at Big Tech. In the post-WWII period, corporate production was spread across transnational production networks. For instance, in the 1990s, companies like Apple began outsourcing electronics manufacturing from the US to China and Taiwan, exploiting sweatshop workers employed by companies like Foxconn. US tech transnationals often design the IP for, say, high-performance router switches (e.g. Cisco) while outsourcing manufacturing capacity to hardware manufacturers in the South. Starrs profiled the world’s top 2,000 publicly traded companies, as ranked by Forbes Global 2000, and organized them according to 25 sectors, showing the dominance of US transnationals. As of 2013, they dominated in terms of profit shares in 18 of the top 25 sectors. In his forthcoming book American Power Globalized: Rethinking National Power in the Age of Globalization, Starrs shows that the US remains dominant. For IT Software & Services, US profit share is 76 percent versus China’s 10 percent; for Technology Hardware & Equipment, it is 63 percent for the US versus 6 percent for China, and for Electronics, it is 43 and 10 percent, respectively. Other countries, such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, often fare better than China in these categories as well. Portraying the US and China as equal contenders in the battle for global tech supremacy, as is often done, is therefore highly misleading. For example, a 2019 United Nations “Digital Economy” report states that: “Geography of the digital economy is highly concentrated in two countries” — the United States and China. But the report not only ignores factors identified by authors like Starrs it also fails to account for the fact that most of China’s tech industry is dominant inside China, save a handful of major products and services, such as 5G (Huawei), CCTV cameras (Hikvision, Dahua), and social media (TikTok), which also hold large market shares abroad. China also has substantial investments in some foreign tech firms, but this hardly suggests a genuine threat to the dominance of the US, which has a much larger share of foreign investments as well. In reality, the US is the supreme tech empire. Outside of US and Chinese borders, the US leads in the categories of search engines (Google); web browsers (Google Chrome, Apple Safari); smartphone and tablet operating systems (Google Android, Apple iOS); desktop and laptop operating systems (Microsoft Windows, macOS); office software (Microsoft Office, Google G Suite, Apple iWork); cloud infrastructure and services (Amazon, Microsoft, Google, IBM); social networking platforms (Facebook, Twitter); transportation (Uber, Lyft); business networking (Microsoft LinkedIn); streaming entertainment (Google YouTube, Netflix, Hulu), and online advertising (Google, Facebook) — among others. The upshot is, whether you are an individual or a business, if you are using a computer, American companies benefit the most. They own the digital ecosystem.

Political domination and the means of violence

The economic power of US tech giants goes hand-in-hand with their influence in the political and social spheres. As with other industries, there is a revolving door between tech executives and the US government, and tech corporations and business alliances spend a great deal lobbying regulators for policies favorable to their specific interests — and digital capitalism in general. Governments and law enforcement agencies, in turn, form partnerships with tech giants to do their dirty work. In 2013, Edward Snowden famously revealed that Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple all shared information with the National Security Agency via the PRISM program. More revelations followed, and the world learned that data stored by corporations and transmitted over the internet is sucked into enormous government databases for exploitation by states. Countries in the South have been targets of NSA surveillance, from the Middle East to Africa and Latin America. Police and the military also work with tech corporations, who are happy to cash fat checks as providers of surveillance products and services, including in countries across the South. For example, through its little-known Public Safety and Justice Division, Microsoft has built an extensive partnership ecosystem with “law enforcement” surveillance vendors, who run their tech on Microsoft cloud infrastructure. This includes a city-wide command-and-control surveillance platform called “Microsoft Aware” that was purchased by police in Brazil and Singapore and a police vehicle solution with facial recognition cameras that has been rolled out in Cape Town and Durban, South Africa. Microsoft is also deeply involved with the prison industry. It offers a variety of prison software solutions that cover the entire correctional pipeline, from juvenile “offenders” to pretrial and probation, through jail and prison, as well as those released from prison and put on parole. In Africa, they partnered with a company called Netopia Solutions, which offers aPrison Management Software (PMS) platform that includes “escape management” and prisoner analytics.0 While it is not clear where exactly Netopia’s Prison Management Solution is deployed, Microsoft stated that “Netopia is [a Microsoft partner/vendor] in Morocco with a deep focus on transforming digitally, government services in North and Central Africa.” Morocco has a track record of brutalizing dissidents and torturing prisoners, and the US recently recognized its annexation of Western Sahara, in contravention of international law. For centuries, imperial powers tested technologies to police and control their citizens on foreign populations first, from SirFrancis Galton’s pioneering work on fingerprinting applied in India and South Africa, to America’s combination of biometrics and innovations in managing statistics and data management that formed the first modern surveillance apparatus to pacify the Philippines. As historian Alfred McCoy has shown, the collection of surveillance technologies deployed in the Philippines offered a testing ground for a model which was eventually brought back to the United States for use against domestic dissidents. Microsoft and its partners’ high-tech surveillance projects suggest that Africans continue to serve as a laboratory for carceral experimentation.

Conclusion

Digital technology and information plays a central role in politics, economy, and social life everywhere. As part of the American empire project, US transnational corporations are reinventing colonialism in the South through their ownership and control of intellectual property, digital intelligence, and the means of computation. Most of the core infrastructure, industries, and functions performed by computers are the private property of American transnational corporations, who are overwhelmingly dominant outside US borders. The largest firms, such as Microsoft and Apple, dominate global supply chains as intellectual monopolies. An unequal exchange and division of labor ensues, reinforcing dependency in the periphery while perpetuating mass immiseration and global poverty. Instead of sharing knowledge, transferring technology, and providing the building blocks for shared global prosperity on equal terms, the rich countries and their corporations aim to protect their advantage and shake down the South for cheap labor and rent extraction. By monopolizing the core components of the digital ecosystem, pushing their tech in schools and skills training programs, and partnering with corporate and state elites in the South, Big Tech is capturing emerging markets. They will even profit from surveillance services provided to police departments and prisons, all to make a buck. Yet against the forces of concentrated power, there are always those who push back. Resistance to Big Tech in the South has a long history, dating back to the days of international protests against IBM, Hewlett Packard, and others doing business in apartheid South Africa. In the early 2000s, Global South countries embraced Free Software and the global commons as a means to resist digital colonialism for a while, even if many of those initiatives have since faded. In the last few years, new movements against digital colonialism are emerging. There is much more going in this picture. An ecological crisis created by capitalism is rapidly threatening to permanently destroy life on Earth, and solutions for the digital economy must intersect with environmental justice and broader struggles for equality. To stamp out digital colonialism, we need a different conceptual framework that challenge root causes and major actors, in connection with grassroots movements willing to confront capitalism and authoritarianism, American empire, and its intellectual supporters.

#### The United States is a revisionist power. Concerns of Chinese tech dominance are rooted in orientalist Sinophobia.

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Imagine a scenario where a senior American business executive is suddenly detained overseas, at the behest of the Chinese government, which accuses him or her of violating its national security. American and Western media would undoubtedly express outrage and have a field day bashing China. Yet when the equivalent happened last week with Canada’s detention of Huawei’s chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, on behalf of the United States, questions about the arrest’s legitimacy, or the presence of political motives behind it, were largely absent. This is not to argue that Meng is completely innocent of breaking American law. But it is important to note that the right to this extraterritorial behavior is asymmetric: only the United States is allowed to wield it “legitimately.” No other country, such as Malaysia, which is trying to recover 1MDB-related money from Goldman Sachs, can dare to act in this way. If other nations tired of U.S. judicial bullying – and there are many – start to retaliate by detaining Americans and citizens of its Western allies, things could become very messy, very quickly. But Meng’s arrest leads to a different question. Despite protests to the contrary, the United States made a choice to escalate tensions by taking this action. Why? Some have connected Meng’s arrest to the wider trade tensions between China and the United States. Huawei had already been accused by Western politicians of being a front for the Chinese government, and it has been denied access to Western markets. Given that technology is one of the few areas where the West is still clearly dominant, people have viewed this pressure as strategic economic leverage. But this misses a more fundamental cause for the worries about China, which now spread beyond trade and economics. Articles about China’s technology and surveillance, such as its “social credit system,” worry about a techno-dystopia, despite similar surveillance being done in Western countries (and by their own tech companies). The United States has expressed concern about the activities of university students from China, while Australian politicians have spent months debating “foreign influence” in their domestic politics: a rather poorly veiled reference to China. A good case study is Google’s cancelled re-entry into China with a Chinese-compliant version of Google search. This was met with controversy both by Western media and Google’s own employees. This is partly the company’s own fault, due to its loud and public withdrawal from China almost 10 years ago. But similar concessions by Google in smaller countries have not sparked such controversy; only China has. Interestingly, a Chinese version of Google might actually be of value to Chinese people, as local search engines like Baidu have been plagued with scandal, hoaxes, and frauds. But the fear that Western observers have about China means that this benefit could be denied them. One could argue that this is part and parcel of the usual geopolitical conflict between an incumbent power and a rising one, or that they are merely representations of how the economic relationship between China and the West continues to change. But the source of suspicion is deeper and often not spoken about. For a long time, “American exceptionalism” (and “Western exceptionalism” in general) has been based on the idea that the American or Western culture, way of life, and values are superior. One could perhaps see racial supremacist undertones in these beliefs as well. After all, these were the same sentiments that permeated the colonial era and were used to explain away or justify the shameful excesses of colonialism. It is clear that neither the United States nor Europe is mentally prepared for the prospect of another country, especially a non-Western one, being successful, let alone overtaking the West. This is particularly true for China: a country long viewed as backward but which has now succeeded while following its own political, economic, and cultural model. For the first time in two centuries a non-Western nation with a wholly different political system is challenging the West, and this is causing great anguish. “American exceptionalism” is threatened when a country with different values does well. We first saw this in the 1980s: anti-Japan sentiment was sparked when Japanese companies started to buy American cultural symbols. This worry was reflected in American popular culture, best shown in any depiction of an American future dominated by Japanese companies. But this sentiment was nowhere near the level we can see today regarding China. Even the most liberal of Western media outlets have found it near impossible to portray China in a balanced way, finding it difficult to remove their inherent comfort with deep-rooted Western ideas and framings, and to confront their own prejudices. The United States and the West by extension cannot accept China’s success on its own terms and this permeates almost all segments of society. This is one issue on which there is bipartisan support in the United States. The fear of China and the rest is real. They cannot just accept that China’s success says nothing about how Western countries should govern themselves. Instead, China’s model must be proven incorrect, by ignoring its successes in poverty reduction, education, and economic development and focusing on other issues. There are hard lessons and warnings for here for developing countries, especially large ones finding their rightful place in the community of nations. People assume that the rise of other large developing nations, such as India, Indonesia, or Nigeria, will not be as disruptive as China’s, perhaps due to the belief that they would “balance” China or would not threaten to disrupt the international order. But this betrays a Western need to oppose China at all costs. Other countries need to be aware that they might be next if they begin to demand a say in world affairs. A rising India could be next. If the roots of American-Chinese tensions come from something other than just geopolitics or economics, then the ascent of these large developing countries may not be as smooth as they hope. This would be due to the Western, U.S.-led opposition to the “rise of the others,” something the world has not seen in over two centuries. It is this that could well define and shape geopolitics in the 21st century. Denying that this sentiment exists and drives foreign policy would be to play into the hands of those who wish to preserve a Western world order at all costs. One question many Americans asked themselves in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks was “Why do they hate us?” One wonders if people in China are asking themselves the same thing. They may not like the answer they get back.

#### Innovation is the jewel in the crown of neoliberalism.

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Of course, in today’s understandings of technological, financial, and corporate strategy, it is not the model of benign innovation that is the object of fascination and advocacy. Instead, the models praised are ones that involve deliberate social, cultural, and material violence—often described as “destruction” or “disruption.” Far from respecting and building upon a tradition of tools and methods, the recommendation is to plunge ahead, discrediting, smashing up rapidly replacing what came before, usually with a narrow set of motives in mind—corporate profit and market capture. While the term innovation has long had a long history in European languages, it is possible to date its emergence as a key concept in thinking about technology policy to the middle twentieth century, especially in the writings of the Austrian thinker Joseph Schumpeter, who eventually taught economics at Harvard. Pondering the dynamics of modern capitalism and in particular the ways in which new industries replace old ones and new product’s replace functionally similar products of earlier times, Schumpeter proposed the notion of “creative destruction.” He wrote, “The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates.” Schumpeter emphasized the dynamics of a “process of industrial mutation … —that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism” (Joseph [1950](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-91134-2_8#CR12)). Although Schumpeter’s term seemed new and catchy at time, an entirely similar idea had been around for a long while. In 1848, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels observed that “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production. … All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned.”[4](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-91134-2_8#Fn4) In recent years, the idea that change involves deliberate attack redefined under the rubric, “Disruptive Innovation,” a theory and strategy widely promoted in business schools, Silicon Valley, and on Wall Street. Prominent spokesman for this tactic is Clayton Christensen of the Harvard Business School. Christensen’s method is to locate existing sources of value contained within existing fields of endeavor—communications, transportation, health care, hotels, education, etc., and fundamentally restructure them with a disruptive innovation of some kind or another. If one can crack open the existing social container of economic value and strongly reconfigure its flows and contents, recapitalize its terrain, then the rewards will come pouring out, captured as profits for some new business enterprise (Clayton [1997](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-91134-2_8#CR4)). Christensen’s conviction is that, in fact, such disruptions are inevitable given the continuing emergence of new forms of hardware and software that eventually and challenge and destroy the status quo in just about any form of organized social activity one can mention. Disruptive innovations occur when a new product or idea “transforms an existing market or sector by introducing simplicity, convenience, accessibility, and affordability where complication and high cost are the status quo.” Paradigmatic in his view was the replacement of the mainframe and min computers of earlier generations by the high powered “personal computers” of the 1980s and since. Christensen and his followers now apply this way of thinking in many areas of business and social life, including education. His book on that topic, Disrupting Class: How Disruptive Innovation Will Change the Way the World Learns, makes it clear that innovation in the schools must be aggressive and forceful. At the book’s conclusion he advises his readers: The tools of power and separation, though they seem foreign to leaders who have been schooled in consensus, are the key pieces of the puzzle of education reform. As you face budget crises and difficulty finding teachers, don’t solve the problems by doing less in the existing system. Solve it by facilitating disruption. (Clayton [2008](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-91134-2_8#CR6)) It’s interesting that he openly embraces the classic military and political strategy of divide and conquer. As a program of restructuring and possible improvement for long-standing institutions, their commitments, practices, and practitioners, Christensen’s worldview revises an old American maxim: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” That now becomes, “If it ain’t broke, by all means break it!” As if to turn the classic Hippocratic Oath for medical and professional ethics on its head, fashionable maxim seems to be: “First do some harm!”[5](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-91134-2_8#Fn5)

8.5 Jewel in the Crown

Today’s ideas of “innovation” inherit the optimistic aura of a god term noted earlier—the idea of “Progress,” a notion that long expressed the highest aspirations of modernity, hopes that looked to continuing expansion of scientific knowledge, embodied in technological advance, leading to inevitable improvement in nutrition, health, mobility, and other kinds of material well-being along with general improvement in social, moral, and political conditions. An early statement of this dream was offered by Rene Descartes in his Discourse on Method. “‘I perceived it to be possible to arrive at knowledge highly useful in life…to discover a practical, by means of which, knowing the force and action of fire, water, air the stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us, as distinctly as we know the various crafts of our artisans, we might also apply them in the same way to all the uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the lords and possessors of nature.”[6](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-91134-2_8#Fn6) While twenty-first century hopes for “innovation” echo beliefs of this kind, there some crucial differences. In everyday parlance “innovation” is usually regarded as a matter of limited application often geared to market-centered benefits. A product or idea is useful, accessible, flexible, visually appealing, and lower cost than the available alternatives. It helps a business or organization vanquish the competition and capture savings and profits. But a central feature of the classic idea of progress—that there is an inevitable, universal tendency toward improvement in living conditions for all of humanity—that is no longer part of the program. Indeed, in today’s fashions of thinking and talking, “innovation” is perhaps best seen the jewel in the crown of neoliberalism, the ruling ideology of our time, a pungent worldview that promotes economic liberalization, privatization, “free trade,” open markets, deregulation, privatization of formerly public institutions, and cuts in government spending (especially for social programs) in order to enhance the role of the private sector in the economy and society as a whole. From this standpoint, market-based approaches are generally thought to be superior because they foster a spirit of innovation by those who hope to profit from their success. The core belief is that the world will improve incrementally by the proliferation of clever innovations that succeed in the global marketplace. Hence, we can celebrate the renunciation of any widely shared project to realize the common good because improvement will be achieved in other ways. And we can welcome the destruction of institutional and material frameworks that previously sought to realize social, economic, and political well-being as a project within the public sphere. Now secured by the efforts of clever people in their private pursuits, an enhanced, often upgraded world pours steadily from the laboratories and corporations. This is how things get better! (Eagleton-Pierce [2016](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-91134-2_8#CR9)). The widely heralded features of “creative destruction” and “disruptive innovation” play a role in the episodes of “shock doctrine” described in the Naomi Klein’s analysis of the excesses of neoliberal policies around the globe (Klein [2006](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-91134-2_8#CR14)). Klein argues that when an earthquake, tsunami, war, revolution, coup d’etat, or financial crash upsets the existing order of things, often the event is seized upon as an opportunity for radical, right-wing, market-centered restructuring. In the several case histories she analyzes, one finds deliberate, well-planned programs of shock doctrine, almost always to the benefit of political oligarchs, autocrats, billionaires, and global firms. By the same token, policies of this kind are direct alternatives to egalitarian strategies that seek “the common good” within the societies affected. Policies of neoliberalism—outsourcing, privatization, anti-unionism, deregulation in banking and environmental protection, dismantling of public services, pressures to maintain low wages, the imposition of a mountain of debt on college students, and similar measures are now widely recognized to have contributed to the steady erosion of the incomes and life prospects for the middle class and working people in the U.S.A. Thus, glowing hopes for “innovation” are all that remains as more conventional doors to social betterment are slamming shut.

#### The 1AC paves the way for neoliberal governance --- their division of legitimate/illegitimate economic activity masks the structural violence of the market

Nieto 11, Professor @ University of Icesi (Diego Nieto, 2011, Professor, Universidad Icesi, “Neoliberalism, Biopolitics, and the Governance of Transnational Crime,” Colombia Internacional 76, julio a diciembre de 2012: 137-165, ava)

Finally, but not less important, there is much historical evidence in recent years to support the claim that the move toward an intelligence-led policing has also meant more extensive use of military hardware, personnel, and strategies for law enforcement tasks, as well as the rising status of policing issues in diplomacy and security discourses (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006, 15; Haggerty and Ericson 1997; 2000; Sheptycki 2000). As Beare argues, these blurring of the frontiers between national security and criminal intelligence cannot be separated from the connection established between criminal organizations, money-laundering activities, drug trafficking, and terrorism, especially after September 11 (Beare 2003, xvii). Techniques and strategies for waging war acquire great political prominence when crime is considered the main form of financing political violence and terrorism. Activities such as drug trafficking and money laundering link terrorism and organized crime, and thus bring together crime control strategies with military techniques to fight them. Atypical enterprises of war, such as those against drugs and terror, involve policing as much as conventional soldiering and strategies for waging war. Indeed, the paradoxical use of techniques of war in so many fields which were normally the competence of law enforcement authorities, and vice versa, has become even more explicit in the “age of terror.” This is the constitution of what I call the transnational police-law enforce-ment/military-security assemblage, which in many fields has displaced the military-diplomatic apparatus that used to regulate the relations between states and guarantee the establishment of the equilibrium and security of the international arena in modernity. This complex topic is difficult to tackle properly here. Suffice to say that it has drawn the attention of many authors working within Foucault’s framework; for instance, Michael Dillon and other commentators have interpreted this phenomenon as the assemblage between forms of actuarial and self-regulatory technologies with those of despotic rule and coercive sovereign power, that is, between the biopower of fostering and preserving life and the sovereign power to kill (cf. Dean 1999; Hindess 2000; Dillon and Neal 2008; Dillon 2009; Dillon and Reid 2009; Reid 2008). In the context of biopolitics, crime has a significant place to make sense of what is at stake in global governance. Crime discloses at least two very important dimensions: first, how the idea of a transnational governmentality is thought of through defining threats to the global society; and second, that power over subjects is exercised through various mechanisms derived from these “racist” discourses of criminal threats. Many of us have experienced these mechanisms of control exposed in the last part of the article, where the “fear” of terror and crime**—**typical biopolitical discourses**—**triggers forms of regulations and surveillance that go well beyond the fight against organized crime and terrorism itself. These mechanisms discipline subjects and control populations, devise policies targeting and classifying “dangerous” placesand people, and in the end divide the world between the “respectable” and the outlaw and reckless populations. This last point is critical, and the place of neoliberalism in thisdiscourse cannot be underestimated. Neoliberalism has a very specific definition of the ethos of the respectable individual, and therefore, of the valuable ways of enjoying freedom. For all neoliberalism’s defense of individual freedom, it is significant to see how, whereas entrepreneurs and millionaires are welcomed to enjoy the “benefits" of globalization (and accordingly policing mechanisms are designed), the vast majority of the population suffers all these controls and the severe consequences of diffuse wars such as those on drugs and terror. This is the great paradox of biopolitical power in neoliberal politics: to enhance individual freedom, neoliberalism must deploy many forms of power over subjects. As Foucault says about the interplay in liberalism between freedom and apparatuses of security: “The problems of what I shall call the economy of power peculiar to liberalism are internally sustained, as it were, by this interplay of freedom and security... the horsemen of the Apocalypse disappear and in their place everyday dangers appear, emerge, and spread everywhere... there is no liberalism without a culture of danger” (Foucault 2008, 65, 67). The neoliberal rationality of crime control epitomizes this paradox, illustrating how the homo economicus has become the grid and interface between the individual and the technologies of power designed for governing the population. In this way, thanks to this fundamental connection between the problems of the market and the problems of security and crime, a re-territorialization of forms of power takes place. The global assemblage for governing crime constitutes the extension of a political imagination of freedom to the production of subjects and populations through security apparatuses. My contention is that if we consider there is something questionable, normatively and in the practical consequences brought about by the mechanisms of policing and securitization developed over the last few decades (let alone the wars on drugs and terror), we cannot separate our criticism from a profound examination of the neoliberal rationality underlying them. This also demands we must re-imagine the interplay between freedom and security beyond neoliberalism.

#### Capitalism causes existential climate change, nuclear war, democratic collapse, extreme inequality, and perpetual exploitation of the global south — try or die for a transition.

Foster 19, Sociology Professor @ Oregon (John Bellamy, February 1st, “Capitalism Has Failed—What Next?” *The Monthly Review*, Volume 70, Issue 9, <https://monthlyreview.org/2019/02/01/capitalism-has-failed-what-next/>, Accessed 06-30-2021)

Less than two decades into the twenty-first century, it is evident that capitalism has failed as a social system. The world is mired in economic stagnation, financialization, and the most extreme inequality in human history, accompanied by mass unemployment and underemployment, precariousness, poverty, hunger, wasted output and lives, and what at this point can only be called a planetary ecological “death spiral.”1 The digital revolution, the greatest technological advance of our time, has rapidly mutated from a promise of free communication and liberated production into new means of surveillance, control, and displacement of the working population. The institutions of liberal democracy are at the point of collapse, while fascism, the rear guard of the capitalist system, is again on the march, along with patriarchy, racism, imperialism, and war. To say that capitalism is a failed system is not, of course, to suggest that its breakdown and disintegration is imminent.2 It does, however, mean that it has passed from being a historically necessary and creative system at its inception to being a historically unnecessary and destructive one in the present century. Today, more than ever, the world is faced with the epochal choice between “the revolutionary reconstitution of society at large and the common ruin of the contending classes.”3 Indications of this failure of capitalism are everywhere. Stagnation of investment punctuated by bubbles of financial expansion, which then inevitably burst, now characterizes the so-called free market.4 Soaring inequality in income and wealth has its counterpart in the declining material circumstances of a majority of the population. Real wages for most workers in the United States have barely budged in forty years despite steadily rising productivity.5 Work intensity has increased, while work and safety protections on the job have been systematically jettisoned. Unemployment data has become more and more meaningless due to a new institutionalized underemployment in the form of contract labor in the gig economy.6 Unions have been reduced to mere shadows of their former glory as capitalism has asserted totalitarian control over workplaces. With the demise of Soviet-type societies, social democracy in Europe has perished in the new atmosphere of “liberated capitalism.”7 The capture of the surplus value produced by overexploited populations in the poorest regions of the world, via the global labor arbitrage instituted by multinational corporations, is leading to an unprecedented amassing of financial wealth at the center of the world economy and relative poverty in the periphery.8 Around $21 trillion of offshore funds are currently lodged in tax havens on islands mostly in the Caribbean, constituting “the fortified refuge of Big Finance.”9 Technologically driven monopolies resulting from the global-communications revolution, together with the rise to dominance of Wall Street-based financial capital geared to speculative asset creation, have further contributed to the riches of today’s “1 percent.” Forty-two billionaires now enjoy as much wealth as half the world’s population, while the three richest men in the United States—Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffett—have more wealth than half the U.S. population.10 In every region of the world, inequality has increased sharply in recent decades.11 The gap in per capita income and wealth between the richest and poorest nations, which has been the dominant trend for centuries, is rapidly widening once again.12 More than 60 percent of the world’s employed population, some two billion people, now work in the impoverished informal sector, forming a massive global proletariat. The global reserve army of labor is some 70 percent larger than the active labor army of formally employed workers.13 Adequate health care, housing, education, and clean water and air are increasingly out of reach for large sections of the population, even in wealthy countries in North America and Europe, while transportation is becoming more difficult in the United States and many other countries due to irrationally high levels of dependency on the automobile and disinvestment in public transportation. Urban structures are more and more characterized by gentrification and segregation, with cities becoming the playthings of the well-to-do while marginalized populations are shunted aside. About half a million people, most of them children, are homeless on any given night in the United States.14 New York City is experiencing a major rat infestation, attributed to warming temperatures, mirroring trends around the world.15 In the United States and other high-income countries, life expectancy is in decline, with a remarkable resurgence of Victorian illnesses related to poverty and exploitation. In Britain, gout, scarlet fever, whooping cough, and even scurvy are now resurgent, along with tuberculosis. With inadequate enforcement of work health and safety regulations, black lung disease has returned with a vengeance in U.S. coal country.16 Overuse of antibiotics, particularly by capitalist agribusiness, is leading to an antibiotic-resistance crisis, with the dangerous growth of superbugs generating increasing numbers of deaths, which by mid–century could surpass annual cancer deaths, prompting the World Health Organization to declare a “global health emergency.”17 These dire conditions, arising from the workings of the system, are consistent with what Frederick Engels, in the Condition of the Working Class in England, called “social murder.”18 At the instigation of giant corporations, philanthrocapitalist foundations, and neoliberal governments, public education has been restructured around corporate-designed testing based on the implementation of robotic common-core standards. This is generating massive databases on the student population, much of which are now being surreptitiously marketed and sold.19 The corporatization and privatization of education is feeding the progressive subordination of children’s needs to the cash nexus of the commodity market. We are thus seeing a dramatic return of Thomas Gradgrind’s and Mr. M’Choakumchild’s crass utilitarian philosophy dramatized in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times: “Facts are alone wanted in life” and “You are never to fancy.”20 Having been reduced to intellectual dungeons, many of the poorest, most racially segregated schools in the United States are mere pipelines for prisons or the military.21 More than two million people in the United States are behind bars, a higher rate of incarceration than any other country in the world, constituting a new Jim Crow. The total population in prison is nearly equal to the number of people in Houston, Texas, the fourth largest U.S. city. African Americans and Latinos make up 56 percent of those incarcerated, while constituting only about 32 percent of the U.S. population. Nearly 50 percent of American adults, and a much higher percentage among African Americans and Native Americans, have an immediate family member who has spent or is currently spending time behind bars. Both black men and Native American men in the United States are nearly three times, Hispanic men nearly two times, more likely to die of police shootings than white men.22 Racial divides are now widening across the entire planet. Violence against women and the expropriation of their unpaid labor, as well as the higher level of exploitation of their paid labor, are integral to the way in which power is organized in capitalist society—and how it seeks to divide rather than unify the population. More than a third of women worldwide have experienced physical/sexual violence. Women’s bodies, in particular, are objectified, reified, and commodified as part of the normal workings of monopoly-capitalist marketing.23 The mass media-propaganda system, part of the larger corporate matrix, is now merging into a social media-based propaganda system that is more porous and seemingly anarchic, but more universal and more than ever favoring money and power. Utilizing modern marketing and surveillance techniques, which now dominate all digital interactions, vested interests are able to tailor their messages, largely unchecked, to individuals and their social networks, creating concerns about “fake news” on all sides.24 Numerous business entities promising technological manipulation of voters in countries across the world have now surfaced, auctioning off their services to the highest bidders.25 The elimination of net neutrality in the United States means further concentration, centralization, and control over the entire Internet by monopolistic service providers. Elections are increasingly prey to unregulated “dark money” emanating from the coffers of corporations and the billionaire class. Although presenting itself as the world’s leading democracy, the United States, as Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy stated in Monopoly Capital in 1966, “is democratic in form and plutocratic in content.”26 In the Trump administration, following a long-established tradition, 72 percent of those appointed to the cabinet have come from the higher corporate echelons, while others have been drawn from the military.27 War, engineered by the United States and other major powers at the apex of the system, has become perpetual in strategic oil regions such as the Middle East, and threatens to escalate into a global thermonuclear exchange. During the Obama administration, the United States was engaged in wars/bombings in seven different countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan.28 Torture and assassinations have been reinstituted by Washington as acceptable instruments of war against those now innumerable individuals, group networks, and whole societies that are branded as terrorist. A new Cold War and nuclear arms race is in the making between the United States and Russia, while Washington is seeking to place road blocks to the continued rise of China. The Trump administration has created a new space force as a separate branch of the military in an attempt to ensure U.S. dominance in the militarization of space. Sounding the alarm on the increasing dangers of a nuclear war and of climate destabilization, the distinguished Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved its doomsday clock in 2018 to two minutes to midnight, the closest since 1953, when it marked the advent of thermonuclear weapons.29 Increasingly severe economic sanctions are being imposed by the United States on countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua, despite their democratic elections—or because of them. Trade and currency wars are being actively promoted by core states, while racist barriers against immigration continue to be erected in Europe and the United States as some 60 million refugees and internally displaced peoples flee devastated environments. Migrant populations worldwide have risen to 250 million, with those residing in high-income countries constituting more than 14 percent of the populations of those countries, up from less than 10 percent in 2000. Meanwhile, ruling circles and wealthy countries seek to wall off islands of power and privilege from the mass of humanity, who are to be left to their fate.30 More than three-quarters of a billion people, over 10 percent of the world population, are chronically malnourished.31 Food stress in the United States keeps climbing, leading to the rapid growth of cheap dollar stores selling poor quality and toxic food. Around forty million Americans, representing one out of eight households, including nearly thirteen million children, are food insecure.32 Subsistence farmers are being pushed off their lands by agribusiness, private capital, and sovereign wealth funds in a global depeasantization process that constitutes the greatest movement of people in history.33 Urban overcrowding and poverty across much of the globe is so severe that one can now reasonably refer to a “planet of slums.”34 Meanwhile, the world housing market is estimated to be worth up to $163 trillion (as compared to the value of gold mined over all recorded history, estimated at $7.5 trillion).35 The Anthropocene epoch, first ushered in by the Great Acceleration of the world economy immediately after the Second World War, has generated enormous rifts in planetary boundaries, extending from climate change to ocean acidification, to the sixth extinction, to disruption of the global nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, to the loss of freshwater, to the disappearance of forests, to widespread toxic-chemical and radioactive pollution.36 It is now estimated that 60 percent of the world’s wildlife vertebrate population (including mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds, and fish) have been wiped out since 1970, while the worldwide abundance of invertebrates has declined by 45 percent in recent decades.37 What climatologist James Hansen calls the “species exterminations” resulting from accelerating climate change and rapidly shifting climate zones are only compounding this general process of biodiversity loss. Biologists expect that half of all species will be facing extinction by the end of the century.38 If present climate-change trends continue, the “global carbon budget” associated with a 2°C increase in average global temperature will be broken in sixteen years (while a 1.5°C increase in global average temperature—staying beneath which is the key to long-term stabilization of the climate—will be reached in a decade). Earth System scientists warn that the world is now perilously close to a Hothouse Earth, in which catastrophic climate change will be locked in and irreversible.39 The ecological, social, and economic costs to humanity of continuing to increase carbon emissions by 2.0 percent a year as in recent decades (rising in 2018 by 2.7 percent—3.4 percent in the United States), and failing to meet the minimal 3.0 percent annual reductions in emissions currently needed to avoid a catastrophic destabilization of the earth’s energy balance, are simply incalculable.40 Nevertheless, major energy corporations continue to lie about climate change, promoting and bankrolling climate denialism—while admitting the truth in their internal documents. These corporations are working to accelerate the extraction and production of fossil fuels, including the dirtiest, most greenhouse gas-generating varieties, reaping enormous profits in the process. The melting of the Arctic ice from global warming is seen by capital as a new El Dorado, opening up massive additional oil and gas reserves to be exploited without regard to the consequences for the earth’s climate. In response to scientific reports on climate change, Exxon Mobil declared that it intends to extract and sell all of the fossil-fuel reserves at its disposal.41 Energy corporations continue to intervene in climate negotiations to ensure that any agreements to limit carbon emissions are defanged. Capitalist countries across the board are putting the accumulation of wealth for a few above combatting climate destabilization, threatening the very future of humanity.

#### Racial capitalism outweighs — Capitalism necessitates super-exploitation of the Global South, colonial dispossession, militaristic imperialism, and racial hierarchies to sustain itself. The system must be rejected on ethical grounds.

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Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization.

Footnote 14: Another feature of modern U.S. racial capitalism is property by dispossession. In Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory, Robert Nichols draws on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand to theorize how the “system of landed property” was fundamentally predicated on violent dispossession. While the Anglo-derived legal-political regimes differed in these localities, the “intertwined and co-constitutive” material effects converged in the legalized theft of indigenous territory amounting in “approximately 6 percent of the total land on the surface of Earth.” Such dispossession, Nichols notes, is recursive: “In a standard formulation one would assume that ‘property’ is logically, chronologically, and normatively prior to ‘theft.’ However, in this (colonial) context, theft is the mechanism and means by which property is generated: hence its recursivity. Recursive dispossession is effectively a form of property-generating theft.” As such, theft and dispossession, through property regimes, are an ongoing feature of the Indigenous reality of modern U.S. racial capitalism. Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 50–51.

Footnote 15: Borrowing from Karl Marx’s dictum that the labor process is the hidden abode of the capitalist production of value, and Nancy Fraser’s conceptualization of reproduction as the even more hidden abode, or background condition, for the possibility of capitalist production, I understand Blackness as the obfuscated abode. The immense value of Blackness is obscured and rendered unintelligible by its positioning as worthlessness, as something that does not amount to anything—but that does not equal nothing. As a structural location at the intersection of indispensability and disposability, Blackness exceeds the category of race, is not reducible to class, and does not fit the specifications of caste.

My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership.17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus:

By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19

Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21

Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24

Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism.

Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”29

Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism.

The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33

Although Robinson draws on scholars like Fernand Braudel, Henri Pirenne, David Brion Davis, and Eli Heckscher to understand European history, socialist theory, and the European working class, the work of Black Marxists like James Ford, Walter Rodney, Amílcar Cabral, and Paul Robeson offer me those same intellectual, historical, and theoretical resources. Finally, I agree with Alexander that the resolution to racial capitalism is antiracist socialism, not a cultural-metaphysical Black radical tradition.

In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism.

War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff and critically interrogate the neoliberal discourse of the 1AC — resisting capitalist pedagogy in educational spaces is the first step towards a broader movement away from Capitalism; COVID provides a unique transition opportunity.

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As educators, it is crucial for us to examine how we talk, teach, and write about inequality as an object of critique in an age of precarity, uncertainty and the current pandemic crisis. This is especially true at a time when a growing number of authoritarian regimes around the globe substitute replace thoughtful dialogue and critical engagement with the suppression of dissent and a culture of forgetting r. How do we situate our analysis of education as part of a broader discourse and mode of analysis that interrogates the promises, ideals, and claims of a substantive democracy? How do we fight against iniquitous relations of power and wealth that empty power of its emancipatory possibilities, and as Hannah Arendt has argued, “makes most people superfluous as human beings”? How might we understand how neoliberal ideology, with its appropriation of market-based values, regressive notions of freedom and agency, uses language to infiltrate daily life? How does a pandemic pedagogy in the service of neoliberalism produce identities defined by market values, and normalize a notion of responsibility and individuality that convinces people that whatever problem they face they have no one to blame but themselves? Repeated endlessly on right-wing media platforms, the underlying conditions that disproportionately produce chronic illness among poor people of color disappear among a public distracted, if not persuaded, by a pandemic pedagogy that celebrates unchecked self-interest, disdains social responsibility, and turns away from the reality of a society with deep-seated institutional rot and unravelling of social connections and the social contract. Pandemic pedagogy thrives on inequality and becomes a militarized and heartless normalizing tool to convince the broader public that the lives of the elderly, sick, and vulnerable should be valued according to how much they contribute to the economy. And if they are willing to die in order not to be a drain on the economy, all well and good. Nothing escapes the cruel logic of neoliberalism with its arrogance and hubris on full display as it bathes in the glow of right-wing populism, ultra-nationalism, and neofascism. Its accoutrements of dictatorship are everywhere and can be seen in the swagger of militia that storm state capitals, in police who punch and pepper spray protesters and push elderly men to the ground, and in military forces on the streets without badges reinforcing a climate of fear, repression, and unaccountability. There is more at work here than a lack of humanity on the part of the Trump administration. As the Irish journalist Fintan O’Toole observes, there is also the deepening grip of a culture of cruelty and dehumanization. He writes: “As a society the American people are being habituated into accepting cruelty on a wide scale. Americans are being taught by Trump and his administration not to see other people as human beings whose lives are as important as their own. Once that line has been crossed – and it is not just Trump and the people around him, but many of Trump’s supporters as well – then we know where that all leads, what the ultimate destination is. There is no mystery about it. We know what happens when a government and its leaders dehumanize large numbers of people.”

Depoliticization and the Authoritarian Turn

Neoliberalism is not only an economic system, it is also an ideological apparatus that relentlessly attempts to structure consciousness, values, desires, and modes of identification in ways that align individuals with its governing structures. Central to this pedagogical project is the attempt to prevent individuals from translating private issues and troubles into broader systemic considerations. By doing this, it becomes difficult for individuals to grasp the historical, social, economic, and political forces at work in shaping a social order as a human activity deeply immersed in specific relations of power. Neoliberalism’s attempt to erase or rewrite historical and social forces makes it difficult for individuals to imagine alternative notions of society, with themselves as collective actors, or view their problems as more than the limitations of faulty character, moral failure, or a problem of personal responsibility. Reducing individuals to isolated, discrete, hermetically-sealed human beings whose lives are shaped only by notions of self-reliance and self-sufficiency is a pedagogical strategy that utterly depoliticizes people, leading them to believe that however a society is shaped, it is part of a natural order. President Trump echoed this “no alternative” narrative when asked about celebrities and rich people having special access to being tested for the coronavirus while few others had access. He replied, “Perhaps that’s been the story of life.” This individualization of the social with its mounting privatization, gated communities, and social atomization undermines collective action, any viable notion of solidarity, and weakens the notion of global connectivity. The philosopher Byung-Chul Han has rightly argued that contemporary neoliberal society is shaped by a dysfunctional notion of solitude and hermitically-sealed notions of agency, all of which undermine the values and social connections vital to a democracy. He writes: “Those subject to the neoliberal economy do not constitute a we that is capable of collective action. The mounting egoization and atomization of society is making the space for collective action shrink… The general collapse of the collective and the communal has engulfed it. Solidarity is vanishing. Privatization now reaches into the depths of the soul itself. The erosion of the communal is making all collective efforts more and more unlikely.” This panoptical nature of hyper-individualism is more aligned with shared fears than shared responsibilities. Under such circumstances, trust and the notion that all life is related become difficult to grasp as the myopic language of private self-interest inures individuals to wider social problems such as extreme inequality. There is no understanding in this discourse of the damage fanatical entrepreneurialism does to our embodied collectivity. Nor is there any value attributed to the important responsibilities, social values, and notion of the common good that exceeds who we are as individuals, or how we have been shaped by diverse social forces in particular ways. It should be clear that questions of economic and social justice cannot be addressed by a neoliberal pedagogy that enshrines self-interest and privatization while converting every social problem into individualized market solutions or regressive matters of personal responsibility. Under neoliberalism’s disimagination machine, individual responsibility is coupled with an ethos of greed, avarice, and personal gain. One consequence is the tearing up of social solidarities, public values, and an almost pathological disdain for democracy. This radical form of privatization is also a powerful force for the rise of fascist politics because it depoliticizes individuals, immerses them in the logic of social Darwinism, and makes them susceptible to the dehumanization of those considered a threat or disposable. Just as the spread of the pandemic virus in the United States was not an innocent act of nature, neither is the rise and pervasive grip of inequality. What is clear is that neoliberal support for unbridled individualism has weakened democratic pressures and eroded democracy and equality as governing principles. Moreover, as a mode of public pedagogy, it has undercut social provisions, the social contract, and support for public goods such as education, public health, essential infrastructure, public transportation, and the most basic elements of the welfare state. As a form of pedagogical practice, neoliberalism has morphed into a form of pandemic pedagogy that sacrifices social needs and human life in the name of an economic rationality that values reviving economic growth over human rights. As a lived system of meaning and values, self-reliance and rugged individualism are the only categories available for shaping how individuals view themselves, and their relationship to others and to the planet. The individualization of everyone and the reduction of social problems to private troubles is paralleled by sanctioning a world marked by borders, walls, racism, hate, and a rejection of government intervention in the interest of the common good. Most importantly, neoliberal individualization personalizes power, creating a depoliticized subject whose only obligation as a citizen is defined by consuming and living in a world free from ethical and social responsibilities. In many ways, it does not just empty politics of any substance, it destroys its emancipatory prospects. The neoliberal strategists use education not only to mask their abuses and the effects of their criminogenic policies, they also – in a time of crisis, when dissatisfaction of the masses might lead to chaos, revolts, and dangerous levels of resistance – move dangerously close to creating the conditions for a fascist politics. The noted theologian Frei Betto is right in stating that under such conditions, “…they cover up the causes of social ills and cover up their effects with ideologies that, by obscuring causes, fuel mood in the face of the effects. That’s why neoliberalism is now showing its authoritarian face – building walls that divide countries and ethnic groups, executive power over legislature and judiciary, disinformation about digital networks, the cult of the homeland, the brazen offensive against human rights.” Neoliberalism and its regressive notion of individualism and individual responsibility has undermined the belief that human beings both make the world and can change it. The pandemic has ushered in a crisis that undermines that belief and opens the door for rethinking what kind of society and notion of politics will be faithful to the creation of a socialist democracy that speaks to the core values of justice, equality and solidarity. Under such circumstances, private resistance must give way to collective resistance, and personal and political rights must include economic rights. If inequality is to be defeated, the social state must replace the corporate state and social rights must be guaranteed for all. There can be no adequate struggle for economic justice and social equality unless economic inequality on a global level is addressed along with a movement for climate justice, the elimination of systemic racism and a halt to the spiraling militarism that has resulted in endless wars. This can only take place if the anti-democratic ideology of neoliberalism, with its collapse of the public into the private and its institutional structures of domination, are fully addressed and discredited. Étienne Balibar is right in stating that the triumph of neoliberalism has resulted in the “death zones of humanity.” Following Balibar, what must be made clear is that neoliberal capitalism is itself a pandemic and a dangerous harbinger of an updated fascist politics.

Overcoming Pandemic Pedagogy

The kind of societies that will emerge after the pandemic is up for grabs. In some cases, the crisis will give way to authoritarian regimes such as Chile, Hungary and Turkey, all of which have used the urgency of COVID-19 as an excuse to impose more state control and surveillance, squelch dissent, eliminate civil liberties and concentrate power in the hands of an authoritarian political class. As is well documented, history in a time of crisis also has the potential to change dominant ideologies, rethink the meaning of governance, and enlarge the sphere of justice and equality through a vision that fights for a more generous and inclusive politics. It is crucial to rethink the project of politics in order to imagine forms of resistance that are collective, inclusive and global, capable of producing new democratic arrangements for social life, more radical values and a “global economy which will no longer be at the mercy of market mechanisms.” This is a politics that must move beyond siloed identities and fractured political factions in order to build transnational solidarities in the service of an alternative radically democratic society. Making the pedagogical more political means challenging those forms of pandemic pedagogy that turn politics into theater, a favorite tactic of Trump. In this case, the performance works to suspend disbelief, hold power accountable and unravel one’s sense of critical agency. Pandemic pedagogy does more than undermine critical thinking and informed judgments, it dissolves the line between the truth and lies, fantasy and reality, and in doing so, destroys the foundation for understanding, engaging and promoting that social and economic justice. The endgame under the rubric of a pandemic pedagogy is not simply the destruction of the truth, but the elimination of democracy itself. Central to developing an alternative democratic vision is development of a language that refuses to look away and be commodified. Such a language should be able to break through the continuity and consensus of common sense and appeals to the natural order of things. At stake here is the need to reclaim both critical and redemptive elements of a radical democracy in order to address the full spectrum of violence that structures institutions and everyday life in the United States. This is a language connected to the acquisition of civic literacy, and it demands a different regime of desires and identifications to enable us to move from “shock and stunned silence toward a coherent visceral speech, one as strong as the force that is charging at us.” Of course, there is more at stake here than a struggle over meaning; there is also the struggle over power, over the need to create a formative culture that will produce informed critical agents who will fight for and contribute to a broad social movement that will translate meaning into a fierce struggle for economic, political and social justice. Agency in this sense must be connected to a notion of possibility and education in the service of radical change. Reimagining the future only becomes meaningful when it is rooted in a fierce struggle against the horrors and totalitarian practices of a pandemic pedagogy that falsely claims that it exists outside of history. Václav Havel, the late Czech political dissident-turned-politician, once argued that politics follows culture, by which he meant that changing consciousness is the first step toward building mass movements of resistance. What is crucial here in the age of multiple crises is a thorough grasp of the notion that critical and engaged forms of agency are a product of emancipatory education. Moreover, at the heart of any viable notion of politics is the recognition that politics begins with attempts to change the way people think, act and feel with respect to both how they view themselves and their relations to others. There is more to agency than the neoliberal emphasis on the “empire of the self,” with its unchecked belief in the virtues of a form of self-interest that despises the bonds of sociality, solidarity and community. The U.S. is in the midst of a political and pedagogical crisis. This is a crisis defined not only by a brutalizing racism and massive inequality, but also a constitutional crisis produced by a growing authoritarianism that has been in the making for some time. The recent attacks by the police on journalists, peaceful protesters and even elderly people marching for racial justice echoes the violence of the Brownshirts in the 1930s. Let’s stop the futile debate about whether or not the U.S. is in the midst of a fascist state and shift the register to the more serious question of how to resist it and restore a semblance of real democracy. Under such circumstances, education should be viewed as central to politics, and it plays a crucial role in producing informed judgments, actions, morality and social responsibility at the forefront not only of agency, but politics itself. In this scenario, truth and politics mutually inform each other to erupt in a pedagogical awakening at the moment when the rules are broken. Taking risks becomes a necessity, self-reflection narrates its capacity for critically engaged agency and thinking the impossible is not an option, but a necessity. Without an informed and educated citizenry, democracy can lead to tyranny, even fascism. Trump represents the malignant presence of a fascism that never dies and is ready to remerge at different times in different context in sometimes not-so-recognizable forms. The COVID-19 crisis and the pandemic of inequality and racism have revealed elements of a fascist politics that are more than abstractions. The struggle against a fascist politics is now visible in the rebellions taking place across the United States. While there are no political guarantees for a victory, there is a new sense that the future can be changed in the image of a just and sustainable society. There is a new energy for reform taking place in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd. Massive protests for racial, economic and social justice are emerging all over the globe. As I have argued in The Terror of the Unforeseen, at stake here is the need for these protests to transition from a pedagogical moment and collective outburst of moral anger to a progressive international movement that is well organized and unified. Such a movement must build solidarity among different groups, imagine new forms of social life, make the impossible possible, and produce a revolutionary project in defense of equality, social justice and popular sovereignty. The racial, class, ecological and public health crisis facing the globe can only be understood as part of a comprehensive crisis of the totality. Immediate solutions such as defunding the police and improving community services are important, but they do not deal with the larger issue of eliminating a neoliberal system structured in massive racial and economic inequalities. David Harvey is right in arguing that the “immediate task is nothing more nor less than the self-conscious construction of a new political framework for approaching the question of inequality, through a deep and profound critique of our economic and social system.” This is a crisis in which different threads of oppression must be understood as part of the general crisis of capitalism. The various protests now evolving internationally at the popular level offer the promise of new global anti-fascist and anti-capitalist movements. In the current moment, democracy may be under a severe threat and appear frighteningly vulnerable, but with young people and others rising up across the globe — inspired, energized and marching in the streets — the future of a radical democracy is waiting to breathe again.

#### They prefigured the discussion on neoliberal terms

Robert Knox 12, London School of Economics and Political Science PhD candidate, paper presented at the Fourth Annual Conference of the Toronto Group for the Study of International, Transnational and Comparative Law and the Towards a Radical International Law workshop, “Strategy and Tactics” Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Volume 21, 2010

This warning is of great relevance to the type of ‘strategic’ interventions advocated by the authors. There are **serious perils** involved in making any intervention in liberal-legalist terms for critical scholars. the first is that – as per their own analysis – liberal legalism is not a neutral ground, but one which is likely to favour certain claims and positions. Consequently, it will be incredibly difficult to win the argument. Moreover, even if the argument is won, the victory is likely to be a very particular one – inasmuch as it will foreclose any wider consideration of the structural or systemic causes of any particular ‘violation’ of the law. All of these issues are to some degree considered by the authors.44 However, given the way in which ‘strategy’ is understood, the effects of these issues are generally confined to the immediate, conjunctural context. As such, the emphasis was placed upon the way that the language of liberal legalism blocked effective action and criticism of the war.45 Much less consideration is placed on the way in which advancing such argument impacts upon the long term effectiveness of achieving the strategic goals outlined above. Here, the problems become even more widespread. **Choosing to couch the intervention in liberal legal** terms ultimately reinforces the structure of liberal legalism, rendering it more difficult to transcend these arguments.46 In the best case scenario that such an intervention is victorious, this victory would precisely seem to underscore the liberal position on international law. Given that international law is in fact bound up with processes of exploitation and domination on a global scale, such a victory contributes to the legitimation of this system, making it very difficult to argue against its logic. this process takes place in three ways. Firstly, by intervening in the debate on its own terms, critical scholars reinforce those very terms, as their political goals are incorporated into it.47 It can then be argued the law is in fact neutral, because it is able to encompass such a wide variety of viewpoints. Secondly, in discarding their critical tools in order to make a public intervention, these scholars abandon their structural critique at the very moment when they should hold to it most strongly. that is to say, that at the point where there is actually a space to publicise their position, they choose instead to cleave to liberal legalism. thus, even if, in the ‘purely academic’ context, they continue to adhere to a ‘critical’ position, in public political terms, they advocate liberal legalism. Finally, from a purely ‘personal’ standpoint, in advocating such a position, they undercut their ability to articulate a critique in the future, precisely because they will be contradicting a position that they have already taken. the second point becomes increasingly problematic absent a guide for when it is that liberal legalism should be used and when it should not. Although the ‘embrace’ of liberal legalism is always described as ‘temporary’ or ‘strategic’, there is actually very little discussion about the specific conditions in which it is prudent to adopt the language of liberal legalism. It is simply noted at various points that this will be determined by the ‘context’.48 As is often the case, the term ‘context’ is invoked49 without specifying precisely which contexts are those that would necessitate intervening in liberal legal terms. Traditionally, such a context would be provided by a strategic understanding. that is to say, that the specific tactics to be undertaken in a given conjunctural engagement would be understood by reference to the larger structural aim. But here, there are simply no considerations of this. It seems likely therefore, that again context is understood in purely tactical terms. Martti Koskenniemi can be seen as representative in this respect, when he argued: What works as a professional argument depends on the circumstances. I like to think of the choice lawyers are faced with as being not one of method (in the sense of external, determinate guidelines about legal certainty) but of language or, perhaps better, of style. the various styles – including the styles of ‘academic theory’ and ‘professional practice’ – are neither derived from nor stand in determinate hierarchical relationships to each other. the final arbiter of what works is nothing other than the context (academic or professional) in which one argues.50 On this reading, the ‘context’ in which prudence operates seems to the immediate circumstances in which an intervention takes place. this would be consistent with the idea, expressed by the authors, that the ‘strategic’ context for adopting liberal legalism was that the debate was conducted in these terms. But the problem with this understanding is surely evident. As critical scholars have shown time and time again, the contemporary world is one that is deeply saturated with, and partly constituted by, juridical relations.51 Accordingly, there are really very few contexts (indeed perhaps none) in which political debate is not conducted in juridical terms. A brief perusal of world events would bear this out.52 the logical conclusion of this would seem to be that in terms of abstract, immediate effectiveness, the ‘context’ of public debate will almost always call for an intervention that is couched in liberal legalist terms. This raises a final vital question about what exactly distinguishes critical scholars from liberal scholars. If the above analysis holds true, then the ‘strategic’ interventions of critical scholars in legal and political debates will almost always take the form of arguing these debates in their own terms, and simply picking the ‘left’ side. thus, whilst their academic and theoretical writings and interventions may (or may not) retain the basic critical tools, the public political interventions will basically be ‘liberal’. The question then becomes, in what sense can we really characterise such interventions (and indeed such scholars) as ‘critical’? The practical consequence of understanding ‘strategy’ in essentially tactical terms seems to mean always struggling within the coordinates of the existing order. Given the exclusion of strategic concerns as they have been traditionally understood, there is no practical account for how these coordinates will ever be transcended (or how the debate will be reconfigured). As such, we have a group of people struggling within liberalism, on liberal terms, who may or may not also have some ‘critical’ understandings which are never actualised in public interventions. We might ask then, apart from ‘good intentions’ (although liberals presumably have these as well) what differentiates these scholars from liberals? Because of course liberals too can sincerely believe in political causes that are ‘of the left’. It seems therefore, that just as – in practical terms – strategic essentialism collapses into essentialism, so too does ‘strategic’ liberal legalism collapse into plain old liberal legalism.53

### 1NC---CP

#### The United States federal government should establish single payer health insurance and care

#### Solves disease

Jain and Alam 3-7-17 - King's College London, School of Medicine, London, UK

\*Vageesh, \*\*Azeem, Redefining universal health coverage in the age of global health security, BMJ Global Health, http://gh.bmj.com/content/2/2/e000255

Universal health coverage (UHC) has received a great deal of attention over the past decade, with the WHO spearheading the global advocacy effort. Studies have demonstrated the ability of UHC to reduce mortality, and overcome existing health inequalities to create more equitable systems.1 ,2¶ However, the role of UHC in preventing, detecting and responding to disease outbreaks as per International Health Regulations (IHR), particularly during public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC), is less clear. Past epidemics, including Ebola or H1N1 influenza, have not provided the opportunity to assess the impact that UHC may have on global health security. In the Ebola outbreak, the virus was largely limited to the West African region, among countries that all had poorly functioning health systems. The H1N1 virus proved to be too feeble to allow an analysis of how resilient different health systems were (based on UHC), in combating the 2009 pandemic.¶ UHC, in its existing form, has the potential to improve global health security through various mechanisms. First, low financial barriers can stimulate demand for health services and facilitate early case detection,3 one of the foremost factors in dictating the course of an outbreak. Second, UHC may protect people from financial catastrophe. High healthcare expenditures push people into poverty, further increasing their long-term risk of ill health, particularly through communicable disease. Third, UHC protects against economic downturn, with unemployment associated with a lower mortality in UHC countries compared with those without.2 This is important in the context of epidemics, as seen in the recent Ebola outbreak, where the World Bank estimates $1.6 billion were foregone in GDP in 2015, due to the economic impact of the outbreak.4 Aside from the clinical and economic benefits, there also lies a societal benefit in creating a more equitable and just system of health whereby the poor do not bear a disproportionate burden of disease.¶ The high death toll inflicted by Ebola has reinvigorated health system strengthening efforts, to which UHC is fundamental.5 ,6 But what exactly should UHC involve, to improve global health security? The ongoing Zika virus outbreak, raging through the Americas, provides an opportunity to examine the complex relationship between UHC and infectious disease control.

## Innovation

### 1NC---AT: Impact

#### No impact---Chinese leadership is peaceful, US tech norms are equally authoritarian

**ACLU 3/10** , American Civil Liberties Union (3/10/2021, “ACLU, CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS CALL ON DHS TO ABANDON PROPOSED EXPANSION OF FACE SURVEILLANCE AT AIRPORTS,” <https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-civil-rights-groups-call-dhs-abandon-proposed-expansion-face-surveillance> Date Accessed: 3/21/2021)

WASHINGTON — The American Civil Liberties Union and a coalition of more than 20 civil rights organizations are calling on the Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection to withdraw a proposed regulation that would dramatically expand the use of face recognition technology at airports and the border. The proposed regulation would allow CBP to require all noncitizen travelers entering and exiting the United States to submit to face recognition.

In a [letter sent today](https://www.aclu.org/letter/coalition-letter-secretary-mayorkas-proposed-expansion-face-recognition-airports) to Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, the organizations highlight the dangers of face surveillance, which has been shown to disproportionately harm communities of color and has led to the wrongful arrest of at least three Black men. The organizations urge Mayorkas to withdraw the proposed regulation and suspend the use of face recognition technology on travelers.

“This proposed rule poses grave risks to the privacy of immigrants and all visitors to the United States, giving the government a dangerous tool that could allow it to track everyday movements and private associations,” said Ashley Gorski, senior staff attorney with the ACLU’s National Security Project. “No government agency should have that power. And especially not CBP, given its record of separating families, profoundly harming people it detains, and profiling on the basis of ethnicity and religion. CBP’s use of this technology will undoubtedly harm immigrants and communities of color the most.”

Under the proposed regulation, all noncitizen travelers, including children, may be required to be photographed upon entry and departure from the United States. U.S. citizen travelers who do not affirmatively opt out may be photographed as well. CBP would harvest “faceprints” from these images — precise measurements of the unique facial geometry of each photographed traveler — and then apply a face-matching algorithm to travelers, comparing their faceprint to a gallery of other images in the government’s possession. DHS plans to store all the faceprints it collects in a database for up to 75 years, where they may be used by federal, state, and local law enforcement to identify individuals for purposes unrelated to their travel.

Unlike other forms of identity verification, faceprints can be collected covertly, at a distance, and without consent. And because facial geometry is unique to each person and faces are typically exposed, the collection of faceprints poses a significant risk of persistent surveillance that could allow the U.S. government and others to track our movements wherever we go.

#### Their authors omit facts---research on Chinese authoritarianism is biased and rooted in sinophobia

**Zhang and Xu 20** , \*PhD from KU Levin in 2014 in Geography and Tourism. †An urban sociologist with expertise on social inequality, language and cultural identity. Her dissertation research has encompassed research on globalization, displacement, and language endangerment. Her other research interests lie in urban studies, consumption, China studies, nationalism, and (im)migration. (\*Yunpeng and †Fang, 6/19/2020, “Ignorance, Orientalism and Sinophobia in Knowledge Production on COVID‐19,” *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie (Journal of Economic and Social Geography)*, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/tesg.12441> Date Accessed: 3/17/2021)

Comment is Cheap: The ‘Evil’ Authoritarian Chinese State

In response to the question from the Financial Times to compare authoritarian systems – namely China and Russia– to Western democracies in handling the pandemic, Emmanuel Macron did not give a straightforward answer but marked a strong distinction and strength of Western democracies – free and transparent information, which are considered to be in the DNA of Western democracies but lacking in China and Russia (Mallet & Khalaf [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0024)). He claimed that ‘the immediacy of the information bears no comparison with ours. Social media are not free in those countries, you don’t have any social media … And there are obviously some things happening which we don’t know about. It’s up to China to tell them’ (Mallet & Khalaf [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0024)). Although he believed that cooperation and dialogues between countries of different political systems are necessary, he warned that ‘we should not allow ourselves as citizens of free democracies to be hypnotised by the way authoritarian regimes handle crises’ (Mallet & Khalaf [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0024)).

The interview is representative of a dominant discourse about China’s response to the pandemic and a paradigm frame of China in general. Since the lockdown of Wuhan, authoritarianism has been invoked by journalists, politicians, and academics to explain the suffering of residents in China and to characterise the measures taken by Chinese authorities to bring the pandemic under control. As the epicentres started to shift to Europe and the US and the Chinese authorities reopened its economy, China’s authoritarian regime on the one hand is blamed for delayed responses and resultant socio‐economic upheavals in many countries in the West. On the other, many people in Western democracies are confronted with questions – which political system is better and is China the future? When questions are framed around the binary of authoritarian versus democratic countries like these, answering them – even in a balanced way – often conjures up discomfort and requires cautious calibration of vocabulary.

We engage with representations framed on authoritarian politics given its weight in representing China and imagining political life after the pandemic. Our main point is not that they are necessarily biased against China, although some of them do contain factual errors or deliberate misrepresentation. They raise some undoubtedly important questions about media censorship, freedom of expression, abusive state power, and disempowerment of CDC in China’s political system. However, what worries us here is the danger of ready submission to, and fixating attention on this conceptual category of authoritarianism in destructing, if not completely distorting, social realities. Unless we are ready to give in to conspiracy theories, believing that the virus is man‐made or genetically modified, we must admit that there are objectively existing knowledge gaps about the SARS‐CoV‐2 virus, since it is a new virus. It takes time to overcome this form of ignorance – a native state (Proctor [2008](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0025%20#tesg12441-bib-0026)) – and prepare mitigation strategies that are proportional to available knowledge, perceived risks, and available resources at a given moment. This temporal dimension is also necessary when assessing the responses of different governments and the production of ignorance in retrospect. Otherwise, instead of challenging ignorance, we may risk reproducing it.

A relevant example here is Jeffery Wasserstrom, professor in history at University of California, Irvine and author of several books on modern China, whose critiques of China’s responses were published in The Guardian. To support his claim that local politicians in Wuhan and Hubei province acted in accordance with the incentive structure of China’s authoritarian state systems to conceal information, Wasserstrom ([2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0035)) suggested that they had known of the first case as early as 8 December 2019. He referred to an article from BBC published on 27 January 2020 (Feng [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0011)). The original article from BBC did not mention the source specifically. It does match with the date of the first case stated in the press release from the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission published on 11 January 2020 (Wuhan Municipal Health Commission [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0036)). What the BBC journalist failed to communicate clearly, and which Wasserstrom failed to triangulate, is that this first case was backdated through retrospective epidemiological study (Wuhan Municipal Health Commission [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0036)). It is also intriguing that his piece does not refer to the open‐access article published in The Lancet on 24 Janurary which would have thickened the plot he attempted to develop. In that study researchers pinned the date when the first patient showed symptoms on 1 December 2019 (Huang et al. [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0020)). But again, it is crucial to bear in mind that this research was done retrospectively and that it takes time to make accurate diagnosis of infections with unknown causes during a flu season. It is justified to doubt information from China’s official sources. However, this is more because it is secondary data rather than because it comes from China and/or from its official organs. It is problematic to let a priori concern over authoritarianism – featured by secrecy, lack of transparency, and corruption – prevent us from doing our job of verifying and triangulating data.

While Wasserstrom may be unintentional, researchers at the Henry Jackson Society (a UK‐based foreign policy think tank) deliberately omitted information when cross‐referencing a source from outside mainland China. Their ignorance is deliberate and strategic (Proctor [2008](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0025%20#tesg12441-bib-0026)). It is produced to accumulate political capital. To establish culpability and legal responsibilities of China, they compiled a timeline to show that there was a deliberate cover‐up. The evidence they relied on was a journalistic report on South China Morning Post, which, based on documents of the Chinese government seen only by this journalist, claimed that the first case was recorded on 17 November 2019 and there were 266 cases by the end of 2019 when the Chinese state informed WHO (Ma [2020a](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0022%20#tesg12441-bib-0023)). Although the journalist cautiously suggested that some cases may be identified retrospectively (Ma [2020a](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0022%20#tesg12441-bib-0023)), this was removed in the Henry Jackson Society’s report. By silencing such noises – and only by doing so, these researchers can confidently conclude with certainty that China’s ‘medical authorities withheld authorisation to report the outbreak both internally and to the public’ (Henderson et al. [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0019), p.14), a textbook example of authoritarian politics. In response to similar misrepresentation by the Sky News Australia, the journalist later clarified in her tweet, posted on 13 April 2020, and emphasised that ‘there was no indication when the Chinese government was made aware of the case’ and ‘Chinese doctors only realised they were dealing with a new disease in mid‐to‐late December 2019’(Ma [2020b](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0023)). The lens of authoritarianism is also used to interpret the drastic measures taken by the Chinese authorities and question their effectiveness. Bruce Buckley, China specialist reporting for The New York Times, took issue with the lockdown of Wuhan in his article published on 5 February 2020, and maintained that this level of measure is ‘a vast medical experiment conceivable only in authoritarian China’ (Buckley [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0003)). The phrase ‘medical experiment’ conjures up the fear of a repressive authoritarian regime. For Emma Graham‐Harrison (a journalist for The Guardian), it was suspicious that two newly built hospitals were not running at full capacity one week after their completion (Graham‐Harrison [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0014)). In her article published on 19 February 2020, She referred to the lack of capacity of existing hospitals in Wuhan not long ago (citing an article from the Wall Street Journal published on 5 February), the parallel efforts of converting exhibition halls and a sports stadium to ‘emergency hospitals’ and the absence of military‐style emergency field hospitals (an easier solution to the shortage of medical care facilities in her view). Instead of providing an answer through grounded research or consultation with medical communities, she opted for an easy explanation of authoritarian politics. She held that ‘the complicated reality on the ground is a reminder of one of the main challenges for Beijing as it struggles to contain the coronavirus: its own secretive, authoritarian system of government and its vast censorship and propaganda apparatus’ (Graham‐Harrison [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0014)). Her conclusion appears to be influenced by her interviewee, Steve Tsang (professor of politics at SOAS China Institute), who believed that construction of these hospitals is more an attempt of the Communist Party to manage its image.

Mainstream media in the West are filled with similar accounts of China’s responses to the pandemic. With China watchers and China specialists focusing on authoritarian politics, this may have the worrying effect of drowning out the sobering voices from the expert communities on the frontline fighting this pandemic within China. The decision to lockdown Wuhan was not irrational but was based on the input from the scientific community about the virus and its threats. While there was much uncertainty about the virus during the early weeks of the outbreak in Wuhan, by the time the Chinese authorities decided to seal off the city, it was clear to an epidemiologist, Li Lanjuan, who proposed quarantining Wuhan to the elite politicians in Beijing on the night of 22 January, that the virus can transmit between humans even during the incubation period (Dong et al. [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0010)). This was later confirmed by an article published by researchers from the University of Hong Kong in The Lancet on 24 January 2020, which additionally reported cases of asymptomatic patients (Chan et al. [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0006)). According to Li Lanjuan in the interview, in view of the huge traffic around the Chinese Spring Festival, and the danger of this disease, it was a drastic but necessary decision in order to prevent further spread of the virus nationwide (Dong et al. [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0010)). When it comes to treatment, ‘hospital’ for Chinese experts is also not an undifferentiated category. Not every hospital was capable of treating patients with a highly infectious disease, and a triage system was needed to treat patients with symptoms with different severities and to avoid overwhelming a stressed healthcare system. What Emma Graham‐Harrison called ‘emergency hospitals’ were in fact quarantine centres for patients with mild symptoms and without underlying conditions to avoid cluster transmission within families or communities and to keep patients under close medical monitoring and provide rapid intervention in case their conditions worsen, as explained by Wang Chen (a pulmonologist and an expert in critical care medicine) during an interview on 7 February 2020 (The Paper [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0034)). These two new hospitals were designed and equipped to mainly treat infected patients with more severe symptoms or underlying conditions (Researchers at Nanfang Zhoumo [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0029)). The decisions of Chinese authorities are based on knowledge accumulated about the disease, the threat to public health, China’s own conditions and available resources at that time.

Iterations of China’s response through the lens of authoritarianism are as much about China as about the West’s self‐imagination. They are symptomatic of, and perhaps due to, the conflation of sinophobia, orientalism, and statephobia. Since the eighteenth century, sinophobia has become a dominant way for the West to conceive of China (Zhang [2008](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0037)). Generalisations about China – a threatening, deviant, despotic, backward, and inferior other – are invoked to constitute the West. Classifying a nation or a regime as authoritarian consolidates the West’s power as a knowing subject to define others and affirms its moral authority and superiority. Characteristic here is the analysis from The Economist ([2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0033)). Drawing on a dataset on disasters compiled by researchers at Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium, it concluded that disasters killed more people in authoritarian countries than in democracies (defined as countries with ‘free and fair elections’)(The Economist [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0033)). Even though China’s response may testify to the capacity of authoritarian governments in mobilising resources within a short period of time, the lack of transparency and limited participation of civil society still renders it inferior to democratic countries when it comes to disaster interventions (The Economist [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tesg.12441#tesg12441-bib-0033)).

### 1NC---AT: China

#### Chinese leadership is key to solving all global problems – that solves the case

Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491

As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced. The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance. Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous state in such key areas as global economic governance and climate change. Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics. The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily. All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other civilizations. So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations. Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced. China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.

#### Effective global governance prevents unregulated emergent tech – prevents extinction

Robert Bailey 18, Vision of Earth contributor and computer science masters, 9-5-2018, "Why do we need global governance?," Vision of Earth, https://www.visionofearth.org/social-change/global-governance/

Global governance is necessary because humanity increasingly faces both problems and opportunities that are global in scale. Today, transnational problems such as violence and pandemics routinely reach across borders, affecting us all. At the same time, the increasingly integrated global system has also laid the necessary foundations for peace and spectacular prosperity. Effective global governance will allow us to end armed conflict, deal with new and emerging problems such as technological risks and automation, and to achieve levels of prosperity and progress never before seen.1 The most important challenge for humanity to overcome is that of existential risks. One way to look at the danger of an existential risk is to quantify the level of global coordination needed to deal with it. While best-shot risks, at one end of the spectrum only require that a single nation, organization or even individual (i.e., superhero) has the means and the will to save everyone, weakest-link risks, at the other end of the spectrum, are dangers that might require literally every country to take appropriate action to prevent catastrophe, with no room for failure.2 3 We’ve always been at risk of natural disaster, but with advances in our level of technology the risk we pose to ourselves as a species becomes ever greater. Nuclear weapons are a well-known risk that we still live with to this day. The progress of technological research exposes us to new dangers such as bioengineered superbugs, nanotechnological menaces, and the risk of an out-of-control artificial intelligence with ill-intent. Increased levels of global coordination are needed to combat many of these risks, as described in our article on the cooperation possibilities frontier. There are other problems that don’t necessarily threaten the species or even civilization as we know it, but which are holding back the development of prosperity and progress. Armed conflict, around since the dawn of history, still haunts us today. Even though wars between great powers appear to be a thing of the past, regional conflicts still account for tremendous human suffering and loss of life in parts of the world without stable governance.4 Other problems have emerged precisely because of our successes in the past. The unprecedented advancement of human wellbeing and prosperity over the past century has been based in large part on the use of fossil fuels, thus exposing us to climate change. Widespread automation, already a stressor on society, will put increased pressure on the social and economic fabric of our societies over the next few decades. Global governance can help alleviate these issues in various ways – we refer the interested reader to the very detailed work in Ruling Ourselves. Finally, global governance will increasingly be judged not only by the extent to which it prevents harm, but also by its demonstrated ability to improve human wellbeing.5 Progress has let us set our sights higher as a species, both for what we consider to be the right trajectory for humanity and for our own conduct.6 Major advances in human wellbeing can be accomplished with existing technology and modest improvements in global coordination. Effective global governance is global governance that tackles these issues better than the regional governments of the world can independently. Global governance is key to solving global problems. Without it, we may not be able to avoid weakest-link existential risks or regulate new and dangerous technologies. With it, we may be able to prosper as we never have before. The next step is to determine how effective global governance can be achieved.

#### Letting China win the tech race secures their great power status and forces retrenchment. That’s their 1AC IL AND…

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The analysis of US–China interactions presented here reveals that the phase of heightened geopolitical competition between the two superpowers is upon us. A key bone of contention now and in the coming decade will be about the hierarchy of prestige. By most accounts, China is likely to overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy within a decade; meanwhile it is investing heavily in multiple arenas—military, economic, technological, cultural—to create facts on the ground that will force the US to recognize it as a co-equal. Indeed, if the technological advances sought by ‘Made in China 2025’ and the economic and political–diplomatic goals of the BRI are realized—big ifs, to be sure—China will be well positioned to ‘win friends and influence people’ in ways America did with its economic and technological prowess. It will be in a position to match, and perhaps overtake, the US reputation for power. A Pew poll of 2015 found that, in 27 out of the 40 countries polled, a plurality or majority of individuals believed that China ‘will or already has overtaken the US as a superpower’.78 Such polls need to be interpreted with caution; but if that day does come to pass, it will put the US in a position of great strategic angst. Kishore Mahbubani cites an exchange he had at the 2012 Davos meeting in which he raised the possibility of China replacing the United States as the world's top power—a suggestion to which Senator Bob Corker, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, responded: ‘The American people absolutely would not be prepared psychologically for an event where the world began to believe that it was not the greatest power on earth.’79

#### Otherwise, status competition goes nuclear — letting China peacefully surpass the U.S. is the only way to avoid war.

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However, while the salience of conflict for the sake of gaining territory may be declining, the importance of status as a potential driver of conflict may be increasing. Status is an ambiguous and elusive concept, but at its core, status consists of a country's ranking in a hierarchy within a peer group. Status can be measured indirectly through estimations of a country's influence and prestige, as well as its reputation. Status matters a great deal because it can confer considerable benefits, as studies on the topic have shown. Jonathon Renshon, an expert on the role of status in international relations, has described how high-status countries enjoy a greater degree of deference from other countries and can thus secure a far larger share of available resources at a far lower cost than their lower-status peers. Status can only be achieved through competition, however. Because rankings are inherently zero-sum, one country's rise in status invariably requires the diminishment of its competitors.

The immense benefits that can accompany high status and the competition required to secure it help explain why status concerns have historically underpinned many inter-state conflicts. Historically, many a country has gone to great lengths and sometimes incurred crippling costs to salvage a faltering status or increase its standing. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, for example, Great Britain pursued an unnecessary and pointless military attack to stave off a challenge from Egypt to its waning status in the Middle East. The ensuing debacle confirmed Britain's decline as a great power. During the 1960s, U.S. anxiety over its status vis-á-vis its primary rival, the Soviet Union, led Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to escalate the country's commitment to a war in Vietnam of dubious prospects, a situation the Soviet Union mirrored in its own disaster in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Conversely, the value of an increase in status can be seen in the aftermath of Japan's stunning defeat of Russia in 1904 and 1905. The outcome shocked Western opinion and earned Japan the status of peer with the world's leading imperial powers. Tokyo subsequently expanded its control of Asia. Similarly, America's victory in the Spanish-American War confirmed Spain's eclipse as a great power in Latin and South America. The United States cemented its status as the leading nation in the Americas and saw its influence expand accordingly.

As these examples suggest, competition for status tends to recede when consensus exists among peer states about relative rankings, as happened briefly in the largely peaceful and stable post-Cold War “unipolar” moment of U.S. global preeminence. However, competition for status also tends to increase in periods of uncertainty. Today, persistent economic stagnation in the developed world and the rise of developing countries have unsettled existing hierarchies and raised afresh anxiety over the standing of many great powers.

Fears of diminished standing can be seen in the immense commentary bemoaning the decline in U.S. and European influence and in the debate over the possibilities of a post-Western age. Such apprehensions have also featured prominently in U.S. policy documents. In its recently released National Security Strategy (PDF), U.S. authorities warned that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests.” These concerns are particularly acute in Asia, which has seen an intensifying strategic competition for status and influence between China and its principal rivals—the United States, Japan, and India.

For China, status is increasingly vital to realizing its revitalization as a great power. To sustain growth, China seeks to deepen Asia's integration through the Belt and Road Initiative and shape the terms of regional trade. China also seeks to construct a regional security architecture defined by Chinese-led organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building. With adequate status, China could gain the deference and cooperation from regional powers needed to control potential flashpoints, improve its security, and secure preferential access to resources and markets at a fraction of the cost in resources than would be required if it had to fight and negotiate its way through every issue. Recognizing the importance of the issue, the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress report outlined as a long-term goal the ambition to “become a global leader” in “international influence.” Similarly, Chinese leaders have stepped up efforts to strengthen the country's leadership position in the region.

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China for now has relied on peaceful, albeit intrusive, measures to increase its influence and bolster its standing, such sustained military modernization, massive economic diplomacy initiatives, United Front tactics and the manipulation of diplomatic carrots and sticks. Some observers have seen evidence of China's increasing influence in the Philippines' and South Korea's growing sensitivity to Chinese concerns. But the effectiveness of incremental, peaceful methods is difficult to prove because their effects are harder to perceive. Some commentators, for example, regard Chinese gains in influence as limited. Moreover, peaceful, incremental efforts are also vulnerable to counter-measures. Already, a growing array of countries have begun to raise concern about Chinese economic coercion and influence operations.

The United States and its allies and partners rightfully seek to protect their interests by bolstering their respective positions, even as they continue to cooperate with China. The strategy may succeed, but at its core is the assumption that stability can best be gained if China continues to acquiesce to the international order as established after World War II by the United States and its allies. China's conviction that its security depends on changes to this order sets up a deep, structural contradiction that is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Beijing can accordingly be expected to persist in peaceful methods to supplant the United States as Asia's leader. If, however, Beijing at some point concludes that the United States and its allies have successfully stymied its aspirations, China may be tempted by riskier methods to assert its status. A precedent for such behavior may be seen in a rising Germany of the 1890s-1900s. Convinced that it had been denied a status befitting its national power by Britain and France, Germany provoked a series of militarized crises around the world. In 1906, Germany threatened war against France after the two feuded about influence over Morocco. And in a second Moroccan crisis five years later, Germany extracted colonial concessions after it deployed a gunboat in response to a French military intervention. In China's case, brinksmanship behavior could be carried out in the contested East or South China Seas with military ships and aircraft. Already, a growing literature by Chinese military writers recommends the skillful exploitation of military crises for strategic gain.

Brinksmanship carries its own risks, of course. Miscalculation could lead to unwanted war. The strategic effects could be severe as well. Rivals like the United States, Japan, and India could be alarmed enough by a clash that they step up military preparations, aggravating China's security situation. Moreover, conflict could imperil China's grand Belt and Road Initiative ambition, if aggrieved neighbors opt out and welcome investments by Japan and India instead. China has many good reasons to never consider military provocations against a neighbor. But Beijing also has compelling reasons to increase the country's standing and diminish that of the United States and its allies. Given that the ruling Chinese Communist Party has staked its reputation towards that end, China's leaders should be expected to consider all available options to achieve it.

#### China will only invade when they think the door is closing — they’ll pursue gradual reunification now, but losing military control causes quick and violent lash out.

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IS THERE A DEADLINE FOR UNIFICATION? CHINA’S STRATEGIC PATIENCE Xi Jinping’s repeated association of Taiwan unification with the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” has led some to infer that the 2049 target for the latter is in fact the deadline. As a younger Chinese scholar suggested to me: “There’s a deadline within a non-deadline.” Some Chinese leaders may in fact believe that 2049 is the unification deadline, but my reading of Xi’s speeches is that he is in fact careful not to make explicit what may seem implicit. This makes perfect sense. To state a hard deadline might lead Taiwan and the United States to take actions that undermine Beijing’s Taiwan goals. Not publicly setting a target date for unification avoids the risk of having to act on the implied threat should the designated time arrive with Taiwan still outside “the embrace of the motherland.” Rather than think in terms of a deadline, it makes more sense to try to determine, at any given time, whether PRC leaders perceive that the door to achieving their goal is opening, closing, or standing still. Clearly, a judgment that the door is closing — for example, in the form of an active program by Taiwan leaders to move toward what looks like de jure independence — would demand action in response. If Beijing believes that the long-term trends are favorable for unification — that the door remains open, and that the melon will at some point fall from the stem — then patience is justified. On balance, Xi’s January 2019 speech suggests that Beijing does not believe that the door to unification is closing and that patience is justified and necessary. He in no way altered the unification goal and 1C2S formula, but his remarks do not betray a sense of danger looming or an urgency to resolve the issue. Each Taiwan presidential and legislative election and the attendant re-shuffling of the political deck will provide milestones for calibrating PRC confidence about the future. A KMT victory in 2020 would boost Beijing’s confidence, and Beijing could probably tolerate a narrow win by Tsai. After all, it survived two terms of Chen Shui-bian. The medium-term scenario that is most likely to alarm Chinese leaders is if Tsai managed to win in 2020 and then a next-generation DPP leader won in 2024. That would indicate a fundamental, pro-DPP shift in Taiwan public opinion that would imply that the door to unification is closing. Looking more long term, Xi in his speech did revive the idea that “the long-standing political differences between the two sides of the Strait are the major causes that prevent cross-Strait relations from proceeding steadily. This should not be passed down generation after generation.” The implication of that statement is that the longer the issue is unresolved, the more peaceful separation will grow as a problem for China. From the 2028 Taiwan presidential election on, each new administration that does not make significant movement towards unification will raise doubts in Beijing that it will ever happen. The closer that Hong Kong gets to the end of the 50-year period under 1C2S, the more people in China will feel the need to rely on more than strategic patience with Taiwan characteristics. TAIWAN’S RESPONSE The fundamental cleavage between the KMT and DPP defines how politicians and society respond to Beijing’s current pressure campaign against the Tsai administration. The DPP believes that the pressure is real and is a manifestation of the malevolent intentions that Beijing and its Taiwan allies hold concerning the future of the island. The KMT believes that Tsai’s refusal to accommodate Beijing on the 1992 Consensus justifies the PRC’s negative response. But it is not just a party cleavage that is operative here. Divisions within each camp complicate matters. This is particularly true within the DPP, where the “fundamentalists” are very critical of Tsai’s relative moderation towards China and her unwillingness to pursue symbolic initiatives that explicitly or implicitly promote their independence agenda. Tsai has not completely resisted that agenda. She gave the green light to a transitional justice project, the main effect of which was to deprive the KMT of assets under its control. Her willingness to go along with a relaxation of the referendum law is another, one that the DPP came to regret after the KMT used referendums to block action on certain policy issues. Yet the fact that former premier William Lai challenged Tsai for the party’s presidential nomination is the clearest evidence that this division is real. The KMT also has its divisions, mainly between the northern wing (which is more mainlander in its composition and China-friendly in its orientation) and the southern wing, which is more Taiwanese and skeptical of China on non-economic issues. This division exploded into view when Ma tried to purge legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng in 2013. These multiple cleavages impede any attempt to forge a cross-party consensus on how to deal with China across the board. Such a consensus, to be realistic, would have to start with the premise that Taiwan as a polity and society is under threat and must meet that challenge on a more unified basis. But such a consensus is difficult if and as long as the blue camp believes that the policies of the DPP administration are more of a threat to Taiwan than China is. The desire of some in the DPP to settle scores for long-ago KMT abuses during its authoritarian rule also deepens division. On one issue, there has been broad consensus within Taiwan, and that is the importance of the role of the United States. The KMT and the DPP compete as to which does a better job of managing the relationship with Washington. Beijing blames the United States for blocking unification and encouraging separatism through its security commitment and arms sales to Taiwan. Successive U.S. administrations have supported Taiwan in order to ensure that it does not have to negotiate under duress. But the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations also sought to constrain the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administrations from actions that would unnecessarily alarm China. On the other hand, the Trump administration’s steps to improve relations with Taipei in the diplomatic and security spheres does create the possibility that Taiwan might be drawn into U.S.-China strategic competition beyond what is wise or necessary. That said, the main reason Beijing has not made progress toward unification is not the U.S. role but its own refusal to adapt its policy to Taiwan political realities, as well as its insistence that Taiwan leaders meet preconditions before productive cross-Strait relations can occur. In this as well, intimidation may be a better way for Beijing to diminish the effectiveness of U.S. support, precisely because it is more difficult for Washington to counter.

#### Status denial turns case

**Onea, 14** - Tudor Onea is a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Post-doctoral Fellow with the Department of Government at Dartmouth College (“Between dominance and decline: status anxiety and great power rivalry” Review of International Studies, Volume 40 / Issue 01 / January 2014, pp 125-152

Rivalries between great powers over dominance have captured scholarly attention since the days of Thucydides. However, the bulk of studies have concentrated on shifts in capabilities, while neglecting the motives that produce such positional rivalries. The status anxiety hypothesis is an effort to address this omission, by tracing their occurrence and continuation, sometimes for decades, to the clashing status requirements of the dominant power and those of the next-in-line state. In a nutshell, status anxiety argues that the refusal of the dominant power to allow the succession of the challenger will be a fundamental cause of rivalry, worsening as the rising power threatens to overtake the current leader in additional dimensions. The purpose of this article was to formulate this hypothesis as well as subject it to preliminary testing. The findings suggest that status anxiety represented a significant influence, though not necessarily excluding additional balance of power considerations, in the foreign policy decision-making of declining dominant powers: France in the mid-eighteenth century and Britain at the turn of the twentieth century. Status anxiety thus helps account for the hostility France manifested towards Britain, and Britain towards German demands for superior status, a reaction which is more problematic to account for by theories stressing solely physical security and material gains. A further contribution of this endeavour is that it suggests the existence of a dominant power club, distinct from the club of major or great powers, and, as such, following a different set of rules.138 The existing status literature has concentrated exclusively on the latter club, arguing persuasively that there is no impediment for granting either admission to new members or opportunities for further advancement to current ones.139 Hence, status competition in the great power club is seen as non-zero sum. But the dominant power club has a membership of one, which makes it unfeasible for the dominant power to satisfy the demands of dominant power aspirants without voluntarily surrendering its supremacy. Accordingly, status competition over the dominant position is more likely to be zero-sum and lead to rivalry. The findings of this article are at this point only plausible, yet they highlight the need for further research covering the entire universe of dominant powers in order to determine both if intense status anxiety always prompts conflict and if reduced status anxiety or its absence lead to stability. Consequently, additional studies of the role of status for dominant powers foreign policy should be conducted, extending beyond the current en vogue concentration on the foreign policy of rising powers alone. Indeed, dominant powers' status anxiety may be increasingly policy-relevant, if unipolarity were to erode due to a steady shrinking of distance between the US and China. This is not to suggest that Sino-American confrontation under the ominous shadow of nuclear weapons is inevitable, but to draw attention to the possible heightened risks posed by status anxiety in future decades. In the words of President Obama: ‘if other nations do not play for second place, I do not accept second-place for the United States of America’.140

### 1NC---AT: Pandemics

#### Pandemics are inevitable and accelerating beneath capitalism---it creates breeding grounds for pathogenic spread and undermines global preparedness.

Attard 20, Socialist Appeal activist and writer for Marxist.com, (Joe, March 24th, 2020, “Pandemics, profiteering and big pharma: how capitalism plagues public health”, https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm)

“Outbreaks are inevitable, pandemics are optional”

In 1994, Pulitzer-winning journalist Laurie Garrett wrote The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance. This was followed in 2001 by Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health. Over these two books, she explained that “human disruption of the global environment, coupled with behaviors that readily spread microbes between people and from animals to humans, guaranteed a global surge in epidemics, even an enormous pandemic. [These] outbreaks were aided and abetted by inept health systems, human behavior, and the complete lack of consistent political and financial support for disease-fighting preparedness everywhere in the world.”[[74]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn74) Though she didn’t put it in these terms, these books were a damning indictment of capitalism and its corrosive effects on public health. Garrett’s warnings were corroborated in a 2018 report by the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, which warned that “there is a very real threat of a rapidly moving, highly lethal pandemic of a respiratory pathogen killing 50 to 80 million people and wiping out nearly 5% of the world’s economy”.[[75]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn75)

The report continues:

“Between 2011 and 2018, WHO tracked 1,483 epidemic events in 172 countries. Epidemic-prone diseases such as influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), Ebola, Zika, plague, yellow fever and others, are harbingers of a new era of high-impact, potentially fast-spreading outbreaks that are more frequently detected and increasingly difficult to manage… Any country without basic primary health care, public health services, health infrastructure and effective infection control mechanisms faces the greatest losses, including death, displacement and economic devastation.”[[76]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn76)

In other words, the current COVID-19 crisis is part of a new era in which pandemics will become more common, for the reasons I have described. The world is underprepared for this, and the poorest countries are going to suffer the most. Aside from the emergence of new pathogens, there are other threats on the horizon, including antibiotic-resistant strains of microbes like streptococcus and staphylococcus, cultivated in hospitals in the advanced capitalist countries, due to an over-reliance on antibiotics developed in the post-war period.[[77]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn77) Illnesses of the 19th and 20th century, like TB, are returning with a vengeance in poor communities like Harlem in New York City – and developing antibiotic resistance.[[78]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn78) In the 1990s, a forecast by the University of California predicted that by 2070 the world would have exhausted all antimicrobial drug options, as viruses, bacteria, parasites and fungi would have evolved complete resistance to the human pharmaceutical arsenal.[[79]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn79) This apocalyptic scenario could be avoided, if more was invested in R&D for vaccines and alternative treatments. But as explained, this is not a profitable avenue for big pharma.

Responding to the aforementioned GPMB report, Garrett was sceptical that any of its proposals (which amount to lobbying governments and private enterprise to cooperate more effectively on funding and research) would amount to anything. She wrote: “With no intention of degrading the GPMB’s effort, I must sadly say that this core message has been shouted from the rafters many times before, with little discernible impact on tone-deaf political leaders, financial enterprises, or multinational institutions. There’s no reason to think this time will be any different.”[[80]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn80)

Indeed, on a capitalist basis, it is unlikely that the situation will improve. These diseases have been conjured up by the system itself, and the living patterns of modern capitalist societies create ideal conditions for them to spread. Urbanisation has concentrated the vast majority of the planet’s 8bn people into dense populations, where disease can run rampant. And the dramatic increase in worldwide movement of people and goods (facilitated by modern transport, and exacerbated by war and climate change) creates viable channels for microbes to rage across the planet. It only took a matter of days before COVID-19 had spread from one end of the earth to the other. Such a global problem requires an international solution. But, as described, antagonism between different capitalist nations, the private property rights of the major pharmaceutical companies and the profit-based mode of production prevents the kind of coordinated response necessary to fight pandemics.

#### No extinction from pandemics.

Barratt 17, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute. (Owen Cotton-Barratt et al, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance”, pg. 9, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>)

1.1.3 Engineered pandemics For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

## Federalism

### 1NC---AT: Emerging Tech

#### No emerging tech impact.

Sechser et al. 19, \*Todd S., Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia and Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, \*\*Neil Narang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, \*\*\*Caitlin Talmadge, Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign at Georgetown University. ( “Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 42:6, pg. 728-729)

Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons to be circumspect. First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict. Historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their full potential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms, for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. And even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies.7 Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organisational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8 Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple classification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9

### 1NC---AT: Impacts

#### No impact to superintelligence, nano, or grey goo

Edward Moore Geist 15, MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, 8/9/15, “Is artificial intelligence really an existential threat to humanity?,” <http://thebulletin.org/artificial-intelligence-really-existential-threat-humanity8577>

Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies is an astonishing book with an alarming thesis: Intelligent machines are “quite possibly the most important and most daunting challenge humanity has ever faced.” In it, Oxford University philosopher Nick **Bostrom**, who has built his reputation on the study of “existential risk,” argues forcefully that **a**rtificial **i**ntelligence might be the most apocalyptic technology of all. With intellectual powers beyond human comprehension, he prognosticates, self-improving **a**rtificial **i**ntelligences could effortlessly enslave or destroy Homo sapiens if they so wished. While he expresses skepticism that such machines can be controlled, Bostrom claims that if we program the right “human-friendly” values into them, they will continue to uphold these virtues, no matter how powerful the machines become. These views have found an eager audience. In August 2014, PayPal cofounder and electric car magnate Elon Musk tweeted “Worth reading Superintelligence by **Bostrom**. We need to be super careful with AI. Potentially more dangerous than nukes.” Bill Gates declared, “I agree with Elon Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned.” More ominously, legendary astrophysicist Stephen Hawking concurred: “I think the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race.” Proving his concern went beyond mere rhetoric, Musk donated $10 million to the Future of Life Institute “to support research aimed at keeping AI beneficial for humanity.” Superintelligence is propounding a **solution that will not work** to a **problem that** probably **does not exist**, but Bostrom and Musk are right that now is the time to take the ethical and policy implications of artificial intelligence seriously. The extraordinary claim that machines can become so intelligent as to gain demonic powers requires **extraordinary evidence**, particularly since artificial intelligence (AI) researchers have struggled to create machines that show much evidence of intelligence at all. While these investigators’ ultimate goals have varied since the emergence of the discipline in the mid-1950s, the fundamental aim of AI has always been to create machines that demonstrate intelligent behavior, whether to better understand human cognition or to solve practical problems. Some AI researchers even tried to create the self-improving reasoning machines Bostrom fears. Through decades of bitter experience, however, they learned not only that creating intelligence is more difficult than they initially expected, but also that it grows increasingly harder the smarter one tries to become. Bostrom’s concept of “superintelligence,” which he defines as “any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest,” builds upon similar **discredited assumptions about the nature of thought** that the pioneers of AI held decades ago. A summary of Bostrom’s arguments, contextualized in the history of artificial intelligence, demonstrates how this is so. In the 1950s, the founders of the field of artificial intelligence assumed that the discovery of a few fundamental insights would make machines smarter than people within a few decades. By the 1980s, however, they discovered fundamental limitations that show that there will always be diminishing returns to additional processing power and data. Although these technical hurdles pose no barrier to the creation of human-level AI, they will likely **forestall the sudden emergence of an unstoppable “superintelligence**.” The risks of self-improving intelligent machines are **grossly exaggerated** and ought not serve as a **distraction from the existential risks we already face**, especially given that the limited AI technology we already have is poised to make threats like those posed by nuclear weapons even more pressing than they currently are. Disturbingly, little or no technical progress beyond that demonstrated by self-driving cars is necessary for artificial intelligence to have potentially devastating, cascading economic, strategic, and political effects. While policymakers ought not lose sleep over the technically implausible menace of “superintelligence,” they have every reason to be worried about emerging AI applications such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s submarine-hunting drones, which threaten to upend longstanding geostrategic assumptions in the near future. Unfortunately, Superintelligence offers little insight into how to confront these pressing challenges.

#### \*\*\* Military AI impact is alarmism---PLA is de-coupled and applications are defensive.

Ding 18 (Jeffrey, Centre for the Governance of AI, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream,” March 2018, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Deciphering_Chinas_AI-Dream.pdf>, DOA: 1-5-2021) //Snowball

Media reports of an AI arms race between the U.S. and China have proliferated in 2017,153 and leading thinkers have identified AI as a technology that could provide a decisive strategic advantage in the international security realm.154 In contrast, much of the Chinese academic literature discussing military possibilities for AI technology has been largely abstract and speculative, and a majority of it references or focuses on the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s activities.155 Chinese military institutions, such as the NUDT, have increased their research efforts on intelligent robotics.156 In the short-term, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will likely continue to adopt a range of unmanned vehicles into all four services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force).157 Combined with breakthroughs in UAV swarming and intelligentized missiles, these developments could challenge the U.S. military presence in the Pacific theater.

In the long-term, China’s AI development could revolutionize its conduct of military affairs. Although material evidence for Chinese militarization of AI is limited, some rhetorical evidence does show that China sees AI as a revolutionary military technology. In a statement on the central government’s work report by Lieutenant General Liu Guozhi, director of the Central Military Commission’s Science and Technology Commission, he states, in reference to military applications of AI, that the world is “on the eve of a new scientific and technological revolution,” and “whoever doesn’t disrupt will be disrupted!”158 Combined with AI’s dual-use nature, China’s high degree of civil-military fusion has raised concerns about the military applications of AI. Li Deyi, as a quintessential example, is both the director of the Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence and a major general in the PLA.159 To emphasize, many of these projections are largely speculative as the most sensitive military AI applications are not publicly disclosed. There is not a coherent consensus of ideas on AI in warfare within the PLA. Moreover, the influence of the PLA is not overwhelming, as other bureaucratic entities often have diverging views and the central party apparatus possesses final decision-making powers.

The degree to which China’s militarization will constitute a revolution in military affairs is an important question. Drawing from Chinese-language, open-source articles by military scholars, a recent report by Elsa Kania, at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), argues that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views AI as a “trump card” technology that could revolutionize the conduct of future warfare.160 As the CNAS report acknowledges, the thinking of the PLA and the central government on the direction of military AI is not solidified. Evidence from the PLA’s investment in UAV swarming and intelligentized missiles shows that the most immediate applications of military AI could align with more limited, defensive goals, including asymmetric countering of U.S. military superiority in the Western Pacific and protecting China’s nuclear deterrent.161

#### \*\* No impact to grey goo

Jeremy Shere 16, a science writer who has written and produced for some of public radio's top nationally syndicated science programs, including Sound Medicine, Earth & Sky, and A Moment of Science. His work has appeared in Talking Points Memo, Reuters, Matter Network, The Jerusalem Report, Bloom, and Reform Judaism, among others. He is the author of Renewable: The World-Changing Power of Alternative Energy. Shere teaches journalism and magazine writing at the School of Journalism at Indiana University in Bloomington, “Grey Goo Attack”, 4/2/2016, http://indianapublicmedia.org/amomentofscience/grey-goo-attack-2/

Attack of the Killer Robots Nanotechnology scientists dream of some day creating robots the size of molecules, or even turning molecules into machines that could roam the human body and perform all sorts of useful tasks. But some nanotechnology theorists and science fiction aficionados imagine a more ominous possibility. What if one of these tiny robots were given the ability to self-replicate? All it would take is a single malfunction and the robots would consume everything in the galaxy as they multiply out of control until all that was left was a shapeless, robotic mass called “grey goo.” Worst Case Scenario Now, before you go heading for the hills with a year’s supply of water and a survival guide, understand that the death-by-robot scenario is just that—a scenario, and a pretty fanciful one to boot. First, we’re nowhere near the point of being able to create a self-replicating nano-machine. But even if such machines do one day exist, they would have a hard time taking over the universe for one simple reason: fuel. Even microscopic machines need an energy source. Inorganic matter such as rocks and minerals wouldn’t do the trick because they just don’t contain stuff that the machines could break down and use for power. But what if a mad scientist created a robot that fed on organic materials such as sunlight and living things? Not to worry. Natural life forms have had around four billion years of training to compete for resources; the killer robots probably wouldn’t stand much of a chance against such streamlined competitors. Plus, if the robots were made from organic materials, they might be preyed on by bacteria or other predators.

### 1NC---AT: Bostrom

#### “Existential risks first!” is shouted by academic frauds.

Knutsson 19 – Simon Knutsson, PhD student in philosophy at Stockholm University, master’s degree in economics at New York University. [Problems in effective altruism and existential risk and what to do about them, published 10-16-19, republished with updates on 2-1-20, <https://www.simonknutsson.com/problems-in-effective-altruism-and-existential-risk-and-what-to-do-about-them/>]//BPS

Some in the effective altruism (EA) and existential risk circles seem to behave in problematic ways. The pattern that I think I see is that they want to have influence and therefore act in problematic and unusual ways. I bring up things that I would have wanted to be aware of if I had not already made the observations. The broad theme is acting in ways that appear one-sided, misleading, manipulative, opaque or to lack integrity, or doing things behind the scenes that seem troublesome. Not everything I list fits all these descriptions, but this is the general pattern. I perceive the behaviours as undermining and having a negative effect and corrupting influence on the research and writing landscape, public debate, and teaching. An important point is that what I see in EA and existential risk circles look abnormal to me. For example, here are some of the troublesome-looking things that I have not seen outside of EA and existential risk circles (at least I have not seen them to nearly this extent): First, behind-the-scenes coordination, guidelines and outreach that encourage writers and researchers to mention some ideas and texts about moral philosophy and values and to keep quiet about some such ideas. This behind-the-scenes work coincides with a lot of money being granted, and neither the organisation awarding the grant or the recipient will answer my questions. Second, an organisation (the Centre for Effective Altruism, CEA) whose trustees or board members are mainly philosophers compiles a syllabus “to provide inspiration for lectures and professors” which amounts to a one-sided promotion of these philosophers’ (and a closely affiliated philosopher’s) texts and ideas to students. Third, the citation practices by some in EA and existential risk circles are problematic beyond what I have seen elsewhere. The pattern is to mention and cite ideas one agrees with, avoid mentioning competing ideas and texts, and cite one’s allies’ or colleagues’ work (maybe to promote those ideas, texts, allies and colleagues). Fourth, an Associate Professor in Philosophy at Oxford University who is also a team member of the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI) at the same university and a trustee of CEA has used at least one ghostwriter. This can, but need not, be substantially problematic, depending on what was written. Fifth, another philosopher who is Professor at Oxford University and founding Director of FHI makes a seemingly misleading and perhaps false claim on his CV (it seems no one knows whether it is false, including the philosopher himself). It may be common to exaggerate on a CV but this is at a level I have not seen before. In general, the writings I often see in these circles remind me of lobbying and political advocacy but in EA and existential risk circles, it is done by university faculty and people with PhDs and with a veneer of being scientific and open, while my impression is that it is not. If someone asked me which people in the whole world with a PhD in philosophy appear to behave in the most troublesome ways and which philosophers I trust the least, I would rank some of the philosophers in EA and existential risk circles around the top of my list. My aim is not to attack specific people or point fingers and say ‘look at what that person did,’ which would be fairly uninteresting. I think people should be aware of what I write in this essay, be very critical of what they hear and read in EA and existential risk circles, and, importantly, scrutinise what is going on. My most important point is my call for ongoing investigations and scrutiny. A remedy to the kind of behaviour I describe is to have more scrutiny so that it is in people’s interest to avoid such behaviour, and so that the public is aware of what is going on. To be clear, I do not claim to have conclusive evidence for every seemingly problematic behaviour I bring up here. Some of the things I bring up because they appear problematic and warrant further scrutiny. I hope I provide enough of my observations and impressions to show that there is a need for ongoing scrutiny. I hope others will scrutinise more, and that some people who are aware of problematic things happening, especially behind the scenes, will speak up. However, I understand if few in EA and existential risk circles will speak publicly about problems they have observed because by doing so one may harm one’s chances of being employed or funded in this sector. Also, the philosophy world is small and, for example, by writing this text I may harm my academic career. Anyway, my key message is that some things in EA and existential risk circles seem to be highly problematic and abnormal and I hope people will be critical, scrutinise, fact check and speak in public about what goes on, especially about what goes on behind the scenes. The reactions to what I write in this text have been mixed. Some find my points weak, that I behave badly by writing as I do, or that I give a bad impression. One philosopher didn’t have an opinion on the behind-the-scenes activities I describe. Others react with statements such as that some behaviour I describe is ‘totally unacceptable’ or ‘This is very troubling… You (or someone else) should probably post this on the EA forum.’ One philosopher thought the behind-the-scenes activities I describe sound corrupt, another thought the EA and existential risk circles sound like a sect, a third thought I seem to point to improper things and that it was good that I wrote. One person found some of the behaviours I describe ‘manipulative.’ My background related to effective altruism and existential risk Around 2004–2005, I recall thinking about how to have an impact. I thought that instead of becoming a medical doctor, one should work on a large scale, for example, by training medical doctors to improve a health care system. I gave to a charity project in Uganda. I was interested in information about charities’ impact, but what I had seen was mainly unhelpful numbers about how much of expenses goes to administration, fundraising and programs. In the summer of 2008, I interned for the United Nations in Stockholm, and that summer I attended a lecture by Peter Singer in Stockholm who mentioned a new project called GiveWell. In July 2008, I talked to GiveWell about volunteering for the organisation, which I started doing soon thereafter. In 2010, I became a Research Analyst at GiveWell. Elie, Holden, Natalie and I were the four staff members at the time if I recall correctly. I have a good impression of all of them. They seemed nice and genuine. Most people I have worked with in EA seem nice. A few years later, I became the chair of the board of Animal Charity Evaluators. (I have donated to GiveWell, Animal Charity Evaluators and other organisations.) I then worked as a Researcher at the Foundational Research Institute (FRI) and I was the leader of the political party for animals in Sweden. FRI works, at least partly, on risks of astronomical future suffering (s-risks). There is some but not complete overlap between s-risks and existential risks: some, but not all, s-risks are also existential risks, and vice versa. I have worked on s-risks at and outside of FRI. Now I am a PhD student in philosophy. Problems Troublesome work behind the scenes, including censoring research and suppressing ideas and debates A lot seems to happen behind the scenes in EA and existential risk circles. My perhaps most important example in this essay concerns a $1,000,000 grant by the Open Philanthropy Project and two non-public communication guidelines. I provide details right below, but here is a summary. Nick Beckstead works at the Open Philanthropy Project, has a PhD in philosophy, is a trustee of CEA, and is listed as a Research Associate at FHI’s website (FHI is a research institute at Oxford University led by Nick Bostrom). Beckstead was one of the grant investigators for the $1,000,000 grant and the author of a non-public document with communication guidelines. The grant recipient was the Effective Altruism Foundation (EAF). Managers at EAF also wrote non-public communication guidelines meant both for people employed at or funded by EAF and others including university employees like me. I understand the two documents with guidelines as a pair. For example, the guidelines by Beckstead says, “EAF has written its own set of guidelines intended for people writing about longtermism from a suffering-focused perspective.” When a manager at EAF presented the two guidelines to me, he used phrases such as a “coordinated effort” and “it means that we will promote future pessimism … to a lesser extent.” A manager at EAF also communicated that they worked on this with Beckstead who wrote guidelines in turn. The guidelines by EAF encourage the reader to not write about or promote the idea that the future will likely contain more disvalue than value. I gather from a conversation that Beckstead was involved when it comes to this part of the content in the EAF guidelines. Beckstead has defended essentially the opposite idea that if humanity may survive for many years, the expected value of the future is astronomically great.1 The EAF guidelines also encourage referencing Beckstead’s PhD dissertation, as well as several texts by his colleagues (at FHI and CEA) who are also philosophers. Around the time and after the two guidelines were shared with me, management at EAF did non-public outreach to encourage people to follow the guidelines. One manager at EAF also expressed a disposition to maybe silence online discussion of an argument in my paper The World Destruction Argument. This argument is, roughly speaking, against the kinds of views Beckstead has written favourably about. I think the public should be aware of these coordinate efforts behind the scenes that are partly aimed to influence which ideas about ethics and value are written about in public. That the $1,000,000 grant was made around the time the communication guidelines were shared makes the situation look even worse. A question is whether the function of the large grant was partly to silence certain pessimistic views on ethics or value. Based on a conversation with a manager at EAF, I gather the grant might not have been made if EAF did not write their guidelines. Important questions include whether there are other cases like this in which agreements have been made that include which views on morality or value to mention and not to mention and which texts to reference and whether money has changed hands in connection with such agreements. I find all this to undermine research and public intellectual debate, and to be deceptive to those who are unaware of what goes on behind the scenes. I hope future scrutiny will reveal if there have been other agreements and behaviours like this and prevent future such behaviour. On July 18, 2019, Stefan Torges, one of the Co-Executive Directors of EAF, shared with me two communication guidelines in Google document format. One of the two documents says, Written by Nick Beckstead with input and feedback from various community members and several EA organizations. These guidelines are endorsed by the following organizations and individuals: 80,000 Hours, CEA, CFAR, MIRI, Open Phil, Nick Bostrom, Will MacAskill, Toby Ord, Carl Shulman…. This document was originally shared with staff members at the above organizations and a handful of other individuals writing on these topics. The document is intended to be shared with individuals where it seems useful to do so, but was not intended for publication. To share the document with additional people, please request permission by emailing Bastian Stern (bastian@openphilanthropy.org). The other document says, Written by the Effective Altruism Foundation (EAF) and the Foundational Research Institute (Jonas Vollmer, Stefan Torges, Lukas Gloor, and David Althaus) with input and feedback from various community members and several EA organizations. First written: March 2019; last updated: 10 September 2019. Please ask Stefan (stefan.torges@ea-foundation.org​) before sharing this document further This is, of course, a quote from a later version updated September 10 and not the version I was shown in July, which I can no longer access and which EAF is not willing to share with me now. To be clear, I do not mean to ascribe any malicious intentions to anyone at EAF or FRI. In particular, I will mention Torges often in this section, but that is merely because he is the person I was mainly in touch with regarding these guidelines and the coordination. My impression is that he is a nice guy, wants to help others, especially those who suffer, and he thinks that this is the best way to do so. I will also mention Beckstead often, but what the Open Philanthropy Project and its funders do is more important. The guidelines by EAF/FRI have been shared with people who do not work at EAF or FRI like me (I am employed by Stockholm University). Based on my conversation with Stefan, I understand the guidelines by EAF/FRI to be binding for those employed or funded by EAF/FRI, but they are also meant for independent researchers and university employees. The scope of the guidelines is wide. The EAF guidelines from Sep. 2019 say, We encourage you to follow these guidelines for all forms of public communication, including personal blogs, social media, essays, books, talks, meetups, and scholarly publications. Among other things, the guidelines by EAF/FRI encourage the reader to not write about or promote the idea that the future will likely contain more disvalue than value.2 The guidelines by EAF/FRI also lists literature that the reader may want to reference, including Beckstead’s PhD dissertation, and texts by Carl, William, and Bostrom. The guidelines also encourage the reader to mention and emphasise various ideas. For example, the EAF guidelines say, For ​normative​ questions, you could consider referencing ​Beckstead: On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future​, ​Pummer: The Worseness of Nonexistence​, or ​Shulman: Moments of Bliss​ for alternative views. Consider emphasizing normative uncertainty (or the anti-realist equivalent of ​valuing further reflection​), e.g. by referencing ​Bostrom (2009): Moral uncertainty – towards a solution?​, ​EA Concepts: Moral uncertainty​, ​MacAskill (2014): Normative uncertainty​, Greaves & Ord: Moral uncertainty about population axiology​. [Links to texts got lost when pasting.] Several of these authors whose texts the reader is encouraged to reference either wrote or endorsed the other guidelines (​Beckstead, Bostrom, MacAskill, Ord, and Shulman), and almost all of the authors are listed online as colleagues of Beckstead. Beckstead, Bostrom, Greaves, MacAskill, Ord, and Shulman are listed on the FHI team page. Beckstead, Greaves, MacAskill, and Ord are listed as trustees or board members of CEA. I spoke with Stefan and wrote to him, David, Jonas and Lukas, and criticised the guidelines and the whole deal. On July 29, I proposed that I be removed from the FRI website, which I have been now, and I am no longer affiliated with EAF or FRI. The same month, in July 2019, EAF was awarded $1,000,000 by the Open Philanthropy Project (whose website says , “Our main funders are Cari Tuna and Dustin Moskovitz, a co-founder of Facebook and Asana”). The grant web page says “Grant investigators: Nick Beckstead and Claire Zabel.” Claire Zabel is also a trustee of CEA. I am also troubled by what influence those behind the guidelines have had and will have by direct communication with researchers and others about what to say or publish. A while back, I mentioned to Stefan Torges a seminar with a philosophy professor. The seminar was titled Pessimism about the Future, and the abstract on the web page says, It is widely believed that one of the main reasons we should seek to decrease existential risk arising from global warming, bioterrorism, and so on is that it would be very bad overall were human and other sentient beings to become extinct. In this presentation, I shall argue that it is not unreasonable to believe that extinction would be good overall. Stefan then reached out to the professor, which may be problematic. I do not know what Stefan said or tried to say to the professor. It would be fine if he said roughly “beware of how you write so that no extremists try to kill a lot of people.” But I worry that in this case or future cases, those behind the guidelines will reach out to those who write about pessimism and related topics in ethics to try to silence them or see to that they edit their work so that it is more in line with what Beckstead would like to see published or said in public. Another such case relates to a post on the EA forum on September 6, 2019. The post asks ‘How do most utilitarians feel about “replacement” thought experiments?’ The post quotes my paper The World Destruction Argument. In that paper, I challenge moral views of the kind that Beckstead, MacAskill, Ord and Bostrom seem to hold. Jonas Vollmer wrote me and said he spoke with the poster one or few days before the post was published, and that Jonas might have discouraged the poster from making the post if the poster had used a “world destruction” framing. In other words, the organisation where Jonas is Co-Executive Director receives 1 million in a grant for which Beckstead is a grant investigator, and then Jonas may discourage public discussion of my academic work that challenges moral views similar to Beckstead’s. Similarly, Torges wrote me on July 26, 2019, wondering if I had considered changing the title and/or abstract of my paper on the world destruction argument, which had recently been accepted for publication in a journal. He said he would be happy to help with this. I said no and that I react negatively to his question.3 Actually, someone else also suggested that I make a change after the paper had been accepted, but I didn’t perceive that as especially problematic. When Stefan wrote to me, the circumstances make it seem like it was not just a friendly improvement suggestion. I mean, Stefan and others had just made an agreement with Beckstead, who was a grant investigator for a recent large grant to Torges’ organisation. I think Beckstead would like to see my paper not published at all or at least edited in certain ways. And then it seems like Stefan carried out that work of trying to influence this publication. That’s what I don’t like. It is fine for people, in general, to give improvement suggestions at any stage of a paper. A problem with the communication guidelines and behaviours just described is that they go against scientific ideals about freedom to pursue ideas and about pitting ideas against one another. The situation in effective altruism and existential risk circles seems to rather be that some people use power, money, resources and connections in troublesome ways to promote themselves and their ideas

and values. On Oct. 31 and Nov. 5, 2019, I wrote questions to the Open Philanthropy Project, including Has the Open Philanthropy Project recommended a grant and, without saying so in public, conditioned the grant on the following or encouraged the grant recipient to do the following: not publicly endorse or not publicly write favourably about the ideas that the future will be bad overall or likely contain more disvalue than value? • Was the grant to EAF explicitly or implicitly conditioned on EAF writing guidelines and/or distributing them? • Did Beckstead or someone else at the Open Philanthropy Project communicate to anyone at EAF that a grant would be more likely or larger if EAF wrote guidelines? • I wonder whether Beckstead influenced or tried to influence what Jonas Vollmer, Stefan Torges, Lukas Gloor, and David Althaus wrote in their guidelines, or the fact that they wrote guidelines at all. If so, was any such activity by Beckstead a part of his work for the Open Philanthropy Project, or was he, for example, acting only as a private person? I also asked whether I may share the replies in public. A person at the Open Philanthropy Project replied that they do not have anything to add beyond the grant page, which does not answer my questions. I also wrote similar questions to Stefan Torges, one of the Co-Executive Directors of EAF, on Nov. 2 and 5, 2019, including the following questions: • Did Nick Beckstead express a wish that the guidelines encourage referencing his PhD dissertation? • Did he edit the document [with the EAF the guidelines] or make comments in it? • Did the Open Philanthropy Project condition the grant to EAF on the following or encourage EAF to do the following: not publicly endorse or not publicly write favourably about the ideas that the future will be bad overall or likely contain more disvalue than value? • May I share my questions and your replies in public? Stefan Torges replied on Nov. 4 and 7, 2019, with no answers to any of my questions and essentially saying that they will not reply to my questions (see this page for essentially our entire exchange). I tried to contact Nick Beckstead but I did not find any contact information online. Later, on 2 Jan. 2020, I wrote Beckstead on Messenger and LinkedIn (we are 1st-degree connections on LinkedIn), but as of 29 Jan. 2020 I do not see any reply. According to the website of the Open Philanthropy Project, “Openness is a core value of the Open Philanthropy Project…. We believe philanthropy could have a greater impact by sharing more information. Very often, key discussions and decisions happen behind closed doors…” EAF writes on its website that “Effective Altruism Foundation (EAF) strives for full transparency.” These organisations appear to go against their own statements about openness or transparency given their activities and reluctance to answer questions. I think those who help these organisations with donations, work, or promotion should demand replies to the kind of questions I have asked and demand that they be open about the activities I describe. The guidelines written by Beckstead say they are endorsed by 80,000 Hours, CEA, CFAR, MIRI, Open Phil, Nick Bostrom, Will MacAskill, Toby Ord, and Carl Shulman. One may ask about all of these organisations and individuals how and to what extent they were involved in the deal. For example, why did they endorse the guidelines? Did they influence the formulation of the EAF guidelines? Were they aware that EAF also wrote and would distribute guidelines (behind the scenes) that encourage readers to not publicly endorse or not publicly write favourably about the ideas that the future will be bad overall or likely contain more disvalue than value? Did they know or encourage that the EAF guidelines encourage referencing texts by these authors? For example, when Torges shared both documents with guidelines with me on July 18, 2019, he wrote the following in the same message right below the links to two the documents: We’re excited about this coordinated effort. Even though it means that we will promote future pessimism and s-risks to a lesser extent, we think the discourse about these topics will still be improved due to other more widely-read texts taking our perspective into account more. We already saw some concrete steps in this direction: For example, we’ve been able to give input on key 80k content and Toby Ord’s upcoming book on x-risk, which are and will be among the most widely read EA-related resources on long-termism. There will be more such content in the future, and we’ll continue to give input. Nick also invited a number of people to the research retreat that we hosted in May. All of that makes us confident that this will be a win-win outcome. And on July 26, 2019, Torges wrote to me, I also wanted to check back regarding our communication with Nick. Is it okay if I told him that you don’t feel comfortable endorsing the guidelines because of your current position as an academic, similar to GPI’s reservations? A part of my reply from the same day was, It is okay that you tell Nick that a part of the reason why I don’t endorse the guidelines is that I don’t feel comfortable endorsing the guidelines because of my current position as an academic. I had many reasons for not endorsing the guidelines, and one of them was that I do not think a university employee should do so. I presume the Nick we were talking about is Nick Beckstead. One can wonder why Torges would be telling Nick about whether I, a PhD student in practical philosophy in Stockholm, endorse the guidelines, which, among other things, essentially encourage the reader to stay silent about an idea about value that Nick Beckstead seems opposed to, and that encourage referencing texts by Beckstead and his colleagues? One can guess based on this that Nick had an interest in knowing whether people like me endorse the guidelines (at least Torges seemed to think so). The official justification for the guidelines and the related cooperation or agreement by some of those involved would presumably be that they worry that talking about the future being bad or pessimistic ethics may cause some extremist to kill people. I do not believe this is the whole story for several reasons. First, Beckstead, MacAskill, Ord and Bostrom have done a lot to promote views like traditional consequentialism and utilitarianism, and Ord has written, “I am very sympathetic towards Utilitarianism, carefully construed.” One can also accuse them of contributing to what one might call far-future fanaticism, according to which what happens nowadays, even violence and suffering, is essentially negligible as long as the far-future is very good. So I do not find it credible that they are so worried about talk of ethics or value leading to killings. More likely they have several other motives including that they are worried about the specific kind of killing that would prevent the existence of vast numbers of beings and purported value in the far future (killing everyone to replace them might even be morally obligatory, according to the moral views they promote). The following is some background. A standard objection to utilitarianism and consequentialism is that they imply that it would be right to kill if doing so would lead to the best results. Classical utilitarian Torbjörn Tännsjö thinks that a doctor ought to kill one healthy patient to give her organs to five other patients who need them to survive if there are no bad side effects. Philosopher Dale Jamieson wrote as early as 1984 that many philosophers have rejected TU [total utilitarianism] because it seems vulnerable to the Replacement Argument and the Repugnant Conclusion.… The Replacement Argument purports to show that a utilitarian cannot object to painlessly killing everyone now alive, so long as they are replaced with equally happy people who would not otherwise have lived. Tännsjö writes (my translation), “Suppose that we really can replace humans with beings who are … I think that it is clear that this is what in this situation should happen.… Let us rejoice with all those who one day hopefully … will take our place in the universe.” (For sources, see my web page). Years ago a young effective altruist asked me for career advice. The person self-identified as a classical utilitarian and the person’s goal was a hedonic shockwave, which I gather would fill the reachable part of the universe with pleasure. I don’t know if the person pictured that Earth would be destroyed in the process. The moral advocacy by Beckstead, William, Toby and Bostrom may already have resulted in violence and killings because people who are very concerned about ensuring that the far future has much value in it seem to be more prone to eat animals or animal products. A reason why they seem more prone to eat animal products is plausibly that they think the suffering and death they thereby cause is negligible compared to the vast value that could be created in the future, so they prioritise trying to make such a future more likely. Second, if Beckstead had the power to influence the grant to EAF, he may have seen it as an opportunity to make some people at EAF write and spread communication guidelines to silence people and affect what people say so that Beckestead’s own ethical views and priorities get more widespread, while suppressing ethical views and values that compete with his own. He and others behind the guidelines may exaggerate their worry that, for example, what I write will lead to some extremist killing people, in order to get EAF to write and disseminate their guidelines. This point can also be made about the Open Philanthropy Project as an organisation, rather than merely Beckstead as an individual. The following is an older, related example of potentially problematic behaviour behind the scenes. If I recall correctly, some years ago, Lukas Gloor and William MacAskill talked about the ethics of effective altruists. Roughly, speaking Gloor’s moral view appears pessimistic and MacAskill’s appears optimistic. They discussed a compromise (roughly a middle position), according to which effective altruists would have a moral view of the kind that suffering is twice as morally important as happiness (or, e.g., three times as important; I don’t recall exactly). I do not know if any agreement was reached or if they just discussed the idea. In any case, I do not think one should make such agreements behind the scenes. Systematically problematic syllabi, reading lists, citations, writings, etc. The activities described in the previous section seem to be just another instance of a pattern that has been going on for years involving to a large extent the same people and organisations, although not every person or organisation mentioned so far. Historically, a large part of the leadership of the two closely affiliated organisations CEA and FHI have been philosophy PhDs with a specific group of similar moral views, according to which, roughly speaking, it is overwhelmingly important to ensure that there will be vast amounts of value in the future. People at and around CEA and FHI seem to try to present to the public and students the part of the ethics literature that fits their specific view about the importance of ensuring the existence of very many beings and a lot of value in the future. They tend to avoid mentioning other views, and to cite and refer the reader to a small number of authors, often themselves and their colleagues, who essentially all agree with them. Another method appears to be for a philosopher at Oxford Univesity and CEA with a PhD to write an attack on a competing view in a way that is so biased and misleading that I do not recall seeing such problematic writing in ethics by an academic philosopher outside of this cluster of people at and around CEA and FHI. Importantly, many of these texts are not directed at professional philosophers who know about other views and can immediately tell how one-sided the texts are, but the texts seem to be about convincing non-philosophers, often students and young people. All this seems to be done in different troublesome ways, which I describe below. It seems to partly be done through trying to create syllabi with writings by themselves and those who agree with them and trying to establish such courses at universities. Perhaps the overall strategy is to influence the values of students, increase the citation count and prominence of one’s own researchers and allies, while avoid mentioning opposing views. The EA syllabi I’ve read are so one-sided that I would feel dishonest to teach a course with such a syllabus. For example, one syllabus which says it is compiled by CEA (quote from Nov. 2, 2019): …this course syllabus, compiled by the Centre for Effective Altruism. The aim of this syllabus is not to give detailed instructions for how to run a course, but rather to provide inspiration for lectures and professors with an interest in teaching effective altruism. This syllabus is primarily intended to be used in courses in philosophy or political theory, but could also be given, in part or wholly, in courses in other subjects. The syllabus includes the following section: 10) The far future and existential risk Many effective altruists think that the lives of future people are highly ethically significant. A natural conclusion from that view is to focus one’s efforts on shaping the far future and, in particular, to reduce the risk of human extinction, posed by, e.g. synthetic biology and artificial intelligence. This module treats a number of themes related to these issues, from population ethics to strategies to reduce existential risk. Beckstead, Nicholas. On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future. Ph.D Thesis, Rutgers University. (Especially ch. 1.) Bostrom, Nick (2013). Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Global Policy, 4, pp. 15-31. Bostrom, Nick (2002). Astronomical Waste: the Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development. Utilitas 15, pp. 308-314. Greaves, Hilary. Population Axiology. (Unpublished survey manuscript.) Matheny, Jason Gaverick (2007). Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction. Risk Analysis, 27, pp. 1335-1344. Ord, Toby (2014). The Timing of Labour Aimed at Reducing Existential Risk. Blog post at Future of Humanity Institute. Rees, Martin (2015). This Crime Against Future Generations. The Times, 15 August 2015. All texts listed essentially agree on the ethics. Well, Greaves’ text is as an introduction to population axiology so it is not about defending a view, but it still excludes pessimistic publications on population ethics/axiology like works by professors David Benatar, Christoph Fehige and Clark Wolf. Half of the texts are by CEA trustees (Beckstead, Greaves and Ord). Bostrom leads FHI and Matheny lists FHI as a past affiliation on his CV. According to CEA’s organisation chart in a post from 2017, Pablo Stafforini was one of the people located directly below William MacAskill. In September 2016, Stafforini wrote in an e-mail that Will asked him to create a list of EA readings for a wealthy philanthropist, and after doing that Stafforini decided to expand it (here is the perhaps now broken link to the list). Pablo explained kindly that he felt GiveWell was overrepresented and EAF underrepresented so he asked for feedback before making it public and sharing it in the public Facebook EA group. As usual, the section on the long-term future, which I paste right below, was one-sided and referred only to people who agree and who are mainly at or around CEA and FHI (Sandberg is also a team member at FHI). I replied that Pablo should at least add Brian Tomasik’s https://foundational-research.org/risks-of-astronomical-future-suffering/ in this section. He replied that he added it, but when I checked later and then even later in March 2018 I did not see it. I am not saying Pablo removed it, but I did not see it so someone may have. The organisation 80,000 Hours, where MacAskill is President, is a part of CEA. The essay “Presenting the long-term value thesis” from late 2017 by Benjamin Todd, the CEO and co-founder of 80,000 Hours, was shared in the main Facebook EA group by Robert Wiblin, who works for 80,000 Hours. I agree with then philosophy PhD student Michael Plant’s comment, I found this woefully one-sided and uncharitable towards person-affecting views (i.e. the view we should ‘make people happy, not make happy people’). I would honestly have expected a better quality of argument from effective altruists…. 1. Your ‘summary of the debate’ was entirely philosophers who all agree with your view. This is poor academic form. A one-sided part of the essay is that the further reading section at the end only lists texts by or podcasts with Bostrom, Beckstead and Ord, i.e., two trustees of CEA and Bostrom who leads FHI which 80,000 Hours is affiliated with. They all agree, and none of the other views out there are mentioned. Another problem is that Benjamin claims to be arguing for a broad thesis about the importance of the future, but actually argues for a specific version of that view that he and all the people just mentioned at CEA and FHI seemingly endorse (see my comment). Ord is a trustee at CEA and part of the team at FHI. His 2013 essay against negative utilitarianism (NU) is a one-sided and misleading attempt to convince lay people away from negative utilitarianism. I try to be polite in my response to it, but I will try to be blunter here. His text is so bad partly for the following reasons: Toby writes in the role of a university researcher with a PhD in philosophy, and he writes for non-experts. He spends the whole essay essentially trashing a moral view that is opposite to his own. He does little to refer the reader to more information, especially information that contradicts what he writes. He describes the academic literature incorrectly in a way that benefits his case. He writes that “A thorough going Negative Utilitarian would support the destruction of the world (even by violent means)” without mentioning that for many years, a published objection to his favoured view (classical utilitarianism) is that it implies that one should kill everyone and replace us, if one could thereby maximize the sum of well-being (see my paper The World Destruction Argument). Ord’s text fits very well with the overall pattern I describe, and the moral theory NU that Ord attacks is a typical example of the kind of view that the guidelines from 2019 mentioned above encourage the reader to not advocate or write favourably about. In CEA’s Effective Altruism Handbook, 2nd ed. (2017), there is a chapter titled “The Long-Term Future” by Jess Whittlestone, who seemingly has interned for 80,000 Hours, which is a part of CEA. That chapter also contains one-sided framings, citations, objections, etc. (e.g., the ethics discussion on p. 76.) The only text besides Whittlestone’s in “The Long-Term Future”-part of the EA handbook is Beckstead’s “A Proposed Adjustment to the Astronomical Waste Argument.” The decision to make these two texts make up the “The Long-Term Future” part of the book is one-sided. Let’s turn to the text Farquhar et al. (2017) “Existential Risk Diplomacy and Governance,” by the Global Priorities Project, which is or was a part of CEA. The FHI logo is also on the publication. It has a section “1.2. The ethics of existential risk,” which starts with Parfit’s (1984) idea about the importance of a populated future. Then it cites only papers by Bostrom and Beckstead, who are both affiliated with the same organisations as the authors when it makes the case that “because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67” It then admirably acknowledges that there is disagreement about this: Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. But where do they point the reader to in note 68? Only to Beckstead’s dissertation, which argues, sometimes uncharitably, for the ethical view Bostrom and Farquhar et al. favour. A 2017 paper by two authors from FHI called “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity” was published in the journal Health Security. The paper has a section “How Bad Would Human Extinction Be?“ which has a one-sided and dubious take on the literature: Human extinction would not only end the 7 billion lives in our current generation, but also cause the loss of all future generations to come. To calculate the humanitarian cost associated with such a catastrophe, one must therefore include the welfare of these future generations. While some have argued that future generations ought to be excluded or discounted when considering ethical actions,50 most of the in-depth philosophical work around the topic has concluded that future generations should not be given less inherent value.51-55 Therefore, for our calculations, we include future lives in our cost-effectiveness estimate. The references in this passage are by Parfit, an Oxford philosopher who was broadly in line with FHI’s ethics; Ng, a classical utilitarian; Beckstead; Broome, an Oxford philosopher who seems to have an optimistic moral philosophy; Cowen; and a science paper by Lenton and von Bloh, which does not seem especially related to the value of future generations. As further reading, the authors point to the text by Matheny mentioned in syllabus above. As mentioned, Matheny has been affiliated with FHI. No mention of opposing views or the many philosophers who have done in-depth work arguing against the authors’ view here (see, e.g., Wikipedia entry on the Asymmetry or my essay). By the way, this publication Matheny (2007) “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction” that people at CEA and FHI keep pointing to is also one-sided and inaccurate in a biased way. Section 5 is about discounting and touches on population ethics. See, for example, the problematic first paragraph of the section, which gives an inaccurate picture of the state of the philosophical debate in a way that favours his view. See also the one-sided reasoning and references in note 6, which include traditional utilitarians Hare and Ng, Holtug who has argued against the Asymmetry in population ethics, and Sikora who presents an argument for classical utilitarianism. In the end, Matheny acknowledges, among others, Nick Bostrom and Carl Shulman for comments on an earlier draft. Potentially dishonest self-promotion On MacAskill’s profiles at ted.com and theguardian.com, and on the cover of his book Doing Good Better it says “cofounder of the effective altruism movement.” But unless I have missed some key information, he is not a cofounder of effective altruism or the effective altruism movement. When I volunteered for GiveWell in 2008–2009, the ideas of being altruistic and having an impact effectively were already established and there was a community or movement around GiveWell. Then Giving What We Can launched in November 2009. From the time I worked for GiveWell in 2010, I recall MacAskill (last name Crouch at the time) as a student who commented on the GiveWell blog. Then, in 2011, CEA was founded. Perhaps he and others started using the phrase ‘effective altruism’ but it does not really matter because using a potentially new phrase for something that already exists does not make someone a cofounder. My impression of MacAskill’s role over the years is that he has done a lot to grow the effective altruist community, movement and brand (and maybe was one of those who created the brand; I don’t know), and has spread related ideas. He has perhaps also contributed with new ideas. Importantly, he and his colleagues mentioned above, especially at CEA and Oxford University, also seem to have systematically put in a lot of effort to enter and try to shape this movement or community so that people and organisations in it share their particular moral views and priorities, and, for example, donate to the kind of activities they want to see funded (to a substantial extent because of their specific and controversial moral views). Nick Bostrom’s CV says he set a national record for undergraduate performance in Sweden, but I doubt he set such a record (I think no one knows, including Bostrom himself), and I think he presents the situation in a misleading way. His CV says, Imaged omitted for formatting. He also used to bring up the purported record at the landing page of his website (current link https://nickbostrom.com/old/). I have a bachelor’s and two master’s degrees from the same university in Gothenburg, Sweden, and I have lived almost all of my life in Sweden. I have never heard of any national record related to undergraduate performance. I mentioned his statement ‘Undergraduate performance set national record in Sweden’ to a few people in Sweden who are familiar with the university system in Sweden. One person laughed out loud, another found his claim amusing, and a third found it weird. I called the University of Gothenburg on Oct. 21, 2019, but the person there was not aware of any such records. On Oct. 21, 2019, I wrote Bostrom and asked him about his record. On Oct. 23, 2019, he replied and gave me permission to share his reply in public, the relevant part of which reads as follows: The record in question refers to the number of courses simultaneously pursued at one point during my undergraduate studies, which – if memory serves, which it might not since it is more than 25 years ago – was the equivalent of about three and a half programs of full time study, I think 74 ’study points’. (I also studied briefly at Umea Univ during the same two-year period I was enrolled in Gothenburg.) The basis for thinking this might be a record is simply that at the time I asked around in some circles of other ambitious students, and the next highest course load anybody had heard of was sufficiently lower than what I was taking that I thought statistically it looked like it was likely a record. A part of my e-mail reply to Bostrom on Oct. 24, 2019: My impression is that it may be difficult to confirm that no one else had done what you did. One would need to check what a vast number of students did at different universities potentially over many years. I don’t even know if that data is accessible before the 1990s, and to search all that data could be an enormous task. My picture of the situation is as follows: You pursued unusually many courses at some point in time during your undergraduate studies. You asked some students and the next highest course load anyone of them had heard of was sufficiently lower. You didn’t and don’t know whether anyone had done what you did before. (I do not know either; we can make guesses about whether someone else had done what you did, but that would be speculation.) Then you claim on your CV “Undergraduate performance set national record in Sweden.” I am puzzled by how you can think that is an honest and accurate claim. Will you change your CV so that you no longer claim that you set a record? Information about university studies seems publicly available in Sweden. When I called the University of Gothenburg on Oct. 21, 2019, the person there said they have the following information for Niklas Boström, born 10 March 1973: Two degrees in total (one bachelor’s and one master’s degree). The bachelor’s degree (Swedish: fil. kand.) from University of Gothenburg was awarded in January 1995. Coursework included theoretical philosophy. The master’s degree (Swedish: magister or fil. mag.) is from Stockholm University, and, according to my notes from the call, in theoretical philosophy (although I guess coursework in some other subject could perhaps be included in the degree). He also did some additional coursework. He started to study at university in Lund in fall 1992. I asked Bostrom whether this is him but he did not reply. More information that I noted from my call with the university include that the person could see information from different universities in Sweden, and there are in total 367.5 higher education credits in the system (from different Swedish universities) for Boström, according to the current method for counting credits. 60 credits is a normal academic year (assuming one does not, e.g., take summer courses). Boström bachelor’s degree corresponds to 180 credits, which is the exact requirement for a bachelor’s degree. The total number of credits (367.5) corresponds to 6.125 years of full-time study (again, assuming, e.g., no summer courses or extra evening courses). According to the university, he started studying in 1992 and, according to Bostrom’s CV, he studied at Stockholm University until 1996. I asked Bostrom and I gather he confirmed that he only has one bachelor’s degree.

### 1NC---AT: Federalism

#### No spillover.

Robinson 15, J.D. from Harvard University, B.A. from the University of Virginia, Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law; Washington University Law Review, (Kimberly, 2015, “Disrupting Education Federalism,” Rev. 959)

In offering a theory for how education federalism should be restructured to strengthen the federal role over education, and thus reduce reliance on states to ensure equal access to an excellent education, I build upon Yale Law Professor Heather Gerken's argument that federalism theory should eschew advancing a single theory for all occasions because "[b]oth in theory and practice .. . there are many federalisms, not one."39 She astutely contends that scholars developing and critiquing federalism theory should consider the appropriate balance of institutional arrangements for a specific context. 40 Therefore, my theory for how education federalism should be restructured does not attempt to propose a federalism theory for other policymaking arenas such as environmental law or healthcare policy. Instead, it solely proposes a shift in the balance of federal, state, and local authority in order to strengthen the federal role in ensuring equal access to an excellent education while preserving the aspects of state and local autonomy over education that do not undermine equal access to an excellent education.

#### \*\*\* Climate change and COVID-19 thump federalism.

Feldman 2-23-2021, a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and host of the podcast “Deep Background.” He is a professor of law at Harvard University and was a clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter.(Noah, February 23, 2021, “Federalism Shows Its Age Fighting Covid-19, Climate Change,” *Bloomberg Opinion,* <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-02-23/vaccine-rollout-and-texas-disaster-show-limits-of-federalism>)

There wasn’t much President Joe Biden could have done about this month’s Texas energy disaster. Ditto the slow-moving vaccine rollout. The reason is the same: federalism, a system dating back to the 1780s and only seriously overhauled once. Although federalism still has some benefits, its obsolescence is increasingly obvious when the U.S. faces crises that, like climate change and Covid-19, don’t respect state boundaries. Energy and health care are only two of the crucial infrastructure systems that remain state-regulated or state-run. And many of those systems are in need of updating everywhere — not piecemeal, as federalism tends to support. Federalism was, in important ways, an American invention — the brainchild of James Madison. It was a product of political necessity for 13 states that had been separately administered as British colonies and that had already tried and failed to function as a loose confederation between 1776 and 1787. Unifying into a single nation would have been practical for the early United States. At the Philadelphia constitutional convention, big-state representatives, including Madison, favored a heavily national model of government to replace the failing decentralized system created by the Articles of Confederation. But local elites in the small states did not want to give up power. They staged a walkout, returning only once they were assured of permanent protections for their states, including equal representation in the Senate. The core idea of federalism was that states would retain sovereignty over their citizens, while the federal government would in parallel exercise its own sovereignty over the same people. The founders thus “split the atom of sovereignty,” as Justice Anthony Kennedy once grandly put it: Instead of a single sovereign government, the U.S. would have a federal semi-sovereign government operating alongside the semi-sovereign states. The devil was in the details. Which government controlled which powers became a challenge. The Civil War was fought in part over the question of whether states or the federal government would have control over the existence of slavery. Recognizably modern national regulatory legislation began to emerge gradually in the Progressive Era. In 1887, a century after the Philadelphia convention, the Interstate Commerce Commission was created by Congress to regulate railroads, the most important interstate infrastructure of the day. But it took the Great Depression and the resultant New Deal for Congress to pass vast national legislation and to create a raft of federal agencies to perform coordinating tasks that had previously been unthinkable. New Deal federalism was itself continuing the compromise between the federal government and the states. Core issues of national competency were moved to the federal level. Yet states retained a tremendous amount of regulatory capacity, including in areas that overlapped with federal regulatory control. Thus, to take the example of energy, both the federal government and the states regulate different aspects of the power grid. In this respect, today’s federalism isn’t radically different from the federalism of the New Deal. Texas actually made a conscious choice not to connect its power grid to that of other states, partly in order to retain state regulatory control. Under the Constitution as it has been interpreted since the New Deal, Congress would have the power to pass laws that impose regulatory controls even on in-state power grids. If Congress wanted to, it could enact laws empowering federal regulators to require state-based power plants to be capable of functioning even in very cold temperatures, thereby reducing the risk of the kind of temperature-based breakdowns that caused the recent Texas power disaster. Similarly, Congress has the authority to do much more than it does to control or regulate health care at the state level. Even a nationalized health-care system would be within the constitutional reach of Congress. Education is yet another area where states exercise near total authority, even though the issue is of obvious national importance. The problem, therefore, doesn’t lie in the Constitution, at least not primarily. It lies in the deeply established political norms and customs that still confer enormous power on states, even regarding national infrastructure problems that span state boundaries. Those customs and norms continue to shape the distribution of power and responsibility as between the states and the federal government. True, the constitutional design of the Senate, as well as the continued sovereign existence of the states, help shape the ongoing political reality. But as the New Deal federalism overhaul shows, those structural features of our federal system can be overcome when crisis demands it. Will the crises regarding climate change and Covid-19 generate support for overhauling federalism again? If failures continue to pile up over time, the public will demand change, and to meet that need, Congress and the president may see fit to regulate more extensively. As infrastructure in the United States continues to degrade, the need for such federal initiatives is likely to continue to grow. Until it does, the U.S. will remain stuck with the legacy of an 18th-century Constitution that, despite its many virtues, doesn’t always meet the needs of the moment.

### 1NC---AT: Unregulated Tech Acquisition

#### \*\* Unregulated tech is hard to get

Scharre 17, Senior Fellow and director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. (Paul, 12-22-2017, "Why You Shouldn’t Fear “Slaughterbots”", https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/military-robots/why-you-shouldnt-fear-slaughterbots)

The “Slaughterbots” video takes this problem and blows it out of proportion, however, suggesting that drones would be used by terrorists as robotic weapons of mass destruction, killing thousands of people at a time. Fortunately, this nightmare scenario is about as likely to happen as HAL 9000 locking you out of the pod bay doors. The technology shown in the video is plausible, but basically everything else is a bunch of malarkey. The video assumes the following: Governments will mass-produce lethal microdrones to use them as weapons of mass destruction; There are no effective defenses against lethal microdrones; Governments are incapable of keeping military-grade weapons out of the hands of terrorists; Terrorists are capable of launching large-scale coordinated attacks. These assumptions range from questionable, at best, to completely fanciful. Of course, the video is fictional, and defense planners do often use fictionalized scenarios to help policymakers think through plausible events that may occur. As a defense analyst at a think tank and in my prior job as a strategic planner at the Pentagon, I used fictional scenarios to help inform choices about what technologies the United States military should invest in. To be useful, however, these scenarios need to at least be plausible. They need to be something that could happen. The scenario depicted in the “Slaughterbots” video fails to account for political and strategic realities about how governments use military technology. First, there is no evidence that governments are planning to mass-produce small drones to kill civilians in large numbers. In my forthcoming book, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, I examine next-generation weapons being built in defense labs around the world. Russia, China, and the United States are all racing ahead on autonomy and artificial intelligence. But the types of weapons they are building are generally aimed at fighting other militaries. They are “counter-force” weapons, not “counter-value” weapons that would target civilians. Counter-force autonomous weapons raise their own sets of concerns, but they aren’t designed for mass targeting of civilians, nor could they be easily repurposed to do so. Second, in the video, we’re told the drones can defeat “any countermeasure.” TV pundits scream, “We can’t defend ourselves.” This isn’t fiction; it’s farce. Every military technology has a countermeasure, and countermeasures against small drones aren’t even hypothetical. The U.S. government is actively working on ways to shoot down, jam, fry, hack, ensnare, or otherwise defeat small drones. The microdrones in the video could be defeated by something as simple as chicken wire. The video shows heavier-payload drones blasting holes through walls so that other drones can get inside, but the solution is simply layered defenses. Military analysts look at the cost-exchange ratio between offense and defense, and in this case, the costs heavily favor static defenders. In a world where terrorists launch occasional small-scale attacks using DIY drones, people are unlikely to absorb the inconveniences of building robust defenses, just like people don’t wear body armor to protect against the unlikely event of being caught in a mass shooting. But if an enemy country built hundreds of thousands of drones to wipe out a city, you bet there’d be a run on chicken wire. The video takes a plausible problem—terrorist attacks with drones—and scales it up without factoring in how others would respond. If lethal microdrones were built en masse, defenses and countermeasures would be a national priority, and in this case the countermeasures are simple. Any weapon that can be defeated by a net isn’t a weapon of mass destruction. Third, the video assumes that militaries are incapable of preventing terrorists from getting access to military-grade weapons. But we don’t give terrorists hand grenades, rocket launchers, or machine guns today. Terrorist attacks with drones are a concern precisely because they involve DIY explosives strapped to readily available technology. This is a genuine problem, but again the video scales this threat up in ways that are unrealistic. Even if militaries were to build lethal microdrones, terrorists are no more likely to get their hands on large numbers of them than other military technologies. Weapons do proliferate over time to nonstate actors in war zones, but just because antitank guided missiles are prevalent in Syria doesn’t mean they’re commonplace in New York. Terrorists use airplanes and trucks for attacks precisely because successfully smuggling military-grade weapons into a Western country isn’t that easy. Fourth, the video assumes terrorists can carry out coordinated attacks at a scale that is not plausible. In one scene, two men release a swarm of about 50 drones from the back of a van. This specific scene is fairly realistic; one of the challenges of autonomy is that a small group of people could launch a larger attack than might otherwise be possible. Something like a truck full of 50 drones is a reasonable possibility. Again, though, the video takes this scenario to the absurd. The video claims that 8,300 people are killed in simultaneous attacks. If the men in the van depict a typical attack, then this level of casualties would equate to over 160 coordinated attacks worldwide. Terrorist groups often launch coordinated attacks, but usually on the scale of single digit numbers of attacks. The video assumes not just superweapons but ones that are in the hands of supervillains. The movie uses hype and fear to skip past these crucial assumptions, and in doing so it undermines any rational debate about the risk of terrorists acquiring autonomous weapons. The video makes clear we’re supposed to be afraid. But what are we supposed to be afraid of? A weapon that chooses its own targets (which the video is actually ambiguous about)? A weapon with no countermeasure? The fact that terrorists can get ahold of the weapon? The ability of autonomy to scale up attacks? If you want to drum up fears of “killer robots,” the video is great. But as a substantive analysis of the issue, it falls apart under even the most casual scrutiny. The video doesn’t put forward an argument. It’s sensationalist fear-mongering.

# 2NC

## K ⁠— Critique

### 2NC ⁠— O/V

#### Capitalism causes unethical AI development that feeds neoliberalism.

Gurumurthy 20 (Anita Gurumurthy works for IT for Change, an NGO that works at the intersection of digital technologies and social change, and is engaged in research and policy advocacy on network society, with a focus on governance, democracy and gender justice. “How to make AI work for people and planet” , <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/how-make-ai-work-people-and-planet/> , 10 March 2020, date accessed 9/17/21)

The human body is asserting itself more than as a performative spectacle on the streets. From Hong Kong to India, Catalonia, Lebonan, Chile and many more, the body is a signifier of bio-power and hope, defeating surveillance, courting arrest and deliberately seeking the system’s panoptic gaze. The proliferation of protests suggests a tipping point – but systematic change is harder work. And in this regard, we know enough about what the building blocks to dismantle and recreate social structures in their entirety may look like. After all, democracy was born out of the churn that political and economic structures were put through in history. The AI (artificial intelligence) moment as we know it presents a frightening challenge – it is born of and continually feeds a global crisis of gross injustice of a deep state that is led on by a deeper corporation. Sonia Correa, the Brazilian feminist scholar, calls attention to the wider process of de-democratisation that confronts us. The collusion of the neoliberals and the neoconservatives is ravaging the rights of the majority everywhere, constantly creating the un-deserving other. Human rights activists in the digital domain are broadly of the view that the existing human rights regime is still relevant to the challenges of the 21st century. However, a complete failure of twentieth century institutions in promoting global democracy and the rapid evolution of the AI era seem to bring in an unforeseen complexity. A normative crisis characterises the systems that work the techno-economic structures of the world. Carrying the DNA of cyber-libertarian and tech-utopian ambitions of Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, these structures point to the crying need for norms-building for a new data epoch, acknowledging the strengths and limitations of the human rights framework. The fourth industrial revolution demands that the creaking institutions of twentieth century democracy be dismantled. This is not a romantic call for revolution, but an assertion that is historically aware and grounded in the continuities of capitalism. We are compelled to look at time-space and scalar relationships afresh. We are forced to rearticulate institutional values and norms as if data is real; the data economy, the real economy. And we need to acknowledge that the virtual is institutional. Incremental approaches will not work. In the long march of capitalism, this moment of discontinuity has produced hegemonic discourses of AI that serve neoliberal capitalism. The bi-polar geoeconomic order in which US and China are carving up the rest of the world into their economic dominion requires to be countered by an ‘ideas revolution’ for data and AI. The planet’s very sustenance is at stake. The intelligent corporation with its virtualized production and distribution networks can no longer be contained by the rulebook for place-bound operations. Its ceaseless data accumulation needs a new institutional framework for economic rights in data. The datafication and algorithmic management of citizenship cannot be mended by making technical choices. Citizenship rights need to be reimagined as nested, multi-scalar and essentially political. The future of work built on the present of AI-led labour substitution and worker surveillance is but a new era of bondage. It epitomises capital’s ‘final freedom’ from labour. Worker data rights need to be the cornerstone of a new social contract, not to be left to the benevolence of capital. A virulent patriarchy is on the upsurge globally. The fourth industrial revolution is blatantly sexist and mainstream public spheres are inherently misogynistic. Women need a different world order, and they need the power to vision and create it.

#### Turns China: Capitalist 5G development makes war inevitable — but shifting away from growth mindsets causes peaceful development.

Albert 20, M.D. @ John Hopkins. BA in Evolutionary Biology (Michael, April, The Dangers of Decoupling: Earth System Crisis and the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, *Global Policy*, Volume 11, Issue 2, DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12791)

State securitization and totalitarian dangers

The third key risk domain involves the securitization powers of states. FIR technologies may not qualitatively transform state power individually, though their convergent character could offer immense power to states that are able to systematically harness these capabilities for surveillance and militarization purposes. Unsurprisingly, such capacities are being intensively pursued by leading states. In particular, the US and China appear to be engaged in an AI arms race, with China aiming to create a $150 billion AI industry by 2030 and the Pentagon seeking to triple its AI warfare budget to match China’s ambition (Ashizuka, 2019). Military robotics is also a key field of competition, with worldwide spending tripling between 2000 and 2015 from $2.4 to $7.5 billion, and which some estimate will double again by 2025 (Allen and Chan, 2017). The US has also spent $29 billion on nanotechnology research since 2001, with about 20 per cent of its investments involving military applications (National Nanotechnology Initiative, 2019). A short list of potential military applications includes powerful and lightweight body armor, microscopic and networked nano-bots with capacities for ‘swarm intelligence’, and more compact and powerful chemical and nuclear weapons (Drexler, 2013; National Nanotechnology Initiative, 2019). The full extent of the capabilities these technologies may unleash cannot be known in advance, though it seems possible that they could become an ‘axial’ capability of states. As Deudney (2007) describes, an axial capability is one that can dominate an entire system due to its unique character. While FIR technologies may not offer axial capabilities individually, their convergent character is such that they could collectively offer an axial advantage to states able to systematically harness their potential. This could take the form of a globally networked and nano-IOT-AI powered system harnessing vast capacities for force mobilization and information gathering and processing. By integrating nanotechnology, the IOT, big data, and robotics while harnessing the processing power and flexibility of advanced AI, states may in this way be in the midst of unleashing technological capabilities that will enable them to informationalize and monitor human populations while mobilizing destructive power with an unprecedented degree of precision and sophistication. Of course, without speculating on the future, we can already see how states are taking advantage of the global information infrastructure to enhance control over the security environment. In particular, the metastasizing US security state is already in process of forging an incipient TechnoLeviathan – a ‘global-surveillance-state-in-the-making’ – whose drive for informational omniscience is pushing it beyond territorial boundaries in an effort to control the global infosphere and erode all pretense of legality and democratic oversight (Engelhardt, 2014, p. 107). And we are seeing comparable developments in China, where advances in AI, the IOT, and big data are being used to construct a ‘citizen score’ system that incentivizes ‘good’ (i.e. regimefriendly) behavior and punishes citizens for critical thinking (Mitchell and Diamond, 2018). Thus, while securitization trends in the US and China should already give us pause, they will only become more extensive and intensive by integrating increasingly advanced FIR technologies over time, which would likely be the case if the latter are relied upon to achieve decoupling.

The spiral of insecurity and securitization

Overall, due to the combination of democratized violence capacities and totalitarian state powers that it would create, the FIR would likely generate a reinforcing spiral of insecurity and securitization that produces a qualitatively new kind of techno-authoritarianism on a global scale. To understand how this may come about, it is first important to recognize that even if the FIR enables the global economy to grow while stabilizing the climate at 1.5 or 2 degrees C (a highly optimistic assumption), this would still (according to one study) leave 16 to 29 per cent of the world’s population (mostly in the Global South) vulnerable to lethal climate impacts (Byers et al., 2018). Technological advance could certainly improve adaptation capacities even amidst such environmental changes, but poverty and deprivation will remain difficult to reverse, and deep grievances felt towards the Global North – due to its primary responsibility in creating the problem whose consequences are primarily suffered in the Global South – will make militant and/or terrorist violence a likely response. Second, we can see that the increasing dependence of the global economy on FIR technologies would create an exponential expansion of possible bio and cyber attack vectors. In conjunction with steady advances in technologies of securitization and rising fear among policy makers and populations, it may only require a relatively ‘minimal’ attack (e.g. something comparable to 9/11, rather than the kind of million or even billion casualty attack feared by some bioterror experts) to catalyze a further threshold of intensified global securitization. What might this threshold entail? Abstractly, it could be understood as a shift from a predominant ‘liberal’ security apparatus to an ‘authoritarian’ mode that establishes a permanent ‘state of emergency’ on a global scale (Opitz, 2011). While we can only speculate on what this might look like in practice, especially as technologies of securitization advance, it would likely involve a conjoined transformation in and integration of both technological-surveillance and institutional-legal assemblages, with the former being intensified and extended while the latter sheds all pretext of democratic oversight to become an increasingly absolutist form of sovereign authority on a global scale. Surveillance would reach from the planetary to the molecular scale through a network of satellites, distributed environmental sensors, and AI-facilitated data collection and processing techniques; military force mobilization capacities of nearly absolute speed and global reach could be created through a combination of space-based and networked AI-robotic weapons systems; and the right of the planetary sovereign to detain individuals, mobilize force without legal pretext, and constrict the mobility of people and goods to more tightly regulated territories, would be enshrined. While such an apparatus may seem far-fetched, philosopher and futurist Nick Bostrom envisions a similarly totalitarian global surveillance system as the necessary prerequisite of global security in an age of democratized weapons of mass destruction (Bostrom, 2018). And he notes that ‘thanks to the falling price of cameras, data transmission, storage, and computing, and the rapid advances in AI-enabled content analysis, [it] may soon become both technologically feasible and affordable’ (Bostrom, 2018, p. 25). In sum, while techno-authoritarian trends are already evident in the US and China, FIR technologies would further enhance their capabilities while ‘democratizing’ WMD capacities among non-state actors (Blum and Wittes, 2015). This would incentivize states to extend and deepen surveillance as far as possible while making democratic populations more willing to accept intensified securitization, therefore making it difficult to avoid an authoritarian global security apparatus.

Conclusions

To return to the question that opened this essay: can global capitalism solve the earth system crisis? I have shown that the answer is an ambiguous maybe: the FIR may enable economic growth to decouple sufficiently rapidly from CO2 emissions and broader environmental impacts to stabilize the earth system, though these technological solutions would then intensify risks in the domains of biosecurity, cybersecurity, and state surveillance, thereby unleashing a spiral of insecurity and securitization that will push global capitalism towards a new kind of techno-authoritarianism. It is thus worth showing, in a way that differs from, yet complements the arguments of degrowth advocates, that even if global capitalism can succeed in stabilizing the earth system in a context of endless growth, then it would likely create security threats and totalitarian dangers that would undermine the desirability of such a system. This conclusion reinforces the need for a set of global policies that break decisively from the growth-oriented status quo. On one hand, to dampen these technological trends and improve the prospects of earth system stabilization, the pursuit of GDP growth should be replaced by alternative goals based on new metrics (e.g. the Genuine Progress Indicator or Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare) that more accurately represent social welfare (Kallis, 2018). The European Commission’s Beyond GDP project shows that steps are being taken in this direction, though they should go further by explicitly ending reliance on growth by placing hard caps on material-energy throughput while restructuring economies so that livelihoods are not dependent on increasing GDP (Hickel, 2019; O’Neill et al., 2018). On the other hand, many FIR technologies (especially open source synthetic biology) offer great promise for improving human welfare through advances in sustainable energy, agriculture, and medicine. Thus, transitioning beyond growth should not necessarily entail abandoning these technologies, and strong global regimes for regulating and monitoring their use would therefore be necessary. However, rather than simply strengthening existing regimes like the Biological Weapons Convention (Charlet, 2018) or relying on private sectorled initiatives to regulate emerging risks ‘without impeding the capacity of research to deliver innovation and economic growth’ (Schwab, 2017, p. 90), more far-reaching changes are needed to enhance democratic control over the pace and direction of technological innovation, thereby counterbalancing the influence of multinational firms and militaries. In particular, ‘citizens assemblies’ should be empowered to debate the relative benefits and risks posed by FIR technologies (from synthetic biology to IoT, nanotechnology, and AI) and set mandates regarding investment levels and priorities, the direction of research, and the pace of deployment, while also having the right to ‘relinquish’ certain technological trajectories if their risks are perceived to outweigh the benefits.5 Overall, a ‘post-growth’ economy based on more democratized ownership of common wealth, reduced overall material-energetic throughput, decelerated and democratically controlled technological innovation, and prioritization of production for meeting essential human needs rather than profit (Hickel, 2019; Kallis, 2018; Raworth, 2017), has the potential to create a global political-economy that meets all human needs within planetary boundaries without shifting problems into the realms of biosecurity, cybersecurity, and state securitization. While the obstacles it confronts are of course formidable, the alternatives may be ecological collapse and civilizational breakdown (if the FIR fails to decouple economic growth from environmental impacts) or global techno-authoritarianism (if it succeeds).

#### \*Alt makes AI development more ethical.

Gurumurthy 20 (Anita Gurumurthy works for IT for Change, an NGO that works at the intersection of digital technologies and social change, and is engaged in research and policy advocacy on network society, with a focus on governance, democracy and gender justice. “How to make AI work for people and planet” , <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/how-make-ai-work-people-and-planet/> , 10 March 2020, date accessed 9/17/21)

We need to build democratic foundations bottom-up for the AI paradigm. And this is a socio-political task.

Decolonising AI

Today, in many quarters, we hear of data colonialism. Colony and empire are interconnected in history not only because the colonised were enslaved by the empire’s totalising hold; the story of empire also carries an indelible imprint of the power struggles that break that hold, one blow at a time.

Whether AI will be an autonomous weapon of social injustice or a powerful agent of autonomous societies depends on the stories we choose to weave, the parameters we decide to make worthy.

Data as master signifier is firmly located in social subjectivities carefully crafted and tirelessly nurtured by neo-liberal capitalism. In dismantling the AI that fuels 21st century capitalism, democracy must find new master signifiers that inspire new subjectivities.

#### Capitalist tech innovation causes nuclear war and WMD terrorism — extinction, BUT degrowth solves.

Albert 20, M.D. @ John Hopkins. BA in Evolutionary Biology (Michael, April, The Dangers of Decoupling: Earth System Crisis and the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, *Global Policy*, Volume 11, Issue 2, DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12791)

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Overall, due to the combination of democratized violence capacities and totalitarian state powers that it would create, the FIR would likely generate a reinforcing spiral of insecurity and securitization that produces a qualitatively new kind of techno-authoritarianism on a global scale. To understand how this may come about, it is first important to recognize that even if the FIR enables the global economy to grow while stabilizing the climate at 1.5 or 2 degrees C (a highly optimistic assumption), this would still (according to one study) leave 16 to 29 per cent of the world’s population (mostly in the Global South) vulnerable to lethal climate impacts (Byers et al., 2018). Technological advance could certainly improve adaptation capacities even amidst such environmental changes, but poverty and deprivation will remain difficult to reverse, and deep grievances felt towards the Global North – due to its primary responsibility in creating the problem whose consequences are primarily suffered in the Global South – will make militant and/or terrorist violence a likely response. Second, we can see that the increasing dependence of the global economy on FIR technologies would create an exponential expansion of possible bio and cyber attack vectors. In conjunction with steady advances in technologies of securitization and rising fear among policy makers and populations, it may only require a relatively ‘minimal’ attack (e.g. something comparable to 9/11, rather than the kind of million or even billion casualty attack feared by some bioterror experts) to catalyze a further threshold of intensified global securitization. What might this threshold entail? Abstractly, it could be understood as a shift from a predominant ‘liberal’ security apparatus to an ‘authoritarian’ mode that establishes a permanent ‘state of emergency’ on a global scale (Opitz, 2011). While we can only speculate on what this might look like in practice, especially as technologies of securitization advance, it would likely involve a conjoined transformation in and integration of both technological-surveillance and institutional-legal assemblages, with the former being intensified and extended while the latter sheds all pretext of democratic oversight to become an increasingly absolutist form of sovereign authority on a global scale. Surveillance would reach from the planetary to the molecular scale through a network of satellites, distributed environmental sensors, and AI-facilitated data collection and processing techniques; military force mobilization capacities of nearly absolute speed and global reach could be created through a combination of space-based and networked AI-robotic weapons systems; and the right of the planetary sovereign to detain individuals, mobilize force without legal pretext, and constrict the mobility of people and goods to more tightly regulated territories, would be enshrined. While such an apparatus may seem far-fetched, philosopher and futurist Nick Bostrom envisions a similarly totalitarian global surveillance system as the necessary prerequisite of global security in an age of democratized weapons of mass destruction (Bostrom, 2018). And he notes that ‘thanks to the falling price of cameras, data transmission, storage, and computing, and the rapid advances in AI-enabled content analysis, [it] may soon become both technologically feasible and affordable’ (Bostrom, 2018, p. 25). In sum, while techno-authoritarian trends are already evident in the US and China, FIR technologies would further enhance their capabilities while ‘democratizing’ WMD capacities among non-state actors (Blum and Wittes, 2015). This would incentivize states to extend and deepen surveillance as far as possible while making democratic populations more willing to accept intensified securitization, therefore making it difficult to avoid an authoritarian global security apparatus.

Conclusions

To return to the question that opened this essay: can global capitalism solve the earth system crisis? I have shown that the answer is an ambiguous maybe: the FIR may enable economic growth to decouple sufficiently rapidly from CO2 emissions and broader environmental impacts to stabilize the earth system, though these technological solutions would then intensify risks in the domains of biosecurity, cybersecurity, and state surveillance, thereby unleashing a spiral of insecurity and securitization that will push global capitalism towards a new kind of techno-authoritarianism. It is thus worth showing, in a way that differs from, yet complements the arguments of degrowth advocates, that even if global capitalism can succeed in stabilizing the earth system in a context of endless growth, then it would likely create security threats and totalitarian dangers that would undermine the desirability of such a system. This conclusion reinforces the need for a set of global policies that break decisively from the growth-oriented status quo. On one hand, to dampen these technological trends and improve the prospects of earth system stabilization, the pursuit of GDP growth should be replaced by alternative goals based on new metrics (e.g. the Genuine Progress Indicator or Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare) that more accurately represent social welfare (Kallis, 2018). The European Commission’s Beyond GDP project shows that steps are being taken in this direction, though they should go further by explicitly ending reliance on growth by placing hard caps on material-energy throughput while restructuring economies so that livelihoods are not dependent on increasing GDP (Hickel, 2019; O’Neill et al., 2018). On the other hand, many FIR technologies (especially open source synthetic biology) offer great promise for improving human welfare through advances in sustainable energy, agriculture, and medicine. Thus, transitioning beyond growth should not necessarily entail abandoning these technologies, and strong global regimes for regulating and monitoring their use would therefore be necessary. However, rather than simply strengthening existing regimes like the Biological Weapons Convention (Charlet, 2018) or relying on private sectorled initiatives to regulate emerging risks ‘without impeding the capacity of research to deliver innovation and economic growth’ (Schwab, 2017, p. 90), more far-reaching changes are needed to enhance democratic control over the pace and direction of technological innovation, thereby counterbalancing the influence of multinational firms and militaries. In particular, ‘citizens assemblies’ should be empowered to debate the relative benefits and risks posed by FIR technologies (from synthetic biology to IoT, nanotechnology, and AI) and set mandates regarding investment levels and priorities, the direction of research, and the pace of deployment, while also having the right to ‘relinquish’ certain technological trajectories if their risks are perceived to outweigh the benefits.5 Overall, a ‘post-growth’ economy based on more democratized ownership of common wealth, reduced overall material-energetic throughput, decelerated and democratically controlled technological innovation, and prioritization of production for meeting essential human needs rather than profit (Hickel, 2019; Kallis, 2018; Raworth, 2017), has the potential to create a global political-economy that meets all human needs within planetary boundaries without shifting problems into the realms of biosecurity, cybersecurity, and state securitization. While the obstacles it confronts are of course formidable, the alternatives may be ecological collapse and civilizational breakdown (if the FIR fails to decouple economic growth from environmental impacts) or global techno-authoritarianism (if it succeeds).

### Framework ⁠— 2NC

### AT: Root CAuse

#### Their framing causes genocide

Santos 3, Professor of Sociology at the University of Coimbra (Boaventura de Souza Santos, 2003, “Collective Suicide?”, Bad Subjects, Issue # 63, http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage" , to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

### AT: Cap Solves Environment

#### No decoupling — data that accounts for offshoring and rebound effects prove energy efficiency is getting worse. Staying below 1.5° is biophysically impossible under capitalism.

Albert 20, M.D. @ John Hopkins. BA in Evolutionary Biology (Michael, April, The Dangers of Decoupling: Earth System Crisis and the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, *Global Policy*, Volume 11, Issue 2, DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12791)

Unfortunately for the ecomodernists, degrowth scholars and ecological economists have begun to poke holes in their optimistic assessments. Their response can be summarized according to three key counter-arguments: (1) the evidence that ecomodernists provide for relative decoupling is flawed and limited at best; (2) their evidence for the possibility of absolute decoupling is even weaker; and (3) even if absolute decoupling was possible in principle, there is even weaker evidence that this could occur with the necessary speed to stabilize the earth system before reaching irreversible tipping points.

First, claims that rich countries have seen relative or even absolute decoupling of economic growth from domestic material consumption have been shown to focus solely on correlations between national GDP and material throughput while ignoring the material-energetic costs embodied in imported consumer goods. For example, Thomas Wiedmann and colleagues show that while the EU, the US, and Japan have grown economically while stabilizing or even reducing domestic material consumption, a broader analysis of their material footprint embedded in their imports shows that it has kept pace with GDP growth. They conclude that ‘no decoupling has taken place over the past two decades for this group of developed countries’ (Wiedmann et al., 2015, p. 6273). Focusing on the global economy as a whole, Krausmann et al. show that its resource intensity improved over the course of the 20th century, though the early 21st century has seen a faster rate of growing resource consumption than global economic growth (cited in Hickel and Kallis, 2019). Thus, as Kallis and Hickel (Kallis and Hickel, 2019, p. 4; italics added) explain: ‘Global historical trends show relative decoupling but no evidence of absolute decoupling, and twenty-first century trends show not greater efficiency but rather worse efficiency, with re-coupling occurring’.

Second, given the limited evidence for even relative decoupling, it is little surprise that the evidential basis on which claims for the possibility of absolute decoupling rest is even flimsier. In the most comprehensive summary of the modeling evidence to date, Hickel and Kallis (2019) show that even the most optimistic scenarios fail to prove the possibility of absolute decoupling. For example, a modeling study by Schandl et al. (2016) shows that in a ‘high efficiency’ scenario, one that combines a high and rising carbon price plus a doubling in the rate of material efficiency improvement, global resource use grows more slowly (about a quarter the rate of GDP growth) but steadily to reach 95 billion tons in 2050, while global energy use grows from 14,253 million tons of oil equivalent in 2010 to 26, 932 million in 2050. The authors therefore conclude: ‘While some relative decoupling can be achieved in some scenarios, none would lead to an absolute reduction in ... materials footprint’ (Schandl et al., 2016, p. 8). A high efficiency scenario modeled by the UNEP comes to even less optimistic conclusions (with global resource use rising to 132 billion tons in 2050), since it incorporates the ‘rebound effect’ in which efficiency improvements lead to increased consumption due to resulting price reductions (Hickel and Kallis, 2019). In short, as they conclude, these ‘models suggest that absolute decoupling is not feasible on a global scale in the context of continued economic growth’ (Hickel and Kallis, 2019, p. 6).

Third, the critics show that even if absolute decoupling (from both emissions and total environmental impact) were possible in principle, this would need to occur fast enough to prevent transgression of ecological tipping points. Just focusing on the climate problem, the 2018 IPCC report claims that emissions must be reduced 7 per cent annually to reach net zero by 2050 in order to achieve the 1.5 C target, whereas they must reduce 4 per cent annually to reach net zero by 2075 for a shot at the 2 degree target (IPCC, 2018, p. 15). However, even under optimistic assumptions (e.g. a near-term implementation of a high and rising carbon price, alongside heroic carbon intensity improvements), studies suggest that annual declines of 3–4 per cent might be the fastest rate possible assuming continued economic growth (Hickel, 2019). Thus, it would most likely be impossible to meet the 1.5 C target in a context of continuous compound growth. While the 2 degree target might be feasible in this context (assuming implementation of a globally coordinated program starting in 2020), many argue that the IPCC’s estimates downplay the existence of positive feedbacks in the earth system (e.g. Steffen et al., 2018), and thus more rapid emissions cuts might be needed even for 2 degrees. On top of this, economic growth must also be decoupled from impacts on other ‘planetary boundaries’ that may have already been overshot, especially land-use change and biodiversity loss (Raworth, 2017). A number of ecologists believe that to bring humanity back into a ‘safe operating space’, total resource consumption should be reduced from roughly 70 to 50 gigatons per year (Hoekstra and Wiedmann, 2014), while a ‘half earth strategy’ should be implemented that protects 50 per cent of the planet’s surface from direct human interference (up from roughly 18 per cent today) (Wilson, 2017), possibly by 2050 to prevent tipping points in biodiversity loss and land-use change (Hickel and Kallis, 2019). Even if these claims are exaggerated, the magnitude of the overall decoupling challenge remains clear. It would mean that total resource consumption and land use needs to shrink, remain stable, or only increase moderately (depending on our assumptions regarding the further stress (if any) that planetary boundaries can handle) even as the total output of the global economy triples by 2060. It is thus not hyperbole to say, as Boris Frankel puts it, that this goal of absolute decoupling is ‘overwhelmingly staggering in its ambition and historical novelty’ (Frankel, 2018, p. 127).

#### ‘Green growth’ relies on unsustainable colonial exploitation of the Global South — maintaining colonial mindsets makes solving warming impossible.

Kolinjivadi & Kothari 20, Vijay Kolinjivadi: Post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of Development Policy, University of Antwerp in Belgium. Ashish Kothari: Global Tapestry of Alternatives in India (May 20th, “No Harm Here is Still Harm There: The Green New Deal and the Global South (I),” *Jamhoor*, https://www.jamhoor.org/read/2020/5/20/no-harm-here-is-still-harm-there-looking-at-the-green-new-deal-from-the-global-south, Accessed 07-13-2021)

Additional crucial flaws would also severely hamper the GND’s potential for real change. Foremost, current variants of the GND retain a significant dependence on technological solutions to problems that are not necessarily technological in nature. They also say nothing about the need to reduce material consumption or energy demand overall (except ‘weatherization’ to reduce domestic consumption). Thus for example, they fail to acknowledge that even if the US transitioned completely to renewable energy and technologies like electric cars, it would still be engaging in unsustainable exploitation of nature and natural resources.

Moreover, by focusing heavily on carbon reductions, the GND ignores other major ecological crises, including those of biodiversity and ecosystem loss, driven by uncontrolled consumption in the Global North. Finally, while it commits to holding corporations accountable to domestic climate goals and labour standards, it does not ensure that they will also be held accountable globally (beyond carbon emissions). Similarly, while Bernie’s proposals were committed to ending rising inequality within the US, through taxes on fossil fuel billionaires and “green jobs” for low-income sectors, it is not clear how this inequality would be addressed in a way that does not just shift it outside the US.

As such, the GND cannot adequately challenge the structures of capitalism and patriarchy, and from a global perspective remains rooted in “green” colonialism. It effectively perpetuates the quest for cheap raw materials and black and brown labouring bodies to achieve “green” growth.

In the context of the Global South, then, the GND has failed to illustrate what is “new” about it. Put differently, it is simply inadequate, and indeed unjust, in our current hyper-connected world (laid bare by COVID-19) to limit a GND to the national policy of Global North countries. For instance, if a GND for Europe promises to be “climate neutral,” whose resources and labour will be deployed to power Europe’s unrestrained energy and consumption demands?

This is an especially salient question given how renewable technologies for “cleaner,” “greener” economies depend on the same socially and ecologically degrading land and labour practices as traditional energy sources. They are also conveniently located in countries of the Global South, such as Bolivia and DR Congo, where regulatory safeguards are more lax. The uneven playing field of resources and regulatory frameworks works in the favour of those who have not only historically usurped resources and labouring bodies around the world but also currently dictate the modus operandi of development, including its “greener and eco-friendly” varieties. What is easily forgotten in “eco-friendly” talk is just how development models of the Global North are structurally founded on dehumanization, in which hundreds of millions across the globe are seduced and stripped of their diverse ways of knowing the world, and dumbed down into passive consumerist onlookers and screen junkies, unable or unwilling to acknowledge (much less act upon) the consequences of their consumption patterns.

#### Tech fails — doesn’t displace fossil fuels and increased consumption offsets efficiency gains.

Parrique et al. 19, Centre for Studies and Research in International Development (CERDI), University of Clermont Auvergne, France; Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), Stockholm University, Sweden, Barth J., Briens F., C. Kerschner, Kraus-Polk A., Kuokkanen A., Spangenberg J.H. (Timothee, July, Decoupling Debunked: Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability, *European Environmental Bureau*, https://mk0eeborgicuypctuf7e.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Decoupling-Debunked.pdf)

Not leading to relevant innovations

Innovation is not in and of itself a good thing for ecological sustainability. The desirable type of innovation is eco-innovation or one that results “in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts of resources use compared to relevant alternatives” (Kemp and Pearson, 2008, p.5). But this is only one type among several. In general, firms have an incentive to innovate to economise on the most expensive factors of production to maximise profits. Because labour and capital are usually relatively more expensive than natural resources, more technological progress will likely continue to be directed towards labour- and capital-saving innovations, with limited benefits, if any, for resource productivity and a potential rise in absolute impacts due to more production. But decoupling will not occur if technological innovations contribute to saving labour and capital while leaving resource use and environmental degradation unchanged.

Another issue is that technologies do not only solve environmental problems but also tend to create new ones. Assuming that resource productivity becomes a priority over labour and capital productivity, there is still nothing preventing technological innovations from creating more damage. For example, research into processes of extractions can lead to better ways to locate resources (imaging technologies and data analytics), to extract them (horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing, and automated drilling operations), and to transport them (Arctic shipping routes). These innovations may target resource use but with a result opposite to the objective of decoupling, that is more extraction. And this is not even considering unintended side-effects, which often accompany the development of new technologies (Grunwald, 2018).

Not disruptive enough

Another problem has to do with the replacement of harmful technologies. Indeed, it is not enough for new technologies to emerge (innovation), they must also come to replace the old ones in a process of “exnovation” (Kimberly, 1981). What is required is a “push and pull strategy” (Rockström et al., 2017): pushing environmentally-friendly technologies into society and pulling harmful ones, like fossil-based infrastructure, out of it.

First, in reality, such a process is slow and difficult to trigger. Most polluting infrastructures (power plants, buildings and city structures, transport systems) require large investments, which then creates inertia and lock-in (Antal and van den Bergh, 2014, p. 3). Let us, for instance, consider the energy, buildings, and transport sectors, which account for the large majority of world energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Initial lifetime for a nuclear or a coal power plant is about 40 years. Buildings can last at least as much. The average lifetime for a car is 12-15 years, and this is about what it takes for an innovation to spread in the vehicle fleet. The wide availability of petrol refuelling stations gives an infrastructural advantage to petrol-based cars, whereas this is the opposite situation for electric, gas, or hydrogen vehicles that would require different and new supporting infrastructures. Building a highway or a nuclear plant is a commitment to emit for at least as long as these infrastructures will last – Davis and Socolow (2014) speak of “committed emissions.”

Energy is a good case in point: using more renewable energy is not the same as using less fossil fuels. The history of energy use is not one of substitutions but rather of successive additions of new sources of energy. As new energy sources are discovered, developed, and deployed, the old sources do not decline, instead, total energy use grows with additional layers on the energy mix cake. York (2012) finds that each unit of energy use from non-fossil fuel sources displaced less than one-quarter of a unit of its fossil-fuel counterpart, showing empirical support for the claim that expanding renewable energies is far from enough to curb fossil fuel consumption. The relative part of coal in the global energy mix has been reduced since the advent of petroleum but this occurred in spite of absolute growth in the use of coal (Krausmann et al., 2009).

### AT: Transition Wars

#### Financialization is linked to imperial lashout and war-making which turns the case

Şahan Savaş Karatasli 13, UNC Greensboro sociology professor, “Financialization and International (Dis)Order: A Comparative Analysis of the Perspectives of Karl Polanyi and John Hobson,” https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b2c7/0e6f15bb11e226494d7df7dc0057c318ea1b.pdf

Interestingly, however, during the contemporary era of financialization, the terms “imperialism”, “new-imperialism” and “empire” have also come back to the literature (Go 2011: 206-234; Harvey 2003; 1 In The Great Transformation, haute finance (high finance) refers to big "international" banks and bankers (e.g. Rothschild family or J. P Morgan) located at the center of global capital markets (e.g. London in the nineteenth century). Polanyi ([1944] 2001: 10) distinguishes haute finance from ordinary banks and bankers based on their economic and political power, their independence from single governments (even from the most powerful ones) and from the central banks. Although they are independent from all of these actors, they can influence these actors (see Polanyi ([1944] 2001: 10-14). The content of the term is similar to Hobson's "big financiers". 42 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY Johnson 2004; Steinmetz 2006; Arrighi 2007). For many, this intensification of imperialist aggression led by the declining hegemonic power is closely linked to various aspects of financialization (Harvey 2003; Steinmetz 2006; Martin 2007; Arrighi 2007). Giovanni Arrighi (1994; also see Arrighi and Silver 1999) emphasized that during the contemporary period of financial expansion, as during previous periods of financialization in historical capitalism, profit-making activities shift from productive to non-productive sectors, including war-making activities, most notably the lending of money to states to pay for military build-ups and open warfare. David Harvey has argued that the rise of the neoconservative “new imperialism” in the twentyfirst century is associated with the consequences of neoliberal imperialist policies implemented after the turn to financialization (Harvey 2003: 183- 212). Based on Tim Mitchell's (2002) interpretation of the relationships between oil and US foreign policy, Steinmetz (2005) suggests that the war in Iraq must be seen as a part of a larger historical trend toward financialization which is inherently linked to postfordist neoliberalism. While it is true that the contemporary era of financialization is characterized by attempts to establish self-regulating markets and an increasing commodification of land, labor, and money, it is also characterized by increasing militarization and interstate warfare. In the literature it is not uncommon to find that scholars who wish to emphasize both trends often refer to Karl Polanyi side by side with a rich literature on the role of finance capital and imperialism - including Hobson's Imperialism: A Study. Although such interpretations are feasible and even useful, especially for explaining the emergence of vicious cycles of economic, social and political destruction of human society in national and international spheres during periods of financialization, the theoretical framework set up by Polanyi in The Great Transformation does not permit such readings. In the Polanyian schema, selfregulating markets destroy human society, the environment, and production on national levels, where haute finance assumes the role of protecting global peace and order. That's why a direct adaptation of Polanyi's arguments for the contemporary era of financialization presents important problems which must be addressed. Our study discusses Polanyi's arguments regarding haute finance and the rivalry among the great powers during the nineteenth century in comparison to John Hobson's ([1902] 1988) study of imperialism. This comparative analysis, which takes Hobson's paradigm as the reference for comparison, is critical for understanding Polanyi's line of reasoning in The KARATASLI AND KUMRAL 43 Great Transformation, as well as for overcoming difficulties in the adaptation of certain arguments in the same work to the contemporary era of financialization. Among all alternative explanations regarding the relationship between haute finance and imperialism, Hobson's paradigm is a more fruitful source for comparison because both Hobson and Polanyi took as their case the United Kingdom (more specifically the London capital markets and the House of Rothschild) during the last thirty years of the 19th century2 . Although Hobson and Polanyi looked at the effects of the same financial actors, the contrast in their conclusion is stark. Hobson regarded financial interests as the “governor of [new] imperialism”, whereas Polanyi saw the same financial actors as the protectors of peace and order3 .

#### Reject transition wars arguments – they’re *culturally biased projections of American exceptionalism* that reflect the importance of hegemony to *national identity* not *global stability*

Glaser 12 (John Glaser, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “American Decline: What the Foreign Policy Elite Really Fear,” April 17, 2012, https://www.antiwar.com/blog/2012/04/17/american-decline-what-the-foreign-policy-elite-really-fear/)

There is a fixation in elite foreign policy circles these days to speculate on the impending decline of America’s global economic and military hegemony and to lament that decline as the dangerous end to international order. Without global American dominance, goes the thinking, lawless competition and chaos will rule. Former Carter administration national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s latest book Strategic Vision goes through this lament. He worries that, absent U.S. hegemony, regional powers will be less restrained. Russia will bully tiny Caucasian states like Georgia; China will bully Taiwan; North Korea will threaten South Korea; diminished unilateral support for Israel would destabilize the Middle East; et cetera. Thomas P.M. Barnett in World Politics Review takes a look at Ian Bremmer’s forthcoming book Every Nation for Itself, another lament of American decline. Post-hegemony, states will be “superseded by a generalized anarchy” in “an era [that] begets a ‘free for all'” and witnesses Asia’s rise, or even more ominously, China’s rise. Bremmer fears a world without the “global leadership” of America to “keep the peace.” Indeed, this is the most interesting insight I drew from Bremmer’s book: The real danger of a G-Zero world is not the accelerated decline of the West but the unbridled — and unpoliced — appetites of the East. As Bremmer points out repeatedly, Western states need not fear a “world of regions,” his term for an era of pronounced regionalism. By and large, their national structures are more than robust for that scenario. But if it’s regionalism run amuck, the clash of civilizations most unlikely to unfold is not East versus West or West versus South, but East versus South — without a West as referee. To buy into this is to have very little ability to self-criticize. This line of thinking assumes that the West, and America specifically, has acted like an impartial referee over the international system, which is really an absurd suggestion. What people like Brzezinski and Bremmer and Barnett really fear is not that the Benevolent Empire and the “global order” it preserves will be no more. Rather, the fear is that the selfish, unscrupulous, hypocritical, coercive disposition of other states will prevail instead of the U.S. government’s selfish, unscrupulous, hypocritical, coercive behavior. Other states will get to do the horrible things that only we’ve been able to do for decades. Overthrowing governments that threaten the state’s supremacy, supporting the world’s worst dictators, committing the supreme international crime of unprovoked war, military bases spanning the globe…these things will no longer be solely American prerogatives. “The concern over “’decline,'” writes Nikolas Gvosdev, ” is not that the U.S. is about to stop being a superpower; it is that future likely adversaries are not going to be the pushovers the U.S. has gotten used to for the past 20 years.” Daniel Larison comments: What doesn’t make much sense about “anti-declinist” fearmongering along these lines is that relative decline isn’t something that the U.S. can avoid by making certain policy choices rather than others. It’s certainly possible to sap and exhaust U.S. resources in the fruitless quest to reclaim an unsustainable position. We have spent the last decade doing just that. The U.S. can react to a multipolar world by demonizing and vilifying other major powers and by punishing them when they fail to fall in line on every international issue, which seems to be the preferred response of the most vocal “anti-declinist” presidential candidate, or it can attempt to find common interests with these other powers. The latter seems advisable, not least because a multipolar world is one in which the demands on and costs to the U.S. are fewer.

## CP ⁠— Single Payer

#### Doesn’t wreck innovation

Cohn 7 – Senior National Correspondent @HuffPost where I cover health care, social welfare & politics

Jonathan, 11-12, Does universal health care suppress innovation?, Physicians for a National Health Program, http://www.pnhp.org/news/2007/november/does\_universal\_healt.php

But it’s one thing to say that universal coverage could lead to less innovation or reduce the availability of high-tech care. It is quite another to say that it will do those things, which is the claim that opponents frequently make. That argument requires several leaps of logic, many of them highly suspect. The forces that produce innovation in medicine turn out to be a great deal more complicated than critics of universal coverage seem to grasp. Ultimately, whether innovation would continue to thrive under universal health care depends entirely on what kind of system we create and how well we run it. In fact, it’s quite possible that universal coverage could lead to better innovation.¶ The single biggest source of medical research funding, not just in the United States but in the entire world, is the National Institutes of Health (NIH): Last year, it spent more than $28 billion on research, accounting for about one-third of the total dollars spent on medical research and development in this country (and half the money spent at universities). The majority of that money pays for the kind of basic research that might someday unlock cures for killer diseases like Alzheimer’s, aids, and cancer. No other country has an institution that matches the NIH in scale. And that is probably the primary explanation for why so many of the intellectual breakthroughs in medical science happen here.¶ There’s no reason why this has to change under universal health insurance. NIH has its own independent funding stream. And, during the late 1990s, thanks to bipartisan agreement between President Clinton and the Republican Congress, its funding actually increased substantially—giving a tremendous boost to research. With or without universal coverage, subsequent presidents and Congress could ramp up funding again—although, if they did so, they would be breaking with the present course. It so happens that, starting in 2003, President Bush and his congressional allies let NIH funding stagnate, even though the cost of medical research (like the cost of medicine overall) was increasing faster than inflation. The reason? They needed room in the budget for other priorities, like tax cuts for the wealthy. In this sense, the greatest threat to future medical breakthroughs may not be universal health care but the people who are trying so hard to fight it.¶ The ideal would be to come up with some way of achieving the best of both worlds—paying for innovation when it yields actual benefits, but without neglecting less glitzy, potentially more beneficial forms of health care. And that is precisely what the leading proposals for universal health care seek to do. All of them would establish independent advisory boards, staffed by leading medical experts, to help decide whether proposed new treatments actually provide clinical value.¶ Of course, the idea of involving the government in these decisions is anathema to many conservatives—since, they argue, the private sector is bound to make better decisions than a bunch of bureaucrats in Washington. But, while that’s frequently true in economics, health care may be an exception. One feature of the U.S. insurance system is its relentless focus on short-term good. Private insurers have little incentive to pay for interventions that don’t yield immediate benefits, because they are gaining and losing members all the time. As a result, money invested on patient health may very well help a competitor’s bottom line. What’s more, the for-profit insurance industry—like the pharmaceutical and device industries—responds to Wall Street, which cares more about quarterly filings than long-term financial health. So there’s relatively little incentive to spend money on the kinds of innovations that yield long-term, diffuse benefits.¶ The government, by contrast, has plenty of incentive to prioritize these sorts of investments. And, in more centralized systems, it can do just that. Several European countries are way ahead of us when it comes to establishing electronic medical records.¶ Another virtue of more centralized health care is its ability to generate savings by reducing administrative waste. A universal coverage system that significantly streamlined billing (either by creating one common form or simply replacing basic insurance with one, Medicare-like program) and cut down on the need for so many insurance middle-men would leave more resources for actual medical care—and real medical innovation.¶ … the truth about universal health insurance: You don’t have to choose between universal access and innovation. It’s possible to have both— as long as you do it right.

#### It’s not that expensive to develop drugs---their studies are industry-funded

Goozner 9/11 – MS, editor emeritus citing/summarizing new study by Prasad, MD and MPH and Mailankody, MBBS in JAMA (Merrill, 9/11/17, http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2653008)

Contemporary pharmaceutical industry pricing practices are threatening to undermine the health care industry’s and policymakers’ efforts at cost control. Egregious as the price hikes are, the hedge fund managers who gained notoriety for exorbitant price increases on some generics are the least of the problem. The 2 biggest drivers of high drug costs in recent years have been the steady increase in prices for existing on-patent drugs, which account for more than 70% of all drug spending, and the 6-figure retail prices set for the latest generation of specialty and cancer therapeutics. To counter increasing public alarm over these high prices, industry leaders continue to assert that the substantial investment in researching and developing new products and the riskiness of that enterprise must justify charging Americans the highest prices in the world for medicines. To support the assertion, the industry’s trade group relies on an industry-funded study first produced in 1979 by the Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug Development.1 The most recent iteration of the study, which was last updated in 2014, claims it takes more than 10 years and nearly $2.7 billion in capital to develop a single drug.2 In inflation-adjusted dollars, the study’s estimate for developing a new drug has more than doubled in the past decade and is more than 10 times the original 1979 figure. Industry critics and journalists have repeatedly questioned the assumptions in the Tufts study. They argue its authors arbitrarily inflate the value placed on the cost of capital spent on research and development, which is a current expense and not an investment for accounting and tax purposes; fail to distinguish between new products that are truly innovative and those that merely replicate drugs already on the market; and ignore the fact that the industry consistently generates the highest profit margins among all US industries, which suggests the pricing power afforded by patent exclusivity far outweighs the inherent riskiness of pharmaceutical research and development. Critics also lament the Tufts study’s lack of transparency because it relies on industry-supplied data that the authors refuse to make public. Over the years, none of the critiques have had much political impact. Most politicians from both political parties accept the Tufts study’s basic premise because it provides them with a rationale for failing to enact countermeasures, which could include giving Medicare the right to negotiate prices, allowing drug importation or establishing reference pricing or value-based pricing schemes for new products.3 It took just one meeting with industry leaders for President Donald Trump, who had campaigned against high drug prices, to put the issue on the backburner. “Fifteen years, $2.5 billion to come up with a product where there’s not even a safety problem. So it’s crazy,” he said.4 However, the issue of increasing drug prices continues, as do the repercussions. Total retail prescription drug spending increased by 4.8% in 2016, about the same pace as overall health spending, after increasing 12.4% in 2014 and 9.0% in 2015. The outlook for the next 5 years is for 4% to 7% annual growth as new specialty and rare disease drugs, which now account for 42.9% of all drug spending, come on line.5 Therefore, it is timely to revisit the issue of the cost of pharmaceutical research and development and its association with drug pricing. In this issue of JAMA Internal Medicine, Prasad and Mailankody6 report the results of their study of compiled research and development data from the Securities and Exchange Commission filings of start-up companies with a single approved product. By tracking the pharmaceutical companies’ publicly reported investments, the authors found that the actual cost of developing a new drug is approximately one-fourth the Tufts study estimate. Their fresh perspective is powerful because the authors chose not to challenge the core assumptions of the Tufts study, specifically, including the cost of failed experiments, giving equal value to new products that mimic the therapeutic approach of previously approved drugs (so-called me-too drugs), and treating research and development expenses as an investment. Prasad and Mailankody account for the cost of failure because all the companies in their sample were developing multiple drugs at the time of their first approval. They do not discriminate based on the value of the newly approved medications (just half their sample of 10 drugs received a priority review from the US Food and Drug Administration, which is reserved for substantial breakthroughs). In addition, like the Tufts study authors, they increase the total estimated cost of developing a new drug by adjusting the value of expenditures made during the early stages of development for inflation and what those investments would have earned if placed in an alternative investment. To estimate this latter factor, Prasad and Mailankody used an expected rate of return (the cost of capital) that was 3.5 percentage points below the rate reported in the Tufts study. However, the latter’s 10.5% rate may be unrealistic given the industry’s very low tax rate, very low debt to equity ratio, and mean stock price volatility.7 In any case, using the higher Tufts study rate would raise their overall estimate of the cost to develop a new drug by only approximately 10%, which would not alter the markedly different outcomes of the 2 studies. The authors note as a weakness that their study looked only at cancer drugs, whose high cost may not translate to other disease states. However, the method works well with another new drug whose high price generated headlines in recent years: sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) for hepatitis C. Developed by an antiviral drug development start-up company called Pharmasset, the company’s US Securities and Exchange Commission filings reveal it spent just $315 million on research during a dozen years (some of it from government grants) before selling the firm and its promising late-stage drug candidate (phase 2 trials had shown remarkable success in clearing the virus) to Gilead Sciences for $11 billion in 2011.8 The cost of the final trials plus a cost of capital would bring its total development costs into the same range as the Prasad and Mailankody cancer drug study. According to the US Securities and Exchange Commission filings, Gilead generated sales of sofosbuvir, either alone or as part of combination products, that were $2.6 billion alone in the first quarter of 2017 or more than 3 times its estimated cost of development.9 In addition, sofosbuvir has yet to make good on its promise of reducing the number of cases of hepatocellular carcinoma. Basing their study on start-up drug development company costs has another major strength not noted by the authors. Approximately 70% of new sales by the traditional pharmaceutical industry now come from small companies they buy outright (such as Pharmasset) or forge partnerships with during the development process. That is up from just 30% in the 1990s.10 The Tufts study’s focus on the research and development costs of large drug companies, which still spend a substantial portion of their research and development budgets on developing me-too drugs or marketing-oriented seeding trials,11 ignores the substantial shift in the source of important medical breakthroughs that has taken place during the past quarter century. The implications of the present study seem clear. Current pharmaceutical industry pricing policies are unrelated to the cost of research and development. Policymakers can safely take steps to rein in drug prices without fear of jeopardizing innovation.

#### \*\*Squo pharma’s business model is busted---hurts innovation, counterplan solves it

Lazonick et al 17 - William Lazonick is Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts Lowell; Visiting Professor, University of Ljubljana; Professeur Associé, Institut MinesTélécom; and President, The Academic-Industry Research Network (theAIRnet); Matt Hopkins, Ken Jacobson, Mustafa Erdem Sakinç, and Öner Tulum are researchers at theAIRnet. Jacobson is also theAIRnet communications director. Sakinç has just completed a PhD in economics at the University of Bordeaux. Tulum is a PhD student at the University of Ljubljana. Funding for this research came from the Institute for New Economic Thinking (“US Pharma’s Business Model: Why It Is Broken, and How It Can Be Fixed”, 5/22/17, http://www.isigrowth.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/working\_paper\_2017\_13.pdf)

1. Drug-Price Gouging to “Maximize Shareholder Value” The news in September 2015 that pharmaceutical company Turing, led by a 32- year-old hedge-fund manager, had raised the price of a 62-year-old drug from $13.50 to $750.00 focused public attention on price gouging in an industry in which the pursuit of wealth has trumped the improvement of health (Pollack 2015). The day after Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton tweeted that this “price gouging” was “outrageous,” the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index plunged by 4.7%, or $15 billion in market capitalization, in a few hours of trading. This reaction demonstrated the importance of the stock market to the fortunes that individuals can reap when pharmaceutical companies can keep drug prices high (Langreth and Armstrong 2015). The industry trade group Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) was quick to disown Turing, tweeting that its actions did not “represent the values of PhRMA member companies” (Cha 2015). Yet price gouging in the US pharmaceutical drug industry goes back more than three decades. In 1985 US Representative Henry Waxman, chair of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, accused the pharmaceutical industry of “gouging the American public” with “outrageous” price increases, driven by “greed on a massive scale” (Horowitz 1985). Despite many Congressional inquiries since the 1980s, including the case of Gilead Sciences’ extortionate pricing of the Hepatitis-C drug Sovaldi since 2014 (United States Senate Committee on Finance 2015), the US government does not regulate drug prices. UK Prescription Price Regulation Scheme data for 1996 through 2008 show that, while drug prices in other advanced nations were close to the UK’s regulated prices, those in the United States were between 74% and 152% higher (UK Department of Health 1996-2008, 2015; see also Kantarjian and Rajkumar 2015). Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has produced abundant evidence that US drug prices are by far the highest in the world (Médecins Sans Frontières 2015). The US pharmaceutical industry’s invariable response to demands for price regulation has been that it will kill innovation. US drug companies claim that they need higher prices than those that prevail elsewhere so that the extra profits can be used to augment R&D spending. The result, they contend, is more drug innovation that benefits the United States and indeed the whole world (see for example Kravitz 1985, Horowitz 1987, Pollack 1988, Rovner 1992, Leary 1995, Mossinghoff 1999, Levin 2001, Nordrum 2015). It is a compelling argument, until one looks at how major US pharmaceutical companies actually use the profits that high drug prices generate. In the name of “maximizing shareholder value” (MSV), pharmaceutical companies allocate profits from high drug prices to massive repurchases, or buybacks, of their own corporate stock for the sole purpose of giving manipulative boosts to their stock prices. Incentivizing these buybacks is stock-based compensation that rewards senior executives for stock-price performance (Lazonick 2014b, Lazonick 2014c, Lazonick 2015b, Hopkins and Lazonick 2016). Like no other sector, the pharmaceutical industry puts a spotlight on how the political economy of science is a matter of life and death. In this chapter, we invoke “the theory of innovative enterprise” to explain how and why high drug prices restrict access to medicines and undermine medical innovation. An innovative enterprise seeks to develop a high-quality product that it can sell to the largest possible market at the most affordable price (Lazonick 2015c). In sharp contrast, the MSV-obsessed companies that dominate the US drug industry have become monopolies that restrict output and raise price. 2. Buyback Boosts to Stock Prices US pharmaceutical companies claim that high drug prices fund investments in innovation. Yet the 19 drug companies in the S&P 500 Index in February 2015 and publicly listed from 2005 through 2014 distributed 97% of their profits to shareholders over the decade, 47% as buybacks and 50% as dividends (see Table 1). The total of $226 billion spent on buybacks was equivalent to 51% of their combined R&D expenditures. That $226 billion could have been returned to households in the form of lower drug prices without infringing on R&D spending, while providing ample dividends to shareholders. Or it could have been allocated to the development of drugs for high-priority access areas that are otherwise underfunded and underserved. In the United States, massive distributions of cash to shareholders are not unique to pharmaceutical companies. From 2005 through 2014, 459 companies in the S&P 500 Index expended $3.8 trillion on buybacks, representing 53% of net income, on top of paying $2.6 trillion in dividends equaling 36% of net income. They held much of the remaining profits abroad, sheltered from US taxation (Rubin 2015). Many of America’s largest corporations, Pfizer and Merck among them, routinely distribute more than 100% of profits to shareholders, generating the extra cash by reducing reserves, selling off assets, taking on debt, or laying off employees (Lazonick et al. 2015). Over the decade 2005-2014, Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, and Merck, the three largest pharma companies, spent an annual average of $3.9 billion, $6.1 billion, and $2.6 billion, respectively, on buybacks, while Amgen, the largest independent biopharma company, spent $3.5 billion per year. The profits that a company retains after distributions to shareholders are the financial foundation for investment in innovation. These retained earnings can fund investment in plant and equipment, research and development, and, of critical importance to innovation, training and retaining employees (Lazonick 2015b). Dividends are the traditional, and legitimate, way for a publicly listed corporation to provide income to shareholders. They receive dividends for holding shares. In contrast, by creating demand for the company’s stock that boosts its price, buybacks reward existing shareholders for selling their shares. The most prominent sharesellers are corporate executives, investment bankers, and hedge-fund managers who can time their stock sales to take advantage of buyback activity done as open-market repurchases. Buybacks also automatically increase earnings per share (EPS) by decreasing the number of shares outstanding. Since EPS has become a major metric by which stock-market traders evaluate a company’s performance, buybacks tend to increase demand for a company’s stock, thus creating opportunities for stock-market traders to sell their shares at a gain, even in the absence of increased corporate revenues or profits (Lazonick 2015a). 3. Pumping Up Executive Pay Why do companies buy back their own shares? In “Profits Without Prosperity: Stock Buybacks Manipulate the Market and Leave Most Americans Worse Off,” Lazonick argues that the only logical explanation is that stock-based compensation gives senior executives personal incentives to do buybacks to boost stock prices (Lazonick 2014b). There are two main types of stock-based pay: stock options, for which the realized gains depend on the difference between the stock price on the date the option to buy the shares is exercised and the date the option was granted; and stock awards, for which the realized gains depend on the market price of the stock on the date that the award vests (Hopkins and Lazonick 2016). By using stock buybacks to boost stock prices, executives can augment the gains that they realize from exercising options or the vesting of awards. As shown in Table 2, from 2006 through 2014, the average annual total compensation of the 500 highestpaid US executives (not including billion-dollar-plus outliers) ranged from $14.7 million in 2009 to $33.2 million in 2014, with realized gains from the combination of exercising options and vesting of awards constituting from 66% to 84% of the average annual total pay (Hopkins and Lazonick 2016).1 Stock-based pay incentivizes executives to take actions that increase the company’s stock price and rewards them for doing so. Buybacks serve these purposes. Pharma executives are well represented among the 500 highest-paid executives at US corporations. In the most recent years, as their numbers among the top500 have increased, the average total compensation of the drug executives has soared, with the proportion of their pay derived from exercising stock options substantially higher than the average for the top500 as a whole in 2013 and 2014. Table 3 shows that biopharma companies launched in the late 1980s and early 1990s account for the explosion in pharma executive pay. Table 4 identifies the six highest-paid pharma executives for each year from 2006 through 2014. Note the prominence, especially in 2012-2014, of executives from four of the companies in Table 3: Gilead Sciences (14 of the 54 cells), Celgene (7), Regeneron (7), and Alexion (3), and also note the extent to which their pay is stock based.2 Gilead Sciences CEO John C. Martin appears on this top6 list in all nine years, three times in first place, four times in second, and twice in third. 4. Gilead’s Greed With 12-week treatments for Hepatitis-C Virus (HCV) costing $84,000 for Sovaldi and $94,500 for Harvoni, Gilead Sciences exemplifies the price-gouging drug company. Prior to 2014 Gilead had two blockbuster drugs, with Truvada, launched in 2004, reaching $3.2 billion in sales in 2012, and Atripla, launched in 2006, generating a high of $3.6 billion in 2013. In their first full years on the market, Sovaldi had sales of $10.3 billion in 2014 and Harvoni $13.9 billion in 2015. As a result, Gilead’s revenues and profits exploded in these two years (see Table 5). Once Gilead moved into sustained profitability in 2007, it had very high profit margins (NI/REV%), but these margins soared with its most recent blockbusters, as have sales per employee (REV/EMP$m). Pre-Sovaldi/Harvoni, Gilead was already doing substantial buybacks, but these reached massive levels in 2014 and 2015. The result, as the Sovaldi/Harvoni pricing strategy intended, was an exploding stock price from June 2012 (see Figure 1), about six months after its $11.2 billion acquisition of Pharmasset, which had substantially developed sofosbuvir (Sovaldi). An 18-month Congressional inquiry by US Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Charles Grassley (R-IA) probed the rationale for Gilead’s Sovaldi pricing strategy, and, in a report issued on December 1, 2015, concluded that “a key consideration in Gilead’s decision-making process to determine the ultimate price of Sovaldi was setting the price such that it would not only maximize revenue, but also prepare the market for Harvoni and its even higher price” (The Staffs of Senators 2015). But the WydenGrassley report made no attempt to probe the influence and impact of Gilead’s pricing strategy on its stock price and executives’ pay. In our view, the objective of Gilead’s executives in setting high prices was not to maximize revenues but rather to “maximize shareholder value” so that soaring stock prices would translate into enormous executive-pay packages.3 The greed of Gilead’s top executives, sanctioned by MSV ideology, is preventing millions of people with HCV in the United States and abroad from accessing Sovaldi/Harvoni at an affordable cost.4 What is needed is a business model that shares the gains from innovative medicines with households as taxpayers who fund the government agencies that provide intellectual and financial support to the drug companies, workers whose skills and efforts have developed the drugs, and consumers who have illnesses waiting to be cured or relieved. In contrast, the MSV business model concentrates the gains from innovative medicines in the hands of senior corporate executives who pad their paychecks by doing billions of dollars of stock buybacks to manipulate the company’s stock price. In the process, for millions who cannot afford access to innovative medicines, the life sciences become death sciences. In a hard-hitting article entitled “Gilead’s greed that kills,” economist Jeffrey Sachs (2015) makes this case: Gilead Sciences is an American pharmaceutical company driven by unquenchable greed. The company is causing hundreds of thousands of Americans with Hepatitis C to suffer unnecessarily and many of them to die as the result of its monopolistic practices, while public health programs face bankruptcy. Gilead CEO John C. Martin took home a reported $19 million last year in compensation – the spoils of untrammeled greed. A glance at Table 4 above reveals, however, that Martin’s actual compensation in 2014 was $192.8 million. As Hopkins and Lazonick (2016) explain, the “reported $19 million” that Sachs cites is an estimated “fair value” accounting measure of executive compensation that, as can be seen, vastly understates actual compensation. For the decade 2005-2014, the “fair value” measure of Martin’s pay totaled $141.5 million but his actual pay, reported to the US Internal Revenue Service, was $717.4 million, of which 95% was stock based. In 2014 the actual pay packages of the other four Gilead executives named on the company’s proxy statement were: John F. Milligan $89.5 million (97% stock based); Gregg H. Alton $52.6 million (97%); Norbert W. Bischofberger $50.7 million (96%); and Robin L. Washington $26.6 million (93%). In 2015 the compensation of Martin was $232.0 million (98%), Milligan $103.4 million (97%), Bischofberger $95.5 million (98%), Alton $33.6 million (94%), and Washington $22.0 million (91%). In the first six months of 2016, even with Gilead’s stock price in decline, Martin, who stepped down as CEO in March but remains at the company as executive chairman, “earned” $55.1 million from stock-based compensation. In the first quarter of 2016 Gilead did $8.0 billion in buybacks, thus helping to “create value” for its senior executives as sharesellers. In the second quarter of 2016 Gilead scaled back its buybacks to $1 billion.5 In an interview in December 2013, Alton, Gilead vice-president of corporate and medical affairs, defended the price of Sovaldi by saying: “Really you need to look at the big picture. Those who are bold and go out and innovate like this and take that risk, there needs to be more of a reward on that. Otherwise it would be very difficult for people to make that investment” (The Staffs of Senators 2015, p. 108).But whose risks are being rewarded? Over its entire corporate history, Gilead has secured a total of $376 million from public share issues, all between 1991, when it did its IPO, and 1996. Especially since Gilead only began paying dividends in 2015, it is probable that virtually all of those shareholders have long since sold their shares to secure capital gains. Current shareholders are just stock-market traders who have bought outstanding shares. So why are Gilead’s senior executives so intent on “creating value” for shareholders who have contributed nothing to the development of Gilead’s products? The executive-pay numbers provide the answer. Gilead is not an innovative company. Among the ten drugs that have generated 97% of Gilead’s revenues since 1999, only two contain ingredients fully developed by Gilead researchers. Gilead gained control over the remaining ingredients, including sofosbuvir, the key component of Sovaldi and Harvoni, through acquisitions of companies that had brought the drugs to the later stages of development or had already put them on the market. And the history of the design and development of the drugs that Gilead sells reveals seminal research that was done with government funding from the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Indeed, the NIH’s 2016 budget of $32.3 billion is, in real terms, triple NIH’s annual spending in the mid-1980s (National Institutes of Health 2016). Yet even three decades ago, before companies like Celgene, Gilead, Cephalon, Regeneron, Vertex, and Alexion had been founded, NIH funding was critical to drug innovation. At a meeting with French President François Mitterrand in Silicon Valley in 1984, documented in a Washington Post report (Henderson and Schrage 1984), venture capitalist Thomas Perkins, whose firm brought Genentech from startup in 1976 to IPO in 1980, “extolled the virtues of the risk-taking investors who finance the entrepreneurs.” The Post article goes on to say: Perkins was cut off by Stanford University Professor Paul Berg, who won a Nobel Prize for work in genetic engineering. “Where were you guys in the ’50s and ‘60s when all the funding had to be done in the basic science? Most of the discoveries that fueled [the industry] were created back then....I cannot imagine that if there had not been an NIH funding research, that there would have been a biotechnology industry,” Berg said. As these things go, Berg himself would be appointed to Gilead’s board in 1998, and as a company director from 2004 to 2011 regularly exercised his stock options, netting an average of $2.9 million per year.6 But the acute problem of access to medicines goes far beyond the actions of individuals or even companies. The Gilead problem is an American problem, and given the centrality of US pharmaceutical research, the American problem is a global problem. The key cause of high drug prices, restricted access to medicines, and stifled innovation, we submit, is a social disease called “maximizing shareholder value.” Armed with “the theory of innovative enterprise,” policy-makers can take steps to eradicate the MSV disease (Lazonick 2014a). 5. The Theory of Innovative Enterprise and the Flaws in MSV MSV is a profit-driven ideology that results in high drug prices, restricted access to existing medicines, and stifled pharmaceutical innovation. If widespread access to critical medicines at affordable prices is the goal, MSV needs to be replaced by a product-driven norm of corporate governance. Underpinning this product-driven norm is “the theory of innovative enterprise” (Lazonick 2012b; Lazonick 2016b).7 The theory of innovative enterprise provides an analytical framework for understanding how a business enterprise can generate a product that is higher quality (in medicines, more effective and safer) and lower cost (more accessible and affordable) than products previously available. The innovation process that can generate these outcomes is: • Uncertain: When investments in transforming technologies and accessing markets are made, the product and financial outcomes cannot be known. Hence the need for strategy. • Collective: To generate higher-quality, lower-cost products, the enterprise must integrate the skills and efforts of large numbers of people with different responsibilities and capabilities into the learning processes that are the essence of innovation. Hence the need for organization. • Cumulative: Collective learning today enables collective learning tomorrow, and these organizational learning processes must be sustained over time until, through the sale of innovative products, financial returns can be generated. Hence the need for finance. The theory of innovative enterprise identifies three social conditions – strategic control, organizational integration, and financial commitment – that can enable the firm to manage the uncertain, collective, and cumulative character of the innovation process. • Strategic control: For innovation to occur in the face of technological, market, and competitive uncertainties, executives who control corporate resource allocation must have the abilities and incentives to make strategic investments in innovation. Their abilities depend on their knowledge of how strategic investments in new capabilities can enhance the enterprise’s existing capabilities. Their incentives depend on alignment of their personal interests with the company’s purpose of generating innovative products. • Organizational integration: The implementation of an innovative strategy requires integration of people working in a complex division of labor into the collective and cumulative learning processes that are the essence of innovation. Work satisfaction, promotion, remuneration, and benefits are important instruments in a reward system that motivates and empowers employees to engage in collective learning over a sustained period of time. • Financial commitment: For collective learning to cumulate over time, the sustained commitment of “patient capital” must keep the learning organization intact. For a startup company, venture capital can provide financial commitment. For a going concern, retained earnings (leveraged if need be by debt issues) are the foundation of financial commitment. The theory of innovative enterprise explains how, in the United States during the twentieth century, a “retain-and-reinvest” allocation regime enabled a relatively small number of business enterprises in a wide range of industries to grow to employ tens, or even hundreds, of thousands and attain dominant product-market shares.8 Companies retained corporate profits and reinvested them in productive capabilities, including first and foremost collective and cumulative learning. Companies integrated personnel into learning processes through career employment. Into the 1980s, and in some cases beyond, the norm of a career-with-one-company prevailed at major US corporations. A steady stream of dividend income and the prospect of higher future stock prices based on innovative products gave shareholders an interest in “retain-and-reinvest.” From the 1960s, however, a changing business environment encouraged executives of established US corporations to shift corporate resource allocation from “retainand reinvest” to “downsize-and-distribute” (Lazonick 1992, Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000, Lazonick 2009, Lazonick 2015b).9 By the 1980s, even in good times, companies began to downsize their labor forces and distribute more profits to shareholders. Justifying this dramatic transformation in corporate resource allocation was a new ideology that taught that, for the sake of economic efficiency, companies should “maximize shareholder value” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Lazonick 2014a). The MSV argument is that, of all participants in the corporation, only shareholders make productive contributions without a guaranteed return (Jensen 1986). All other participants such as creditors, workers, suppliers, and distributors allegedly receive a market-determined price for the goods or services they render to the corporation, and hence take no risk of whether the company makes or loses money. On this assumption, only shareholders, as the sole risk-takers, have an economically justifiable claim to profits. A fundamental flaw in MSV lies in the erroneous assumption that shareholders are the only corporate participants who bear risk. Taxpayers through government agencies and workers through the firms that employ them make risky investments in productive capabilities on a regular basis. Households, as taxpayers and workers, may have legitimate economic claims on the distribution of profits. The National Institutes of Health (NIH), which from 1938 through 2015 spent $958 billion in 2015 dollars on life-sciences research, is a prime example of how taxpayers invest without a guaranteed return (National Institutes of Health 2016). Drug companies benefit from the knowledge that the NIH generates. As risk bearers, taxpayers fund investments in the knowledge base – as well as physical infrastructure such as roads – required by business, and hence have tax claims on corporate profits. But because profits may not be forthcoming and tax rates can be changed, the returns to taxpayers’ investments are not guaranteed. Through the application of skill and effort, workers regularly make productive contributions to the company’s future products, and hence prospective profits. Their rewards take the forms of continued employment and career advancement, and hence workers invest in collective and cumulative learning without guaranteed returns. “Retain-and-reinvest” rewards innovative workers. But profits from innovation may not materialize, and even when they do, “downsize-and distribute” may deny these workers shares of profits that, as risk-bearers, they should have received. As risk bearers, therefore, taxpayers whose money supports business enterprises and workers whose efforts generate productivity improvements have claims on corporate profits if and when they occur. MSV ignores the risk-reward relation for these two types of economic actors in the operation and performance of business corporations. Another basic flaw in MSV is that the public shareholders whom it holds up as the only risk bearers typically do not invest in the value-creating capabilities of the company. Rather, as savers or speculators, they buy outstanding shares on the stock market for the sake of dividends and stock-price increases. Public shareholders generally make no productive contributions to the enterprise. Indeed, from 2006 through 2015, net equity issues in the United States were over four trillion dollars in the negative; US stock markets fund public shareholders rather than vice versa.10 The proponents of MSV (see Jensen 1986; Jensen and Murphy 1990) advocate that, through stock-based pay, senior executives should be incentivized to “disgorge” corporate earnings as buybacks and dividends to the corporate participants who matter least – just the opposite of the financial commitment needed for innovation. These distributions to shareholders generally come at the expense of the stable and remunerative career opportunities that integrate employees into processes of collective and cumulative learning. As for strategic control, a senior executive who sees MSV as the key to corporate success has lost not only the incentive but probably also the ability to allocate corporate resources to potentially innovative investments. In sum, MSV undermines investments in innovation that, if successful, can yield products that are higher quality and lower cost than previously available. Major US pharmaceutical companies have the MSV disease, as evidenced by not only massive stock buybacks and exploding executive pay (Lazonick et al. 2014, Hopkins and Lazonick 2016) but also a “productivity crisis” in drug discovery (Pisano 2006, Cockburn 2007, Munos 2009, Lazonick and Tulum 2011, Pammolli et al. 2011, Khanna 2012, DeRuiter and Holston 2012). Companies such as Merck and Pfizer have spent the last two decades living off patented blockbuster drugs, with very little to replace them in the pipeline (Phillips 2014, McGrath 2014a, McGrath 2014b). In the name of MSV, they have been profit-driven. For a company to be an innovative enterprise, however, it needs to be product-driven.

#### Big pharma trades off with NIH innovation which would develop more, better drugs cheaper without them

Snapp 17 – MS Business Logistics from Penn State, Managing Editor & Consultant at Brightwork Research & Analysis (Shaun, “The Inefficiency of the Pharmaceutical Industry”, 4/26/17, http://www.scmfocus.com/criticalthinking/2017/04/inefficiency-pharmaceutical-industry/)

NIH vs. Pharmaceutical Companies There are two research paths in the pharmaceutical industry. One is the NIH, which spends roughly $30 billion per year on basic research. The other is pharmaceutical companies which mostly perform and run clinical trials, but also perform research in assaying chemicals found by NIH supported university research. This comes to roughly $25 billion per year. Pharmaceutical revenues are roughly $325 billion per year (according to Reuters). Most the costs that the pharmaceutical companies incur are “marketing” related costs (over-paying doctors for clinical trials in order to get them to prescribe drugs, buying off top university research professors, patenting and re-patenting drugs, paying for pharmaceutical reps for distributing company propaganda, lobbying in congress, television advertising etc..). As can be seen, some of these marketing costs are not really marketing costs as much as bribes. The Current System Under a system where the NIH took over final drug development and clinical trials patents could be removed from the drug business altogether. The productivity of drug companies is atrocious. For the $325 billion in yearly expenditures (to which we must add the $30 billion of the NIH budget bringing it to $355 billion), US drug companies produce roughly 7 innovative drugs, and most of these are very narrow drugs which do not cure ailments but extend the life of late-stage terminal diseases. 78% of drugs are simply extending the life of old drugs which could come off of patent or copying another drug that already exists. This is according to (Marcia Angell as well as Dr. Jerry Avorn – two of the top experts in the field) Secondly the cost of clinical trials is greatly increased by the fact that a good portion of the payment to doctors is, in fact, a payoff to prescribe drugs (for those that are already approved), and in 78% of the cases, the drugs they are performing a trial on are not new chemical compounds. For this reason, we estimate that pharmaceutical companies only do actually $2.5 billion in research on new drugs. (and a number of these drug tests are falsified) However, they claim $325 billion in drug revenues. Even if all of their research was beneficial and non-corrupt (which we estimate less than $2.5 billion of it is) it still would not entitle the industry to $325 billion off of it. Handing it All Over to the NIH If the NIH took over clinical trials, it could do so at a cost of only $32.75 billion dollars (their current budget + the actual contribution of pharmaceutical company research). These unpatented discoveries could then be released to the generic manufacturers. This new system would mean no advertising, no pharmaceutical reps (doctors can read journals for their medical information, or if they don’t have time (and most of them don’t) they can go to Consumer Reports Health.com which provides a quick rundown of the benefits of drugs in an easy to read and digest format). This would allow the doctor to begin working for the patient rather than the pharmaceutical industry when prescribing drugs. It would also allow the doctor to be looking for other factors related to health problems rather than taking a narrow-minded drug approach because that is where their bread is buttered. Generic drug companies have low-profit margins and low costs of doing business. It cost less than ½ again as much to provide generic companies with a good profit for manufacturing and distributing the drugs because it is a very simple operation with high economies of scale. This would mean the total drug cost to Americans would not be more than $32.75 billion x 1.4 = $45 billion. This would reduce US health care costs by roughly $280 billion per year. In fact, there would be so much only left over that we could even increase the NIH budget by another $10 to $20 billion creating somewhat of a renaissance in medical research and providing more employment in the industry. This would require that most the old drugs, which should come off patent because they have been artificially extended through the abuse of patent law, need to fall into the public domain. It also means that the major pharmaceutical companies essentially go away and become small generic manufacturers with no ability to influence health care policy. For all the calculations see the image below. How Easy Would It Be? What is amazing is how easy this policy change would be (practically, not politically). The NIH can easily run clinical trials and do it far better than pharmaceutical companies. Pharmaceutical companies should not be running clinical trials, or even paying for clinical trials at all. Universities used to perform more clinical trials, but big pharma has increasingly begun to use private practice doctors or trial mills that they completely control. They then receive the studies, and compile them and then send only the ones the like to the FDA, where they have already positioned executives from their company into the top roles through political appointment. Better Quality Drugs Another issue that could be changed with an NIH takeover is better drugs could be developed. We could even decide as a society to give another 5 to 10 billion to the NIH, there would be so much excess created by removing the pharmaceutical companies, which could lead to even more useful drugs and more money for the actual workers, medical researchers. Because of greed and narrow self-interest, big pharma is pushing mostly the wrong drugs to clinical trials. Right now drugs that are not very socially beneficial are developed because they are the most profitable. The major category being lifestyle drugs. Pharmaceutical companies don’t develop drugs that support that overall objective of the health care system, but rather develop drugs that are very profitable. By having the NIH take over drug development, social goals in public health can begin to come to the forefront. Indirect Cost Benefits The indirect cost reductions would be enormous. Pharmaceuticals are a force that corrupts everything it touches. In addition to developing the wrong drugs, and re-patenting old drugs that are not improvements, they have a big place at the health care policy table that they do not deserve. They sit there for one reason, the corrupting influence of their money. Because this plan would essentially break the pharmaceutical monopoly, relegating them to nothing more than generic drug manufacturers, it would actually change how health care is practiced in the US. The indirect cost savings fall into the following categories: The major pharmaceutical companies would wither away as lobbyists in Washington and would lose their ability to corrupt medical schools and motivate the profession to look for pharmaceutical solutions to every problem. Over prescriptions, which is currently a huge problem would be greatly reduced because pharmaceuticals would tend to be prescribed only if they actually benefited the patient. The medical industry could begin to refocus on health and prevention. Many people currently employed in non-value added activities (pharmaceutical marketing and influence peddling activities) could be redirected to beneficial pursuits. Many clinical trials that are currently run need not be run. This would greatly reduce the load of pharmaceuticals on trial subjects, which they are, in the majority of cases, being misled into thinking that they are doing something beneficial for themselves and for society. (the very fact that clinical trial recipients are taking placebos when the exact drug was tested years ago is a loss for the system in terms of health efficiency.) The indirect benefits are difficult if not impossible to quantify. However, indirect benefits being ½ of the direct benefits could be easily justified. This would bring the benefits to $280 billion x 1.5 or $480 billion, or ½ trillion. Health care costs are growing in an unsustainable fashion, this could be critical change which in addition to reducing costs would more likely than not lead to better health for the country’s population.

#### Pharma doesn’t pursue the right drugs and other sources of revenue solve R&D

Balasegaram 14 -- Executive Director of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Access Campaign. Previously he was Head of the Leishmaniasis Clinical Program for Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi)

(Maica, “Drugs for the Poor, Drugs for the Rich: Why the Current R&D Model Doesn’t Deliver,” February 14th 2014, <http://blogs.plos.org/speakingofmedicine/2014/02/14/drugs-poor-drugs-rich-current-rd-model-doesnt-deliver/)>

In a similar vein, last month British/Swedish pharma company AstraZeneca announced it was pulling out of all early-stage R&D for malaria, tuberculosis (TB) and neglected tropical diseases – all diseases of the developing world. Instead, the company stated they will focus efforts on drugs for cancer, diabetes and high blood pressure, all diseases that affect rich countries, with potentially plenty of people to pay the high prices on new drugs. This system of R&D – which increasingly relies on patents, market monopolies and high prices of drugs to recoup costs – is broken. We are seeing a complete lack of R&D into areas of real need, especially in diseases that affect the poor. The effects of this system on patients in developing countries is something that I – as someone who has worked as a doctor in some of the most remote areas in the world with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) – [have witnessed](http://www.msfaccess.org/our-work/driving-medical-innovation/article/1973) for years. The pharmaceutical industry touts the need for strong intellectual property (IP) protections and patents as a means to secure funding for R&D needs. They say that without 20-year-plus patent terms and the ability to have patents granted on even minor modifications on existing drugs – known as ‘evergreening’ – we simply wouldn’t have innovation. And yet, incredibly, the industry is pulling out and stopping innovation in the areas of the greatest need. This trend is not new. Pfizer stopped R&D into all anti-infective drugs in 2012; in the same year, barely a third of the estimated funding needed for TB drug development was met. The need for new TB drugs and new regimens to treat TB – especially drug-resistant forms of TB – is increasing worldwide, including in some parts of Europe and countries such as South Africa and India. The lack of R&D for new drugs doesn’t only affect developing countries; wealthy countries are also faced with a huge gap in medical innovation. With the numbers of cases of antibiotic resistance on the rise in many parts of the world – including in western hospitals – there are, worryingly, few new antibiotics being developed. We are fast approaching the point, if we’re not there already, where people will develop infections that are resistant to all existing antibiotics, and we’ll have nothing effective with which to treat them. The problem is simply this: pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer, AstraZeneca and Bayer lack the incentives to develop drugs like antibiotics that are only taken for a short period of time, or against diseases that primarily affect the poor. With an obligation to shareholders, pharma companies develop those drugs that will most enable them to achieve high sales in targeted lucrative markets. Typically, these drugs are for diseases that affect mostly people in wealthy countries who can afford – for the most part – to pay the high prices that come with a R&D system which relies on patent monopolies to recoup costs. Increasingly, we’re seeing not only the unavailability of drugs for medical needs, but also unaffordability when drugs are priced out of the reach of most people. The drugs that are developed today are priced so highly that even people in the USA, UK and the EU – the very markets that Big Pharma are targeting – are unable to afford price tags such as US$84,000 for the new hepatitis C drug sofosbuvir, or cancer drugs priced at over $100,000. We have to ask ourselves – if the drugs being developed are priced so highly that no-one can afford them, is society actually benefiting? The pharmaceutical industry’s response to criticism over high prices is that it costs a lot to develop these drugs. While this is undoubtedly true, there are two important points of clarification: first, a lot of the R&D behind successful new drugs is heavily subsidised by the tax payer – globally, about half of all R&D is paid for from the public purse and by philanthropic organisations. In effect, we’re paying twice for new drugs. Secondly, there is a lack of transparency from the pharmaceutical industry- so we don’t really know how much it costs, and how much this can vary. The industry often throws around the figure of $1 billion as the cost. Yet this figure is often questioned, even by one of their own; last year, GSK’s Sir Andrew Witty called the $1 billion figure “a myth”. Other organisations have proved that it’s possible to develop new drugs for significantly less than $1 billion, and have no patents or high prices attached. For example, a non-profit public-private partnership used up-front funding [to develop](http://www.dndi.org/images/stories/pdf_scientific_pub/2013/ASMQ_partnerships.pdf) an artemisinin-based combination therapy for malaria, which has no patent, is priced at less than US$1 and has seen over 250 million treatments used in 31 African countries. Private-public partnership Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative has [estimated that development of a new chemical entity can cost as little as $50 million](http://www.dndi.org/media-centre/press-releases/1711-dndi-rd-model.html) per successfully developed drug; with attrition and failure rates taken into account, it’s still as little as $200 million. Pharma has a vision for R&D – tough intellectual property rights and patents on new medicines, and high prices. But clearly, this approach doesn’t entirely work to deliver public health benefits. Our vision for R&D involves an overhaul of the current system. New drugs should be developed according to actual medical needs in a system that does not exclusively rely on patents and high prices to recoup costs. There are other ways to pay for R&D and [alternative business models](http://www.msfaccess.org/our-work/driving-medical-innovation/article/1354) that can be used. It is essential these are further developed to ensure that innovators are sufficiently and transparently rewarded for developing useful products. It is possible to develop drugs for neglected diseases and diseases that affect the developing world. It is possible to develop new antibiotics and drugs where we aren’t forced to pay more than $100,000 for each patient treated. The system is broken; it’s time we fixed it – for the benefit of everyone, including the pharmaceutical industry.

## Innovation

### 1NR---Link

#### Yes they link---1ac first scenario is about overtaking China which we said is bad.

Atkinson 19 [KU BLUE] (Robert David Atkinson is a Canadian-American economist. He is president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a public policy think tank based in Washington, D.C., that promotes policies based on innovation economics. He was previously Vice President of the Progressive Policy Institute, Caleb Foote is a research assistant at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation NOT the actor from The Kids are Alright, unfortunately :/ April 2019, “Is China Catching Up to the United States in Innovation?” Page 6, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation <https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/innovation/files/2019-china-catching-up-innovation.pdf>) MULCH

The second factor relates to national security and the defense industrial base—a critical issue for the United States as U.S. defense superiority is based is in largely part on technological superiority. American service men and women go into any conflict with the advantage of fielding technologically superior weapons systems. But sustaining that advantage depends on the U.S. economy maintaining global technological superiority, not just in defense-specific technologies, but in a wide array of dual-use technologies. To the extent the United States continues to lose technological capabilities to China, U.S. technological advantage in defense over China will diminish, if not evaporate, as U.S. capabilities whither and Chinese ones strengthen. It is certainly a highly risky proposition to assume the United States can continue its weapons systems superiority over the Chinese if: 1) the Chinese continue to advance, largely through unfair, predatory practices, at their current pace; and 2) the United States loses a moderate to significant share of its advanced technology innovation and production capabilities. As ITIF wrote in 2014, “The United States defense system is still the most innovative in the world, but that leadership is not assured and is in danger of failing. This decline is not only impacting defense innovation and capabilities, but also overall commercial innovation and U.S. competitiveness.

#### AI edge is key to China’s domestic legitimacy.

Ding 18 (Jeffrey, Centre for the Governance of AI, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream,” March 2018, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Deciphering_Chinas_AI-Dream.pdf>, DOA: 1-5-2021) //Snowball

The implications of China’s AI strategy in the economic realm are numerous. Research from PwC in 2017 estimated that China had the most to gain from AI technologies, forecasting a potential 26% boost in GDP to benefits from AI.162 A report from McKinsey Global Institute supports this view, estimating that 51% of work activities in China can be automated - more than any other country in the world.163 Faced with unfavorable demographic trends, China could improve its productivity levels by integrating AI systems.164 This would enable China to sustain its economic growth and meet GDP targets. The stakes for global economic preeminence are stark. A report by PwC projects that the AI sector could contribute up to USD 15.7 trillion to the world economy by 2030.165 Economic benefit is the primary, immediate driving force behind China’s development of AI, so evaluating the economic impact of China’s AI strategy will be a key test of the strategy’s feasibility and success. Early signs support cautious optimism about China’s AI sector. Metrics from the section on China’s commercial AI ecosystem revealed that new AI companies and investment in the years 2014-2016 surpassed the number of companies and investment in all the years prior. These figures should be tempered by the potential for speculative over-investment to cause boom-bust cycles and the need for more concrete figures directly tied to economic growth, such as revenues and assets. As earlier analysis on megaprojects demonstrated, China’s industrial policy approach to scientific innovation has been criticized for diverting resources from bottom-up, investigator-driven projects to large national projects run by mediocre laboratories, on the basis of personal connections.

#### US tech leadership decline is accelerating a peaceful transition to Chinese dominance

Frederick Kempe, 20 - is a best-selling author, prize-winning journalist and president & CEO of the Atlantic Council, one of the United States’ most influential think tanks on global affairs (“Op-ed: How the US can win the post-coronavirus race for global dominance” CNBC, 4/21, <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/18/op-ed-how-us-can-win-the-post-coronavirus-race-for-global-dominance.html> //DH

The post-COVID19 race could determine whether the U.S. rebounds in a manner that allows it to retain the mantle of global leadership. More likely for the moment, Beijing could leverage its first-mover advantage – alongside a faster economic recovery across Asian markets – accelerating the trend toward a Chinese-centric globalization. Elsewhere, as President Macron argued this week to the Financial Times, the coming months could determine whether the European Union collapses as a political and economic project. The days ahead also could trigger a dangerous widening of the economic gap between emerging markets and the developed world – with escalating conflict and surging migration. It may seem premature to reflect on which of the globe’s economies is likely to have the most robust and lasting economic comeback – and with what geopolitical impact. After all, this was a week in which the International Monetary Fund projected a 3% contraction in global GDP for 2020, the most dramatic drop since the Great Depression. Yet it is the details behind that dismal forecast that should raise concerns within the U.S. and Europe. Their steeper economic decline and slower recovery could lay the seeds for a long-lasting shift of global tectonic plates to China’s advantage. The IMF projected a U.S. economic decline of about 6% in 2020 and a contraction of the eurozone of 7.5%. That compares to projected Chinese economic growth for 2020 of 1.2% after a first quarter real decline of 6.7% – far less than the 10%-plus dip many experts had expected. The only group of countries in the world projected to be in positive territory are East Asian, at roughly 1%. Even if one accepts that Chinese coronavirus fatalities likely are greater than their public figures and that the growth decline is likely larger, that doesn’t change the potential for a scenario that Deloitte and Salesforce this week referred to as “Sunrise in the East.” Describing this scenario, as one of four possibilities they list, they write, “The global center of power shifts decisively east as China and other East Asian nations take the reigns as primary powers on the world stage and lead global coordination of the health system and other multilateral institutions.”

### 1NR---AT: China Bad

#### [AT: Abramowitz]

#### China safely regulates AI

Jeffrey **Ding 18**, (As the China lead for the Governance of AI Program, Jeff researches China’s development of AI at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford), 3-14-2018, "Deciphering China's AI Dream", Future of Humanity Institute, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/deciphering-chinas-ai-dream/

However, there are promising signs of substantive engagement with issues of AI ethics and safety in China. A book published in November 2017, titled Artificial Intelligence: A National Strategic Initiative for Artificial Intelligence includes an important chapter that discusses the Asilomar AI Principles in detail and call for “strong regulations” and “controlling spells” for AI.148 A wide range of Chinese AI researchers are also involved with translating the IEEE’s Ethically Aligned Design report, as part of the Global Initiative for Ethical Considerations in Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems. There are a variety of perspectives on AI safety and ethics in the Chinese AI community. Doubling as a launch event for the aforementioned book, the CAICT hosted a seminar in November 2017 on the unique challenges AI poses for law and governance.149 Attendees included representatives from the Supreme People’s Court, Weixing Shen, dean of Tsinghua University law school, and Si Xiao, Tencent’s Chief Research Officer. From the readout of the conference, it appears that participants offered robust and, often differing, views on how to govern AI development. For instance, Dean Shen stated that AI development was an immutable social trend that should be embraced rather than excessively worried over, whereas Guobin Li, president of the Beijing Research Institute for Communication Law, argued that scholars should proactively address the legal and policy issues that could arise from AI.150 The growing efforts of Chinese scholars to tackle difficult questions of AI governance means that assessing the relative influence of these different opinions on China’s AI development will be an important endeavor. Finally, AI may be the first technology domain in which China successfully becomes the international standardsetter. In another chapter, the book’s co-authors, Tencent researchers and CAICT academics, linked Chinese leadership on AI ethics and safety as a way for China to seize the strategic high ground. They wrote, “China should also actively construct the guidelines of AI ethics, play a leading role in promoting inclusive and beneficial development of AI. In addition, we should actively explore ways to go from being a follower to being a leader in areas such as AI legislation and regulation, education and personnel training, and responding to issues with AI [emphasis mine].”151 One important indicator of China’s ambitions in shaping AI standards is the case of the International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) Joint Technical Committee ( JTC), one of the largest and most prolific technical committees in the international standardization, which recently formed a special committee on AI. The chair of this new committee is Wael Diab, a senior director at Huawei, and the committee’s first meeting will be held in April 2018 in Beijing, China - both the chair position and first meeting were hotly contested affairs that ultimately went China’s way.152

#### You should be skeptical the only 1ac defense of US artificial intelligence is a former secretary of defense

Work 19 Robert Orton Work is an American national security professional who served as the 32nd United States Deputy Secretary of Defense for both the Obama and Trump administrations from 2014 to 2017. “The American AI Century: A Blueprint for Action.” DECEMBER 17, 2019. Foreword. <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-american-ai-century-a-blueprint-for-action> {DK}

We find ourselves in the midst of a technological tsunami that is inexorably reshaping all aspects of our lives. Whether it be in agriculture, finance, commerce, health care, or diplomatic and military activities, rapid technological advancements in fields like advanced computing, quantum science, AI, synthetic biology, 5G, miniaturization, and additive manufacturing are changing the old ways of doing business. And AI—the technologies that simulate intelligent behavior in machines—will perhaps have the most wide-ranging impact of them all. This judgment is shared by many countries. China, Russia, members of the European Union, Japan, and South Korea all are increasing AI research, development, and training. China in particular sees advances in AI as a key means to surpass the United States in both economic and military power. China has stated its intent to be the world leader in AI by 2030 and is making major investments to achieve that goal. The United States needs to respond to this technological challenge in the same way it responded to prior technology competitions, such as the space race. U.S. leadership in AI is critical not only because technology is a key enabler of political, economic, and military power, but also because the United States can shape how AI is used around the world. As this report explains, while AI can be used for incredible good by societies, it already is being abused by authoritarian states to surveil and repress their populations. And advances in AI technology are enabling future malign uses, such as launching sophisticated influence attacks against democratic nations. The United States must make sure it leads in AI technologies and shapes global norms for usage in ways that are consistent with democratic values and respect for human rights.

#### Military AI impact is alarmism---PLA is de-coupled and applications are defensive.

Ding 18 (Jeffrey, Centre for the Governance of AI, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream,” March 2018, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Deciphering_Chinas_AI-Dream.pdf>, DOA: 1-5-2021) //Snowball

Media reports of an AI arms race between the U.S. and China have proliferated in 2017,153 and leading thinkers have identified AI as a technology that could provide a decisive strategic advantage in the international security realm.154 In contrast, much of the Chinese academic literature discussing military possibilities for AI technology has been largely abstract and speculative, and a majority of it references or focuses on the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s activities.155 Chinese military institutions, such as the NUDT, have increased their research efforts on intelligent robotics.156 In the short-term, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will likely continue to adopt a range of unmanned vehicles into all four services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force).157 Combined with breakthroughs in UAV swarming and intelligentized missiles, these developments could challenge the U.S. military presence in the Pacific theater. In the long-term, China’s AI development could revolutionize its conduct of military affairs. Although material evidence for Chinese militarization of AI is limited, some rhetorical evidence does show that China sees AI as a revolutionary military technology. In a statement on the central government’s work report by Lieutenant General Liu Guozhi, director of the Central Military Commission’s Science and Technology Commission, he states, in reference to military applications of AI, that the world is “on the eve of a new scientific and technological revolution,” and “whoever doesn’t disrupt will be disrupted!”158 Combined with AI’s dual-use nature, China’s high degree of civil-military fusion has raised concerns about the military applications of AI. Li Deyi, as a quintessential example, is both the director of the Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence and a major general in the PLA.159 To emphasize, many of these projections are largely speculative as the most sensitive military AI applications are not publicly disclosed. There is not a coherent consensus of ideas on AI in warfare within the PLA. Moreover, the influence of the PLA is not overwhelming, as other bureaucratic entities often have diverging views and the central party apparatus possesses final decision-making powers. The degree to which China’s militarization will constitute a revolution in military affairs is an important question. Drawing from Chinese-language, open-source articles by military scholars, a recent report by Elsa Kania, at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), argues that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views AI as a “trump card” technology that could revolutionize the conduct of future warfare.160 As the CNAS report acknowledges, the thinking of the PLA and the central government on the direction of military AI is not solidified. Evidence from the PLA’s investment in UAV swarming and intelligentized missiles shows that the most immediate applications of military AI could align with more limited, defensive goals, including asymmetric countering of U.S. military superiority in the Western Pacific and protecting China’s nuclear deterrent.161

### 1NR---UQ

#### A transition is inevitable – the sole factor that will determine hegemonic war is whether the US chooses to relinquish power

**Layne, 18** – Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, and, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (“The US–Chinese power shift

and the end of the Pax Americana” International Affairs 94: 1 (2018) 89–111; doi: 10.1093/ia/iix249 **LRBIO = Liberal Rules Based International Order**

When the balance of power swings—or is perceived to swing—in its direction, a rising power becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the international order, and seeks to revise it. The challenger wants to change the rules embodied in the existing international order—rules written, of course, by the once dominant but now declining Great Power that created it. It also wants the allocation of prestige and status changed to reflect its newly acquired power. The incumbent hegemon, of course, wants to preserve the existing international order as is—an order that it midwifed to advance, and consolidate, its own interests. The E. H. Carr Moment presents the incumbent hegemon with a choice. It can dig in its heels and try to preserve the prevailing order—and its privileged position therein; or it can accede to the rising challenger’s demands for revision. If it chooses the former course of action, it runs the risk of war with the dissatisfied challenger. If it chooses the latter, it must come to terms with the reality of its decline, and the end of its hegemonic position. The E. H. Carr Moment is where the geopolitical rubber meets the road: the status quo power(s) must choose between accommodating or opposing the revisionist demands of the rising power(s). Liberal internationalists such as John Ikenberry argue that China will not challenge the current international order, even as the distribution of power continues to shift in its favour. This is a doubtful proposition. The geopolitical question—the E. H. Carr Moment—of our time is whether the declining hegemon in east Asia, the United States, will try to preserve a status quo that is becoming increasingly out of sync with the shifting distribution of power, or whether it can reconcile itself to a rising China’s revisionist demands that the international order in east Asia be realigned to reflect the emerging power realities. Unless the United States can adjust gracefully to this tectonic geopolitical shift, the chances of a Sino-American war are high—as they always are during power transitions.92 However, whether change comes peacefully or violently, the Pax Americana’s days are numbered.

#### Otherwise, status competition goes nuclear — letting China peacefully surpass the U.S. is the only way to avoid war.

Heath 18, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND (Timothy, February 2nd, “The Competition for Status Could Increase the Risk of a Military Clash in Asia,” *RAND*, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/the-competition-for-status-could-increase-the-risk.html>, Accessed 09-05-2021)

However, while the salience of conflict for the sake of gaining territory may be declining, the importance of status as a potential driver of conflict may be increasing. Status is an ambiguous and elusive concept, but at its core, status consists of a country's ranking in a hierarchy within a peer group. Status can be measured indirectly through estimations of a country's influence and prestige, as well as its reputation. Status matters a great deal because it can confer considerable benefits, as studies on the topic have shown. Jonathon Renshon, an expert on the role of status in international relations, has described how high-status countries enjoy a greater degree of deference from other countries and can thus secure a far larger share of available resources at a far lower cost than their lower-status peers. Status can only be achieved through competition, however. Because rankings are inherently zero-sum, one country's rise in status invariably requires the diminishment of its competitors.

The immense benefits that can accompany high status and the competition required to secure it help explain why status concerns have historically underpinned many inter-state conflicts. Historically, many a country has gone to great lengths and sometimes incurred crippling costs to salvage a faltering status or increase its standing. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, for example, Great Britain pursued an unnecessary and pointless military attack to stave off a challenge from Egypt to its waning status in the Middle East. The ensuing debacle confirmed Britain's decline as a great power. During the 1960s, U.S. anxiety over its status vis-á-vis its primary rival, the Soviet Union, led Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to escalate the country's commitment to a war in Vietnam of dubious prospects, a situation the Soviet Union mirrored in its own disaster in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Conversely, the value of an increase in status can be seen in the aftermath of Japan's stunning defeat of Russia in 1904 and 1905. The outcome shocked Western opinion and earned Japan the status of peer with the world's leading imperial powers. Tokyo subsequently expanded its control of Asia. Similarly, America's victory in the Spanish-American War confirmed Spain's eclipse as a great power in Latin and South America. The United States cemented its status as the leading nation in the Americas and saw its influence expand accordingly.

As these examples suggest, competition for status tends to recede when consensus exists among peer states about relative rankings, as happened briefly in the largely peaceful and stable post-Cold War “unipolar” moment of U.S. global preeminence. However, competition for status also tends to increase in periods of uncertainty. Today, persistent economic stagnation in the developed world and the rise of developing countries have unsettled existing hierarchies and raised afresh anxiety over the standing of many great powers.

Fears of diminished standing can be seen in the immense commentary bemoaning the decline in U.S. and European influence and in the debate over the possibilities of a post-Western age. Such apprehensions have also featured prominently in U.S. policy documents. In its recently released National Security Strategy (PDF), U.S. authorities warned that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests.” These concerns are particularly acute in Asia, which has seen an intensifying strategic competition for status and influence between China and its principal rivals—the United States, Japan, and India.

For China, status is increasingly vital to realizing its revitalization as a great power. To sustain growth, China seeks to deepen Asia's integration through the Belt and Road Initiative and shape the terms of regional trade. China also seeks to construct a regional security architecture defined by Chinese-led organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building. With adequate status, China could gain the deference and cooperation from regional powers needed to control potential flashpoints, improve its security, and secure preferential access to resources and markets at a fraction of the cost in resources than would be required if it had to fight and negotiate its way through every issue. Recognizing the importance of the issue, the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress report outlined as a long-term goal the ambition to “become a global leader” in “international influence.” Similarly, Chinese leaders have stepped up efforts to strengthen the country's leadership position in the region.

For China, status is increasingly vital to realizing its revitalization as a great power.

China for now has relied on peaceful, albeit intrusive, measures to increase its influence and bolster its standing, such sustained military modernization, massive economic diplomacy initiatives, United Front tactics and the manipulation of diplomatic carrots and sticks. Some observers have seen evidence of China's increasing influence in the Philippines' and South Korea's growing sensitivity to Chinese concerns. But the effectiveness of incremental, peaceful methods is difficult to prove because their effects are harder to perceive. Some commentators, for example, regard Chinese gains in influence as limited. Moreover, peaceful, incremental efforts are also vulnerable to counter-measures. Already, a growing array of countries have begun to raise concern about Chinese economic coercion and influence operations.

The United States and its allies and partners rightfully seek to protect their interests by bolstering their respective positions, even as they continue to cooperate with China. The strategy may succeed, but at its core is the assumption that stability can best be gained if China continues to acquiesce to the international order as established after World War II by the United States and its allies. China's conviction that its security depends on changes to this order sets up a deep, structural contradiction that is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Beijing can accordingly be expected to persist in peaceful methods to supplant the United States as Asia's leader. If, however, Beijing at some point concludes that the United States and its allies have successfully stymied its aspirations, China may be tempted by riskier methods to assert its status. A precedent for such behavior may be seen in a rising Germany of the 1890s-1900s. Convinced that it had been denied a status befitting its national power by Britain and France, Germany provoked a series of militarized crises around the world. In 1906, Germany threatened war against France after the two feuded about influence over Morocco. And in a second Moroccan crisis five years later, Germany extracted colonial concessions after it deployed a gunboat in response to a French military intervention. In China's case, brinksmanship behavior could be carried out in the contested East or South China Seas with military ships and aircraft. Already, a growing literature by Chinese military writers recommends the skillful exploitation of military crises for strategic gain.

Brinksmanship carries its own risks, of course. Miscalculation could lead to unwanted war. The strategic effects could be severe as well. Rivals like the United States, Japan, and India could be alarmed enough by a clash that they step up military preparations, aggravating China's security situation. Moreover, conflict could imperil China's grand Belt and Road Initiative ambition, if aggrieved neighbors opt out and welcome investments by Japan and India instead. China has many good reasons to never consider military provocations against a neighbor. But Beijing also has compelling reasons to increase the country's standing and diminish that of the United States and its allies. Given that the ruling Chinese Communist Party has staked its reputation towards that end, China's leaders should be expected to consider all available options to achieve it.

### 1NR---AT: Disease

#### 1ac evidence does not make an impact claim

Diamandis 21 [KU BLUE] (Eleftherios P. Diamandis, Division Head of Clinical Biochemistry at Mount Sinai Hospital and Biochemist-in-Chief at the University Health Network and is Professor & Head, Clinical Biochemistry, Department of Laboratory Medicine and Pathobiology, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada, April 14th 2021, “The Mother of All Battles: Viruses vs. Humans. Can Humans Avoid Extinction in 50-100 Years?” modified to fix author typo [“could result n” 🡪 “could result in” <https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202104.0397/v1>) MULCH

The recent SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which is causing COVID 19 disease, has taught us unexpected lessons about the dangers of human extinction through highly contagious and lethal diseases. As the COVID 19 pandemic is now being controlled by various isolation measures, therapeutics and vaccines, it became clear that our current lifestyle and societal functions may not be sustainable in the long term. We now have to start thinking and planning on how to face the next dangerous pandemic, not just overcoming the one that is upon us now. Is there any evidence that even worse pandemics could strike us in the near future and threaten the existence of the human race? The answer **is** unequivocally yes. It is not necessary to get infected by viruses of bats, pangolins and other exotic animals that live in remote forests in order to be in danger. Creditable scientific evidence indicates that the human gut microbiota harbor billions of viruses which are capable of affecting the function of vital human organs such as the immune system, lung, brain, liver, kidney, heart etc. It is possible that the development of pathogenic variants in the gut can lead to contagious viruses which can cause pandemics, leading to destruction of vital organs, causing death or various debilitating diseases such as blindness, respiratory, liver, heart and kidney failures. These diseases could result [in] the complete shutdown of our civilization and probably the extinction of human race. In this essay, I will first provide a few independent pieces of scientific facts and then combine this information to come up with some (but certainly not all) hypothetical scenarios that could cause human race misery, even extinction. I hope that these scary scenarios will trigger preventative measures that could reverse or delay the projected adverse outcomes.

#### No extinction from pandemics.

Barratt 17, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute. (Owen Cotton-Barratt et al, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance”, pg. 9, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>)

1.1.3 Engineered pandemics For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

# 2NR

### AT: Twining

#### US leadership fails to prevent conflict

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

#### Twinng is wrong, unipolarity is irreparably destroyed---try or die

Cooley & Nexon 20, \*Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, \*\*Associate Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (\*Alexander, \*\*Daniel H., 6/9/20, “How Hegemony Ends”, *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends)

CONSERVING THE U.S. SYSTEM Great-power contestation, the end of the West’s monopoly on patronage, and the emergence of movements that oppose the liberal international system have all altered the global order over which Washington has presided since the end of the Cold War. In many respects, the COVID-19 pandemic seems to be further accelerating the erosion of U.S. hegemony. China has increased its influence in the World Health Organization and other global institutions in the wake of the Trump administration’s attempts to defund and scapegoat the public health body. Beijing and Moscow are portraying themselves as providers of emergency goods and medical supplies, including to European countries such as Italy, Serbia, and Spain, and even to the United States. Illiberal governments worldwide are using the pandemic as cover for restricting media freedom and cracking down on political opposition and civil society. Although the United States still enjoys military supremacy, that dimension of U.S. dominance is especially ill suited to deal with this global crisis and its ripple effects. Even if the core of the U.S. hegemonic system—which consists mostly of long-standing Asian and European allies and rests on norms and institutions developed during the Cold War—remains robust, and even if, as many champions of the liberal order suggest will happen, the United States and the European Union can leverage their combined economic and military might to their advantage, the fact is that Washington will have to get used to an increasingly contested and complex international order. There is no easy fix for this. No amount of military spending can reverse the processes driving the unraveling of U.S. hegemony. Even if Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee, knocks out Trump in the presidential election later this year, or if the Republican Party repudiates Trumpism, the disintegration will continue. The key questions now concern how far the unraveling will spread. Will core allies decouple from the U.S. hegemonic system? How long, and to what extent, can the United States maintain financial and monetary dominance? The most favorable outcome will require a clear repudiation of Trumpism in the United States and a commitment to rebuild liberal democratic institutions in the core. At both the domestic and the international level, such efforts will necessitate alliances among center-right, center-left, and progressive political parties and networks. What U.S. policymakers can do is plan for the world after global hegemony. If they help preserve the core of the American system, U.S. officials can ensure that the United States leads the strongest military and economic coalition in a world of multiple centers of power, rather than finding itself on the losing side of most contests over the shape of the new international order. To this end, the United States should reinvigorate the beleaguered and understaffed State Department, rebuilding and more effectively using its diplomatic resources. Smart statecraft will allow a great power to navigate a world defined by competing interests and shifting alliances. The United States lacks both the will and the resources to consistently outbid China and other emerging powers for the allegiance of governments. It will be impossible to secure the commitment of some countries to U.S. visions of international order. Many of those governments have come to view the U.S.-led order as a threat to their autonomy, if not their survival. And some governments that still welcome a U.S.-led liberal order now contend with populist and other illiberal movements that oppose it. Even at the peak of the unipolar moment, Washington did not always get its way. Now, for the U.S. political and economic model to retain considerable appeal, the United States has to first get its own house in order. China will face its own obstacles in producing an alternative system; Beijing may irk partners and clients with its pressure tactics and its opaque and often corrupt deals. A reinvigorated U.S. foreign policy apparatus should be able to exercise significant influence on international order even in the absence of global hegemony. But to succeed, Washington must recognize that the world no longer resembles the historically anomalous period of the 1990s and the first decade of this century. The unipolar moment has passed, and it isn’t coming back.

#### U.S. primacy is ineffective and permanently tarnished.

Porter 19, Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London and a Fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. (Patrick Porter (2019) “Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition”, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1590079>)

American grand strategy since 1945 has been one of “primacy,” to secure itself by acquiring unrivalled dominance and denying key regions to hostile powers. Against hopes to the contrary, Washington’s consolidation of its primacy since the collapse of the Soviet Union has not created an international order content to submit to its will. Despite—or because of—expanded alliances in Europe and Asia, a globe-girdling military presence, wars of regime change and occupation, and the spread of capitalism on Washington’s terms, U.S. rivals have amassed greater capability and increased appetite for risk-taking. Additionally, U.S. allies are hedging—for instance through their participation in the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or their opposition to Washington’s abrogation of the JCPOA nuclear agreement and its new sanctions against Iran, all over the United States’urging.2Emerging powers, such as India, also hedge, sharing intelligence with Washington while buying S-400 missiles from Russia and muting criticism of Beijing.3And American allies in Asia are investing increasingly heavily in defense. Though this has come partly through U.S. urging, it could tip potentially into an arms race.

The United States is not willingly accepting these developments that under-mine its primacy. It neither makes major concessions nor willingly shares power. Despite President Donald Trump’s campaign rhetoric, the United States on his watch pursues a more illiberal version of dominance, enlarging its footprint in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.4Trump has drawn down a small garrison in Syria, but increased the overall U.S. presence in the Gulf, and his administration is attempting to isolate and contain Iran. Trump’s domestic opponents, too, show no signs of renouncing the pursuit of primacy abroad. Apart from opposing his trade wars, they denounce the White House for being too accommodating to adversaries and not supportive enough of allies. With escalating rivalries under way against two Eurasian heavyweights, Russia and China, and potential confrontations with two designated proliferation “rogues” in Iran, North Korea and possibly Venezuela, the United States is in danger of being locked into combat with five adversaries simultaneously.

#### No empirical correlation between heg and global stability.

Fettweis ’17 (Christopher J.; is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University; May 8th; *Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace*; <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394?journalCode=fsst20>; accessed 5/3/19; MSCOTT)

These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace.

In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a high-level US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day.

The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

Conflict and US Military Spending

How does one measure polarity? Power is traditionally considered to be some combination of military and economic strength, but despite scores of efforts, no widely accepted formula exists. Perhaps overall military spending might be thought of as a proxy for hard power capabilities; perhaps too the amount of money the United States devotes to hard power is a reflection of the strength of the unipole. When compared to conflict levels, however, there is no obvious correlation, and certainly not the kind of negative relationship between US spending and conflict that many hegemonic stability theorists would expect to see.

During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense by about 25 percent, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990.68 To those believers in the neoconservative version of hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan at the time.69 The world grew dramatically more peaceful while the United States cut its forces, however, and stayed just as peaceful while spending rebounded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the military budget was cut under President Clinton, in other words, and kept declining (though more slowly, since levels were already low) as the Bush administration ramped it back up. Overall US military spending has varied during the period of the New Peace from a low in constant dollars of less than $400 billion to a high of more than $700 billion, but war does not seem to have noticed. The same nonrelationship exists between other potential proxy measurements for hegemony and conflict: there does not seem to be much connection between warfare and fluctuations in US GDP, alliance commitments, and forward military presence. There was very little fighting in Europe when there were 300,000 US troops stationed there, for example, and that has not changed as the number of Americans dwindled by 90 percent. Overall, there does not seem to be much correlation between US actions and systemic stability. Nothing the United States actually does seems to matter to the New Peace.